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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0015/01 0031017
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031017Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8901
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: LOCAL POLITICIANS "REJECT IDEA" OF A 
NATIONAL MODERATE FRONT 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4651 
 
Classified By: Stephanie Miley, PRT Team Leader, for reasons 1.5 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY.  At a December 26 political 
roundtable, keyed-in Salah ad Din (SaD) 
politicians (all Sunni Arabs) "rejected the 
idea" that a national moderate front - 
potentially comprising SCIRI, Dawa, KDP, PUK, 
and IIP - could effectively work together and 
govern the country.  Saying they had heard 
nothing through official party channels and had 
learned of the potential moderate political 
party grouping through the media, the group of 
Provincial Council members and local 
politicians termed the idea "another Coalition 
Forces-inspired attempt to fix a broken 
process."  They asserted that the grouping of 
parties could not work together because their 
specific interests were too different and that 
if a moderate front did emerge, it would not 
last long because "the parties have not been 
communicating their true interests to one 
another."  They also expressed the veiw that a 
moderate front could be very damaging to the 
political process by pushing Iraq into a 
"Lebanese-style, sectarian-based democracy." 
Conceding that Iraq's political parties were 
too weak to handle the current sectarian 
environment, they suggested a strong, secular 
leader (like former PM Ayad Allawi) backed by a 
nonpartisan "salvation" government was the way 
forward for Iraq's democracy.  If a moderate 
front does emerge, it is clear that it will 
have little backing among local politicians in 
Salad ad Din without serious lobbying by the 
respective parties' national leaders at the 
provincial level.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
At the Roundtable 
----------------- 
¶3. (C) On December 26 at a PRT-initiated 
political roundtable, Provincial Council (PC) 
members Jassim Shaki Abdullah and Dhamin Ulaiwi 
Mutlag, Political Action Committee Secretary 
Dr. Nuri Mohammad Dhahir, SaD IIP 
representative Hashem Jihad, and local 
politician Johar Hamad Haham (all Sunni Arabs) 
met to discuss the possibility of a national 
moderate front, potentially comprising SCIRI, 
Dawa, KDP, PUK, and IIP.  All, including those 
affiliated with parties that may join the 
moderate front, said they had heard nothing 
official from their respective parties about 
the potential political grouping and had 
learned of the possibility through the media. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Rejecting the Idea of a Moderate Political 
Front 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The roundtable participants "rejected 
the idea" that the grouping of political 
parties could work together and govern the 
country, terming it "another Coalition Forces- 
inspired attempt to fix a broken process." 
They said the current disarray in the national 
political scene was a result of the Bremer 
Administration's "poor planning" which has led 
to "poor achievements." 
 
¶5. (C) In the view of the keyed-in politicians, 
the moderate front could not function with the 
potential composition of political parties 
because the party's interests were too 
different.  If the parties were able to form an 
alliance, they surmised, it would be short- 
lived and resulting from a lack of the parties 
"communicating their true interests to one 
another."  They questioned "who the leaders on 
the ground" would be. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Moderate Front Seen as a Step toward a 
"Lebanese-Style Democracy" 
 
BAGHDAD 00000015  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (C) They also asserted that formation of 
such a moderate front, based on sectarian 
parties, could be damaging to the political 
process.  They assessed that it would push Iraq 
into a Lebanese-style, sectarian-based 
democracy that would not be able to function as 
a national government.  They conceded that 
Iraq's national political parties are weak and 
suggested that was a potential source of the 
nation's current sectarian dilemma. 
 
¶7. (C) They said that if the U.S. was serious 
about fixing Iraq's "broken political process" 
it would support a strong, secular leader, 
"like Ayad Allawi who is Shia but secular," and 
would repeal all of the Bremer Administration 
legislation.  They recommended that a 
"salvation" government, with no political 
affiliations be elected to the nation's 
leadership.  As Iraq's democracy strengthened, 
possibly after two years, they suggested, 
political parties could be introduced. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Frustrated by Lack of Clear U.S. Policy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) They also expressed frustration with 
what they perceive as the U.S.'s lack of a 
clear policy on Iraq.  They recognized that the 
Bush Administration was undergoing a policy 
review and would set forth its agenda on Iraq 
in early 2007.  They welcomed re-convening a 
similar political roundtable at that time to 
discuss the new policy. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The individuals at the roundtable were 
among Salah ad Din's most active politicians 
and keyed-in individuals.  Their views are 
generally representative of those in the 
province involved in the political process, and 
their forthright rejection of a potential 
moderate front was strong.  If a national 
moderate front does emerge, it is clear that it 
will have little backing among local 
politicians in Salah ad Din without serious 
lobbying by the respective parties' national 
leaders at the provincial level.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, 
Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit. 
SCOBEY