VZCZCXRO7768
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0015/01 0031020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031020Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3724
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6490
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1607
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3426
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINS KISL ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI GOVERNMENT ASCRIBES BOMBINGS TO POLITICAL 
OPPONENTS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 3 (WINAI ON BOMBINGS) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 2 (BOMBINGS) 
     ¶C. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (CASE AGAINST THAKSIN) 
     ¶D. 06 BANGKOK 6689 (TAK BAI CHARGES DROPPED) 
     ¶E. 06 BANGKOK 5747 (HAT YAI BOMBINGS) 
     ¶F. 06 BANGKOK 5610 (ANALYZING BOMBS) 
     ¶G. 06 BANGKOK 5349 (YALA BANKS BOMBED) 
     ¶H. 06 BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB) 
     ¶I. 06 BANGKOK 1845 (BOMB AT DEMOCRAT HQ) 
     ¶J. 06 BANGKOK 1521 (UPDATE: BOMB AT PREM'S HOUSE) 
     ¶K. 06 BANGKOK 684 (NO ATTACKS OUTSIDE SOUTH) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Thailand's Prime Minister said publicly on January 1 
that political opponents linked to deposed Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra likely carried out the New Year's Eve 
bombings in Bangkok.  Other credible theories exist, however, 
and the physical evidence does not yet implicate a particular 
group.  The bombs appear similar to those built by southern 
militants, who have a history of conducting multiple, 
simultaneous bomb attacks, although they have not previously 
shown a desire or capability to operate outside of the 
southern region.  Some people will suspect that the security 
forces themselves staged the bombings as a provocation to 
justify remaining in power.  Whoever the culprit, we are not 
optimistic the perpetrators will be caught, and the Prime 
Minister's ascribing the bombings to political opponents 
could impede the investigation.  Barring arrests, the 
perpetrators may retain the capability and motive to conduct 
further attacks.  While foreigners were injured in the 
December 31 bombings, none of the bombing sites appear to 
have been selected in order to target foreign interests.  End 
Summary. 
 
SURAYUD POINTS A FINGER AT THAKSIN'S CAMP 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the evening of December 31, six bombs exploded at 
various sites in Bangkok between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.; two more 
exploded seconds after midnight.  Three Thais died from blast 
injuries, and up to 55 other people were injured, including 
nine foreigners (no Americans).  In a January 1 public 
statement, Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont said: "From 
the evidence we have gathered, there is a slim chance that 
(the string of bombings) is related to the southern 
insurgency.  It is likely related to people who lost their 
political benefits."  The latter reference clearly pointed 
toward deposed Prime Minister Thaksin and his associates. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Council for National Security (CNS) Chairman Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin publicly echoed Surayud's remarks later the 
same day, saying the government had detected "some links to 
the masterminds but never expected they would do something 
like this."  Sonthi said the CNS had summoned for questioning 
four former aides of Thaksin: close Thaksin advisor Prommin 
Lertsuridej; former Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai 
Vanasatidya (retired Police General); former National 
Intelligence Agency Director (and retired Police General) 
Chumphol Manmai; and Police Lieutenant General Chalor 
Chuwong.  According to media reports, however, none of the 
four appeared for questioning; Prommin reportedly excused 
himself, claiming the timing of the summons was inconvenient. 
 
¶4. (C) In the days prior to the bombings, Thaksin and his 
allies had stepped up their political attacks on the Surayud 
administration.  While interim Thai Rak Thai party leader 
Chaturon Chaiseng criticized the continued imposition of 
restrictions on political freedoms, an associate of former 
Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (who has moved closer to 
Thai Rak Thai) fed reporters allegations that Surayud had 
undeclared assets.  While this claim appeared to lack 
substance, it raised tangential questions about how Surayud 
had acquired a plot of land on which he maintains a 
residence.  Meanwhile, a figure heading an anti-coup group 
made headlines by complaining that General Sonthi had 
committed bigamy. 
 
¶5. (C) These political maneuvers came in the context of the 
RTG intensifying its efforts to find grounds for prosecuting 
Thaksin, targeting members his immediate family as well as 
 
BANGKOK 00000015  002 OF 004 
 
 
the former Prime Minister himself (ref C).  We had detected 
indications that Thaksin hoped to reach an accommodation with 
the CNS and RTG leaders, but the authorities appear 
uninterested in negotiations, as the legitimacy of their coup 
d'etat depends in part on establishing extensive wrongdoing 
by Thaksin. 
 
THAKSIN'S FOES WERE TARGETED BEFORE... 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Many observers will find it plausible that Thaksin or 
his supporters may have orchestrated bombings in order to 
discredit those who overthrew him.  During the last two years 
of Thaksin's administration, there were numerous incidents in 
which bombs were placed at Bangkok sites associated with 
Thaksin's opponents, including: 
 
- On March 27, 2006, an unexploded bomb was discovered next 
to the Democrat Party headquarters (ref I); 
 
- On March 9, 2006, a small bomb exploded at a guardpost 
outside the house of Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda (ref 
J); on the same day, a bomb exploded at the Royal Vajiravut 
College, targeting anti-Thaksin academic Chai-anan 
Samutthawanit; 
 
- On February 22, 2006, a small bomb exploded at the Santi 
Asoke Buddhist Sect, associated with leading Thaksin opponent 
Chamlong Srimuang; 
 
- On December 8, 2005, a small bomb exploded at a phone booth 
outside of Lumpini Park, which had become a site for recent 
anti-Thaksin rallies; and 
 
- On November 3, 2005, a small bomb exploded on property of 
the Manager Media Group, owned by leading Thaksin critic 
Sondhi Limthongkul. 
 
¶7. (C) Additionally, security officials reported the 
discovery of explosive material in a car parked close to 
Thaksin's residence on August 24, 2006 (ref H).  At the time, 
many people suspected Thaksin's loyalists engineered the 
incident in order to generate sympathy for Thaksin, or to 
justify imposing a state of emergency.  The truth behind this 
incident remains unclear. 
 
... BUT THAKSIN'S DENIAL NOT IMPLAUSIBLE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) While it is not difficult to imagine pro-Thaksin 
operatives carrying out the earlier bombings, the devices 
used were significantly less powerful than the December 31 
bombs, and the Thaksin-era detonations clearly targeted the 
Prime Minster's opponents.  Thaksin has publicly denied 
having a role in the New Year's Eve bombings, and this denial 
seems plausible, given the differences in the modus operandi; 
the extensive scrutiny the government was already applying to 
Thaksin and his loyalists; indications from open sources that 
Thaksin wanted to return to Thailand; and the fact that 
political allegations against the CNS (see above) had 
successfully garnered prominent coverage and put the CNS and 
RTG on the defensive, seemingly obviating the need at this 
stage for Thaksin to order desperate measures. 
 
SOUTHERN MILITANTS NOT RULED OUT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In a January 1 discussion with the Ambassador (ref A), 
CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul acknowledged a 
possibility that southern militants had carried out the 
attacks, noting the bombs used on New Year's Eve were similar 
to those constructed by the militants in the past.  To date, 
however, southern militants have not attacked targets outside 
of the South.  (Ref K noted several reasons, including 
organizational, linguistic, and ethnic factors, why militant 
activities generally have been restricted to the southern 
border provinces.)  Nevertheless, in recent months -- albeit 
prior to the September 19 coup -- the militants have 
conducted coordinated bombings that would have an economic 
impact: 
 
- In a September 16 attack (ref E), six bombs exploded in 
stores and streets in Hat Yai, a Buddhist-majority city which 
serves as a commercial center in southern Thailand and draws 
 
BANGKOK 00000015  003 OF 004 
 
 
foreign tourists from Malaysia.  Several people died, and at 
least 60 were injured.  (Hat Yai has been the target of 
significant separatist attacks before.) 
 
- In an August 31 daylight attack, at least 23 bombs exploded 
at banking facilities in the southern province of Yala (ref 
G), marking a significant expansion of attacks against 
commercial targets. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Prime Minister Surayud has made a concerted effort 
to promote reconciliation with disaffected Muslims in 
Thailand's southern provinces.  In early November, visiting 
the South, he offered a public apology for the deaths of 
scores of people during and after demonstrations at Tak Bai 
in 2004.  (This apology, welcomed by Thai Muslims, was 
controversial; some Thais deemed it too strong of an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the security forces.) 
Shortly afterwards, the Office of the Attorney General 
dropped all charges against 81 protesters involved in 
demonstrations at Tak Bai (ref D), and Surayud ordered 
government agencies to destroy any existing "blacklists" of 
suspected troublemakers in the South. 
 
¶11. (C) Despite these gestures, militant activity in the 
South has continued at a steady pace, indicating that some 
separatists are disinclined to accept the olive branch which 
Surayud extended.  Some of our contacts assess that the 
continued violence in the South since the coup is, in part, 
an effort by separatists to undermine Suryayud's attempt at 
reconciliation.  A widespread perception that southern 
separatists carried out the Bangkok bombings would entail a 
significant loss of face for Surayud and could result in 
public demand for more aggressive security tactics in the 
South. 
 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES: JUSTIFYING MILITARY RULE... 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (C) We cannot at this stage rule out another theory, that 
persons associated with the current regime carried out the 
bombings to create a pretext for extending military rule. 
Small pieces of circumstantial evidence could bolster this 
idea.  Critics might point out that the authorities have been 
slow to ease political restrictions.  The administration has 
not yet forwarded for royal endorsement the decree to lift 
martial law in much of the country.  In late December, the 
authorities considered but rejected a proposal to annul 
restrictions on political party activities, claiming the 
situation was not yet sufficiently stable -- despite the CNS 
having just secured over 550 million Baht (over 15 million 
USD) to form a new "Special Operations Centre," over 
13,000-strong, accountable directly to the CNS. 
 
... OR A MANIFESTATION OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶13. (C) The hypothetical involvement of members of the 
security forces in the bombings might not necessarily have 
been at the behest of the CNS.  We note that, since the coup, 
the new regime has generated ideas about how to reorganize 
(read: marginalize) the national police force.  When a member 
of a Surayd-endorsed working group floated a decentralization 
proposal in mid-November, media reports quoted National 
Police spokesman Lieutenant General Achirawit Suphanphesat as 
saying "Please don't treat the police organization with 
contempt.  Give us some respect.  The day we are transferred 
to local organizations, the country will go up in flames." 
 
¶14. (C) It is possible to imagine that figures in the police 
might have been complicit in the December 31 attacks.  We 
have heard scattered reports consistent with this theory; for 
example, some of the police booths which were bombed should 
have been manned around the clock but were empty when 
attacked.  We also have heard some closed circuit television 
cameras near targeted areas became dysfunctional shortly 
before the bombings. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Prior to the bombings, many of our contacts predicted 
political instability in the coming months.  Assessing the 
interim administration as likely to prove relatively 
ineffective, they believed students, NGOs, and other groups 
 
BANGKOK 00000015  004 OF 004 
 
 
would hold large demonstrations to advance their agendas, 
particularly to influence the shape of the next constitution. 
 None of our contacts foresaw a bombing campaign, however. 
 
¶16. (C) We do not rule out the possibility that the December 
31 attacks might prove to be a one-off event.  Without 
knowing the culprits and their motives, we cannot assess 
whether they would deem further attacks to be in their 
interests.  However, the perpetrators remain on the loose, 
and, in the absence of significant changes to the political 
environment, they may well retain the same motive that 
prompted the first wave of bombings. 
 
¶17. (C) The areas targeted on December 31 do not represent 
foreign interests.  The target selection, the nature of the 
bombs, and the bombers' seeming intention not to maximize 
casualties, lead us to doubt strongly the involvement of the 
Jemaah Islamiyah international terrorist network.  We note, 
however, that if the bombers wanted to damage the Thai 
economy, tourist areas, or other high-profile sites where 
foreigners gather, could become targets. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) The physical evidence from the bombings is under 
examination.  Many of the specialists with the metropolitan 
police, which has jurisdiction in this matter, have received 
USG training, and we are optimistic they can conduct a 
capable forensic analysis.  We worry, however, that the 
authorities jumped to a conclusion and announced their views 
prematurely.  Their credibility now depends on showing the 
involvement of Thaksin or his associates, who, whether 
involved or not, will surely try to spin recent events to 
advance their own interests.  The stakes are high, and the 
investigation could be politicized down to the working level. 
 Given that many previous bombings, attempted bombings, and 
alleged attempted bombings remain unsolved, we are not 
optimistic that the perpetrators -- or the mastermind -- will 
be uncovered. 
BOYCE