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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UNSC ECON EAID SOCI KIRF KPAO ER
SUBJECT: TIME TO SPEAK UP: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ERITREA 
 
 
ASMARA 00000036  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
REFTEL: ASMARA 28 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction:  The serious abuses of human rights fo 
which the Government of Eritrea is responsible and its continued 
rejection of even the most fundamental democratic principles in 
governance remain serious problems and a major impediment to improvemen 
of bilateral ties. (reftel)  Over the past year, we have scaled back ou 
engagement with the GSE on many levels, particularly in terms of the 
military-military partnership, but we had hoped that there was still 
room for engagement on issues of mutual concern such as Sudan and the 
unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia.  The GSE, however, appears to 
have made a strategic decision to reject engagement with the USG and to 
seek closer ties with a range of states, including Iran and Venezuela, 
who do not share our world view.  In so doing, the GSE has also become 
force for greater regional instability, with their direct support for 
the CIC in Somalia, and the channeling by Eritrea of weapons and men, 
standing as an example. 
 
¶2. (C) We believe that in order to support both our policies and our 
principles, we must accept that quiet efforts to engage Eritrea on huma 
rights have been ignored by the GSE.  Thus, our efforts must become mor 
public and assertive.  We believe that with more vocal efforts we will 
expose Eritrea to more intense international scrutiny.  Moreover, as th 
true nature of this regime is revealed, we will: lessen its credibility 
reduce the flows of critical funding from the diaspora; and ultimately 
decrease Eritrea's ability to insert itself in unhelpful ways in issues 
beyond its own borders.  We have no illusions that the GSE will be 
quickly responsive - except perhaps negatively.  Nonetheless, we hope 
that USG leadership will elicit or compel support from at least our EU 
partners to speak out as well.  Post suggests a multi-faceted approach 
involving the use of radio and internet media, increased people-to- 
people interaction with the Eritrean people through means of the 
Ambassador's self help grants and coordinated outreach to the Eritrean 
diaspora, members of Congress, and our international partners.  And 
while post will once again aggressively seek to engage the GSE in 
discussion on human rights issues, a strong and visible Washington role 
will be necessary to frame our message and concerns and to build the 
base of support we need outside the Department.  End Summary and 
Introduction. 
 
PUTTING THE GSE ON NOTICE 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In our engagement with GSE representatives, post routinely raise 
our concerns on human rights abuses and the lack of civil liberties. 
GSE officials, however, largely disregard our concerns and cavalierly 
dismiss criticisms of their human rights performance.  In fact, as note 
reftel, the government seems to take an almost perverse delight in its 
role of human rights "bad boy" and relishes its "in-your-face" defiance 
of international concerns.  Our requests for dialogue and engagement on 
these issues are ignored and, as a general rule, GSE officials refuse t 
meet with Embassy officers to answer even the most basic of questions 
regarding Eritrea's laws and policies.  Our EU colleagues have faced 
similar stonewalling as well.  We have persistently requested meetings 
with officials in the Office of Religious Affairs and with the Director 
of National Security.  With the former we have had our requests 
routinely refused for over a year and with the latter we were told 
recently to "stop calling."  (Note:  We continue our efforts 
nonetheless.)  Most recently, in response to the designation of Eritrea 
as a country of particular concern for severe restrictions on religious 
freedoms, one GSE official told the Ambassador that for Eritreans "bein 
detained in a shipping container is a luxury." 
 
¶4. (C) Despite the GSE's callous indifference to our concerns, post 
plans to embark on a more aggressive USG human rights campaign in 
Eritrea.  Our strategy calls for the Ambassador to press even more 
strongly for a series of formal calls on officials in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Office of Religious Affairs, the Office of Nationa 
Security, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Local Government and 
the Office of the President to seek greater engagement with the GSE on 
issues of human rights and the restrictions of civil liberties.  In 
these calls the Ambassador will, on the one hand, encourage greater 
bilateral interaction to clarify any possible confusion over GSE laws, 
 
ASMARA 00000036  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
proclamations and practices and, on the other, let the GSE know that th 
USG will not hesitate to publicly voice our concerns on these issues an 
hold the GSE accountable for its actions in appropriate fora. 
 
USING OUR WEBSITE, AMERICAN CORNERS, THE OPPOSITION AND PUBLIC FORA 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) With no free media, no civil society and nearly no opportunities 
for public discussions, countering GSE propaganda within Eritrea is 
difficult.  To date, the internet is the only source of external media 
the GSE has not restricted.  As part of our strategy, Post will use 
internet-based resources aggressively while also seeking to expand our 
public outreach - although doing so on human rights-specific issues wil 
be challenging in the face of GSE restrictions and hostility.  We 
propose as initial steps to prepare short and easy-to-read fact sheets 
detailing both U.S. policy and our concerns on GSE human rights abuses 
that we can post on our website, print out for distribution and provide 
as backgrounders to media, opposition websites, and interested NGOs.  W 
will use our monthly speakers program with the American Club to focus o 
subjects concerning civil society and civil liberties.  We will continu 
efforts to reach out to schools in addressing younger audiences on 
similar topics through the use of films and discussion.  We also wish t 
explore the possibility of podcasts, discussion boards, list-serves and 
other live on-line means of conversations with Embassy/State Department 
staff that could reach Eritreans with internet access within Eritrea an 
those within the diaspora.  We would also seek to increase VOA's 
Tigrinya broadcasting and explore VOA-Arabic broadcasting that focuses 
on Eritrea as well. (Note: Given the political issues associated with 
translation within Eritrea - and the arrest of two FSNs allegedly for 
translating opposition documents in 2001 - Post would need assistance 
from Washington to procure Tigrinya and Arabic translations. End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) In addition, the exiled Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean 
Democratic Party under the leadership of Mesfin Hagos, is eager to 
establish radio broadcasting to Eritrea.  With the normalization of 
relations with Sudan, some of the Eritrean opposition located in 
Khartoum has come under increased scrutiny, and the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) recently closed down a previous GOS-sanctioned Eritrean oppositio 
radio broadcast.  Supporting efforts of the Eritrean opposition to 
provide alternative news sources could also prove valuable. 
 
REACHING OUT TO A NEEDY COMMUNITY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) With the closure of the USAID office by order of the GSE, post 
lost a significant tool for promoting democratic values and civil 
society, and the means to provide basic humanitarian assistance to 
communities.  The average Eritrean, particularly those outside of 
Asmara, remains isolated.  Most are unable to access alternative 
information other than the anti-U.S. and anti-Western propaganda 
presented by GSE-controlled media outlets and in local meetings with GS 
and PFDJ officials.   Given the GSE restrictions on travel and the 
inability of Embassy staff to meet with, let alone work with, most arms 
of the GSE bureaucracy, our strategy includes intensified outreach 
efforts and direct support to communities at the grass-roots level. We 
have widened our net this fall to seek out more and varied community- 
based projects for FY2007 funding under the Ambassador's Self Help (SSH 
and Democracy and Human Rights (DHR II) initiatives (Note: Cable fundin 
requests will be sent septel. End note.)  The implementation of these 
projects will expand the visibility of the U.S. Embassy and tangibly 
demonstrate the USG's commitment to assisting the Eritrean people. 
 
REACHING OUT TO STAKEHOLDERS: CONGRESS, DIASPORA, AND FOREIGN MISSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The remittances sent and the taxes paid by the diaspora are a 
critically needed revenue source for the GSE and we believe that the 
diaspora must be educated and exposed to the realities of the Isaias 
regime and its blatant disregard for both the welfare of Eritrean 
citizens and for the most basic of international norms on democracy and 
human rights.  Doing so will, we believe, also lead to diminished 
remittance flows and may encourage members of the diaspora to speak out 
- and these are voices to which the GSE might listen.  While 
conversations have begun on mechanisms to restrict the transmission of 
diaspora remittances, we recognize that there would be many ways of 
 
ASMARA 00000036  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
circumventing restrictions (e.g. third-country transfers, informal 
mechanisms, etc).  Thus we believe it is critical to offer the diaspora 
an alternative perspective to GSE propaganda and undercut their 
motivation to support the GSE.  Also critical to this effort will be th 
continued restriction on the movement of GSE-sponsored fund-raisers in 
the U.S. 
 
¶9. (C) The engagement with the diaspora will, of necessity, be driven a 
much by Washington as by post.  We welcome other suggestions from 
Washington for increased engagement that will bring greater focus on 
Eritrea's human rights abuses.  Encouraged by the working group recentl 
convened by AF/E, we would propose a similar approach with DRL, the 
Office of Religious Freedom, PD and H to discuss other strategies that 
would increase the focus on the GSE's human rights violations and 
rejection of democratic values and norms.  In particular, we would look 
for ways to work with legislators concerned both about human rights and 
stability in the Horn of Africa. 
 
¶10. (C) Efforts in Washington and New York to work with our 
international partners as well will be important, using various vehicle 
including our engagement with the EU troika.  We understand from our 
German colleagues in Asmara that the EU, under the German presidency, 
may seek to develop a more comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of 
Africa.  We know that EU member-states with missions in Eritrea are 
deeply concerned about the human rights situation and will likely 
emphasize that the need for an increased focus on these issues be 
factored into any comprehensive strategy.  As it is, the EU missions 
here, which have sought dialogue with the GSE on human rights under the 
framework of the Cotonu agreement, have met with little cooperation fro 
the Eritreans. After two years of efforts to dialogue, they are 
questioning whether stronger measures are required. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The above suggestions are not exhaustive, but hopefully, 
illustrative, of some of the options available to us.  We believe 
strongly, however, that the USG must be seen as willing to speak out, 
especially given Eritrea's deteriorating social, economic, and politica 
environment.  The Isaias regime, if anything, continues to move in the 
wrong direction on human rights and civil liberties and is unlikely to 
self-correct.  We must speak out with a clarity and purpose that offers 
Eritreans, both within Eritrea and the diaspora, an alternative vision 
and the realization that their plight is not being ignored. 
 
¶12. (C) Comment con't.  We believe a coordinated strategy involving the 
Embassy in Asmara, Washington and other bilateral and multilateral 
missions, will have impact - but could possibly result in negative 
repercussions directed against the Embassy and our staff.  The already 
difficult operational problems we face in terms of travel and visa 
restrictions and violations of the Vienna Convention could be 
exacerbated and the possibility that some U.S. staff members could be 
expelled is real.  We nonetheless believe that this is the right course 
- but suggest that this is all the more reason we need to have 
Washington's continued engagement and commitment, to provide a degree o 
cover to an already exposed Embassy staff, if we are to proceed as 
robustly as we envision.  We look forward to working with the Departmen 
in discussing and coordinating various options and next steps.  End 
Comment. 
 
McIntyre