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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FWD FOR CAOC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016 
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF QA
SUBJECT: RFG: QATAR CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION STATUS OF NATO 
PERSONNEL AT AL UDEID 
 
REF: A. A. OLSON/RATNEY EMAIL 12/18 
 
     ¶B. B. COCKRELL/MULTIPLE ADDRESS 12/18 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) This is a request for guidance; see para 5. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Qatari government has informed NATO 
that fourteen ISAF personnel at the CAOC at al Udeid airbase 
are in illegal immigration status, working ISAF issues in the 
absence of a NATO-Qatar SOFA.  Qatar has asked NATO to 
declare formally the presence of these personnel in Qatar, so 
that the GOQ may grant them an as-yet undefined interim 
status, and begin formal negotiations on a SOFA.  Prospects 
for a satisfactory NATO-Qatar SOFA are dim at present, based 
on several months of inconclusive legal expert exchanges. 
Qatar has stated these personnel are not/not presently 
covered by respective bilateral SOFAs, either.  SYG de Hoop 
Scheffer intends to satisfy the Qatari request via a letter. 
We request guidance on whether we can concur with this way 
ahead.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (C) NATO IS officials informed the NATO Political 
Committee on 12/18 that the Alliance had received a letter 
from the Qatari government (ref A) on 12/6 identifying 14 
NATO military personnel (US/UK/CA/NL) which the GoQ 
considered to be working at the al-Udeid air base combined 
air operations center (CAOC) under an "illegal" immigration 
status.  The Qataris state that the fourteen are performing 
NATO Afghanistan mission-related tasks yet hold immigration 
status linked to tourist visas or bilateral arrangements 
which the GoQ considered inconsistent with their actual CAOC 
tasks.  They asked that NATO immediately confirm in writing 
to the GoQ whether the fourteen identified in the letter were 
performing NATO tasks and, if so, that NATO begin an 
immediate negotiation process to determine a legal SOFA 
status for the NATO personnel.  They specifically told NATO 
authorities that while they would consider the reported 
fourteen personnel to be covered by an unspecified "interim 
status" once reported by NATO, they s 
pecifically would not be covered by their respective 
bilateral SOFA arrangements -- and are not currently covered 
by respective bilateral SOFA arrangements.  Their cover 
letter says that "it is imperative at this stage that the 
Embassy (of Qatar in Belgium) receives as soon as possible a 
request whereby NATO provides clarification about the NATO 
procedures, in addition to an application to rectify their 
status, in order that this situation will not lead to any 
further implications." 
 
¶4. (C) NATO IS officials further explained that, since 
receiving the letter on 12/6, senior NATO officials, 
including the Deputy Secretary General Minuto Rizzo on the 
margins of a regional NATO seminar in Kuwait on 12/12-13 and 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John Craddock in an 
otherwise previously scheduled 12/18 visit to Qatar, have 
engaged the GoQ.  They have encountered a strong resolve by 
the GoQ to have a NATO SOFA negotiated with 
Qatar immediately, as well as work on a further elaboration 
of NATO ties to Qatar, such as defense and security training 
and military education.  NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer wants to send a reply to Qatar no 
later than 12/20 confirming the status of the fourteen 
personnel identified by the Qatari letter and addressing the 
request from the GoQ on NATO's stance about their "urgent 
request" for a NATO-Qatar SOFA negotiation (comment: which 
we, and NATO legal officials, based on several months of 
inconclusive initial legal expert exchanges and the stated 
Qatari position, estimate is unlikely to produce a privileges 
and immunity set at the level we receive in U.S.-Qatari legal 
arrangements.  End Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (C) RFG: SYG de Hoop Scheffer is seeking Allied opinions 
on this course of action.  We seek U.S. stance on whether we 
would support NATO sending this letter, thus putting the 14 
into a formal undefined "interim" status -- more than the 
"illegal" status they currently hold, according to the 
 
USNATO 00000731  002 OF 002 
 
 
December 6 Qatari note to NATO in Brussels -- and starting a 
negotiation with Qatar on a NATO SOFA.  This could mean that 
if NATO is unable to negotiate a SOFA that provides equal 
protections to personnel as does the U.S. bilateral SOFA, 
future U.S. personnel perform missions for ISAF at the CAOC 
in a NATO SOFA status would be less protected than those 
performing Coalition tasks, who would be covered by bilateral 
SOFA arrangements. End request. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ref B forwarded a copy of the letter to NATO and U.S. 
military authorities, as well as Embassy Doha, to seek to 
verify the status and identity of the reported American 
military members in the Qatari letter.  SHAPE contacts stated 
that a portion of the CAOC at al-Udeid is dedicated to NATO 
ISAF support, but we have not yet been able to confirm 
whether the NATO personnel identified by Qatar, are in fact 
working there currently.  (Comment: we spoke with the head of 
the ISAF staff at the CAOC, who stated that the list attached 
to the December 6 Qatari letter is now OBE, as some staff 
have already rotated out.  Nevertheless, the underlying 
issues remain valid, and some staff may still be in an 
unclear immigration status, as outlined above.  End comment.) 
 
 
OPTIONS LOOKING AHEAD 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) We believe that the most direct solution, absent a 
NATO-GOQ SOFA at present, would be for the GOQ to permit 
foreign military personnel to work both NATO and Coalition 
issues within the CAOC, under the protection of respective 
bilateral agreements.  While Qatar has firmly stated it will 
not agree to this, it may be worth readdressing the issue 
from both an Alliance and bilateral perspective, given 
significant U.S. equities in the success of ISAF.  We do not 
know whether Qatar would seek to expel the fourteen possible 
NATO personnel whom they have identified, but such a risk 
exists.  In any event, if these NATO military personnel 
perceive that they are covered by bilateral SOFA status now, 
Qatar expressly considers them not to be protected by those 
arrangements.  We do not exclude that there is at least a 
risk that short-term ISAF-related air operations could be 
degraded and disrupted if Qatar forces these personnel to 
leave, or prohibits replacements from entering the country. 
If NATO can reach a NATO 
-wide applicable SOFA arrangement with Qatar, we may well 
face a situation wherein U.S. personnel assigned to the 
NATO-related portion of CAOC duties are asked to serve under 
protections less generous than our current bilateral SOFA. 
NULAND