VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGP #0023/01 0031043
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031043Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2143
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0066
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2376
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 1944
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5538
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6388

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO ISN/CPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC MTCRE PARM PREL KNNP SN
SUBJECT: MFA PROVIDES BLOCKED SHIPMENTS UPDATES 
 
REF: A. 06 STATE 204021 
     ¶B. 06 STATE 185541 
     ¶C. 06 STATE 184097 
     ¶D. 06 SINGAPORE 3849 
 
Classified By: E/P Counselor Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(c) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Michelle Teo-Jacob, Assistant Director of MFA's 
International Organizations Directorate, on January 3 
provided us updates on three outstanding export control and 
nonproliferation cases.  She presented us with two 
non-papers, reproduced in paragraphs 6 and 7. 
 
¶2. (S) Teo-Jacob began with the shipment of chromium-nickel 
steel plates (Ref C) that Singapore seized at USG request on 
November 8, 2006.  She reported that Singapore had 
independently confirmed that China was the source and that 
Iran was the final destination for the plates but that the 
GOS was unable to determine if they were intended for use in 
a WMD program. Therefore, the GOS had no legal basis to 
continue detaining the shipment and had decided to release 
the plates to the shipping company, provided it returned them 
to China.  Teo-Jacob said that Singapore would monitor the 
plates' return and recommended we do the same. 
 
¶3. (S) Turning to the Weining Pte Ltd case (Ref B), Teo-Jacob 
told us that GOS officials had investigated the company and 
found no evidence that it had procured Japanese-origin carbon 
fiber on behalf of a Pakistani missile program entity. 
However, the GOS investigation confirmed that Weining, an 
engineering equipment company, had exported to Pakistan, 
among other countries.  Teo-Jacob said that the GOS had used 
the industry outreach program associated with Singapore's 
announced expansion of its export control list as a pretext 
for contacting Weining and had advised the company that it 
was under surveillance and warned it not to engage in any 
proliferation activities.  She suggested that we should now 
pursue this matter with Tokyo. 
 
¶4. (S) Finally, Teo-Jacob raised the shipment of precision 
lathes (Ref D) that Singapore had detained in December in 
response to a USG request.  She said some of the equipment 
might be of concern but that the GOS needed further 
information on the lathes' tolerances from the USG (conveyed 
through separate channels) in order to determine whether the 
lathes were regulated under any multilateral nonproliferation 
regimes.  Teo-Jacob stressed that the ability to legally 
justify seizures was of utmost importance to the GOS.  E/P 
Counselor took this opportunity to deliver the points and 
non-paper provided in Ref A. 
 
¶5. (S) Teo-Jacob said that the recent increase in USG 
requests (and GOS compliance) to stop shipments as they pass 
through Singapore, while "not insurmountable", had caused 
waves in the shipping industry.  In her opinion, any actions 
that slowed the transfer of potentially dangerous goods to 
countries of concern were valuable.  Decisions like the one 
to return the steel plates to China, however, had been the 
source of much discussion amongst GOS agencies, she said. 
 
¶6. (S) Begin text of steel plates non-paper: 
 
SECRET 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NON-PAPER 
 
We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through 
the U.S. Embassy on 8 and 22 November 2006, concerning the 
possible transshipment of chromium-nickel steel plates for 
Iran,s missile programme through Singapore. 
 
The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter.  We 
have ascertained through independent sources that the steel 
plates originated from China and are bound for Iran through 
Dubai.  However, we are unable to ascertain if they are 
intended for WMD purposes and have no legal basis to continue 
to detain the steel plates.  Therefore, the relevant 
authorities have decided to release the steel plates to the 
shipping company on the undertaking that they be returned to 
China to their Chinese owners. 
 
The U.S. may wish to pursue this matter further with its 
Chinese counterparts.  On its part, Singapore authorities 
will also continue to monitor the shipment of the steel 
plates from Singapore to its destination of China. 
3 January 2007 
 
End text of non-paper. 
 
¶7.  (S) Begin text of carbon fiber non-paper: 
 
SECRET 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NON-PAPER 
 
We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through 
the U.S. Embassy on 17 November 2006 concerning the Singapore 
company, Weining Pte Ltd, which may be working to procure 
Japanese-origin carbon fibre on behalf of a Pakistani missile 
development organization, possibly the National Development 
Complex (NDC). 
 
The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter. 
The company,s core business is in the trading of engineering 
equipment for oil, gas and water treatment, although it does 
on occasion also trade in other goods when requested by 
regular customers.  The bulk of the company,s business is 
local but it also exports to Pakistan, Malaysia and a few 
other countries in the region.  Our officials have advised 
Weining Pte Ltd not to engage in any illicit activities that 
supports (sic) the development of WMD programmes by countries 
of proliferation concern which would include Pakistan. 
 
The U.S. should now follow up by further pursuing this matter 
with its Japanese counterparts as the carbon fibres are 
likely of Japanese origin.  Singapore authorities will 
continue to monitor the company,s activities.  We will not 
hesitate to take appropriate action, should the company be 
found to have committed any offence under our laws. 
 
3 January 2007 
 
End text of second non-paper. 
HERBOLD