VZCZCXRO2522
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCL #1330/01 3561032
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221032Z DEC 06
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7536
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2844
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0720
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0230
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3678
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 2207
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7796
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1967

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CASABLANCA 001330 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL MO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY RICKMAN MEETS WITH JEWISH COMMUNITY LEADERS IN 
CASABLANCA 
 
 
Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas C. Greene for Reasons 1.4 
(b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During a recent visit to Casablanca, the 
Department's Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, Gregg 
Rickman, met with leading members of Morocco's Jewish community to 
discuss various topics of concern.  Candid conversations highlighted 
the community's anxiety over possible political gains by the 
Islamists in the 2007 elections.  In addition, community leaders 
voiced their disapproval of perceived U.S. support for the Justice 
and Charity Organization (JCO) and the Party of Justice and 
Development (PJD).  Our interlocutors were highly critical of both 
the U.S.' "invitation" to JCO's Nadia Yasine and the IRI poll, 
carried out earlier this year, predicting a potentially strong 
showing for the PJD in the elections.  When the conversation turned 
to Jewish-Muslim relations, Rickman proposed using Morocco as an 
interfaith model for the greater Middle East.  Community leaders 
expressed their discomfort with the initiative, which might raise 
their profile, and indicated we should leave well enough alone and 
not "rock the boat." End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
The Islamists are Coming 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  During a recent visit to Morocco's financial and business 
capital, Gregg Rickman, Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat 
Anti-Semitism, made the most out of his limited time by meeting with 
the leading members of the country's Jewish community to discuss 
their concerns.  During the five-hour stop Rickman visited the city's 
Jewish Museum, met with the country's Chief Rabi, and dined with 
three community leaders.  Chief among the community's concerns was 
the anxiety felt by many leaders of the community regarding the 
potential gains of the Islamists and the upcoming elections. 
According to Simon Levy, curator of the only Jewish museum in the 
Arab world, "We (Jews) have real enemies in Morocco" relating his 
concern over a perceived threat from the Islamists. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Serge Berdugo, leader of Morocco's Jewish 
community and the King's Ambassador-at-large, the PJD's moderate 
pitch is merely a facade.  He dismissed the efforts made by the group 
to reach out to his community after the May 13 bombings, which struck 
four Jewish targets, as a hollow publicity stunt.  He insinuated that 
the PJD has connections to other less "reasonable" Islamist 
organizations and speculated that the party may have a hidden agenda. 
 Berdugo cautioned that if the PJD gain power there will be problems 
for the Jews and others as well, indicating moderate Muslims might 
face difficulties.  According to Berdugo "An unstable Morocco would 
be the worst in the whole Middle East. You will be surprised." 
 
¶4.  (C) The representatives of the community, lead by Berdugo, went 
on to criticize the U.S.' "invitation" to Nadia Yasine, daughter of 
JCO leader Sheikh Abdesalam Yasine, to visit the U.S.  We pointed out 
that Yasine's invitation came from private universities and 
organizations and was not sponsored by the USG.  The leaders retorted 
that simply issuing a visa and allowing her to visit the U.S. gave 
the appearance of support by the USG and lent credibility to her 
extremist organization, legitimizing their efforts and "erasing what 
they are." 
 
¶5.  (C) As we have heard from other Moroccan contacts, the community 
representatives were also unhappy with IRI's polling results and 
accused the U.S. of supporting the PJD by "predicting" a majority of 
Moroccans would vote for the party in the 2007 elections.  Berdugo 
dismissed our efforts to clarify the often-misunderstood results 
commenting that what matters is people's perception of the poll, not 
the details or the process. 
 
¶6.  (C) Corruption and the absolute power of the king were also 
topics addressed throughout the visit.  Berdugo and Levy saw the 
recent crackdown on corruption within political parties as a possible 
threat to the country's immediate stability.  According to the 
community leaders, the crackdown only serves to call attention to the 
fact that the Islamist Party is the only "honest" party giving more 
power to the Islamists and threatening Morocco's democracy movement. 
Berdugo opined that, "Absolute power of the King is the only way to 
democracy and enforced democracy is the only way for Morocco." 
 
¶7.  (C) Berdugo is clearly hedging his bets in the face of the rising 
popularity of the PJD.  Having expressed strong criticism earlier 
about PJD motives and goals, he expressed confidence that, as long as 
the King is in control, even an Islamist victory would not upset the 
system.  "I talk to them everyday" Berdugo said, explaining that he 
believes that the PJD understand that they need to operate within 
 
CASABLANCA 00001330  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
certain parameter set by the palace. 
 
---------------- 
Morocco as Model 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Turning to Morocco's reputation for religious tolerance, 
Rickman proposed holding Morocco up as a model for the Arab world. 
With its history of acceptance of the Jewish community, Rickman 
stated, Morocco's arrangement could serve as a framework for other 
countries.  While all agreed that the system works in Morocco, the 
community leaders expressed anxiety at the prospect of using the 
country as a model.  It was evident that while the Jewish community 
is comfortable with their situation they are equally uncomfortable 
with the idea of disturbing the status quo.  Clearly, this community 
realizes it is shrinking due to natural attrition, and acknowledges 
many of its youth are leaving to seek educational and economic 
opportunities abroad.   There is natural concern that close scrutiny 
and increased exposure might reveal or create a problem, which could 
accelerate that process. 
 
¶9.  (C) In addressing the possibility of USG assistance for projects 
within the community, the leaders politely rejected the idea of 
outside efforts to help with the community's campaign to include the 
Moroccan-Jewish history in Moroccan textbooks.  Additionally, they 
flatly refused even to consider a suggestion about building monuments 
memorializing wartime camps in Morocco, arguably in order to maintain 
their less than prominent profile. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment: The Moroccan Jewish community was very eager to 
meet with the Special Envoy while he was in Casablanca.  Moreover, 
they were decidedly candid in their comments about the community's 
situation in the country and their feelings towards the Islamists, 
perceived U.S. policy, and related issues.  They clearly see the 
protection of the King as necessary to their current and future 
security and stability.  Too much democracy, too quickly, makes them 
uncomfortable.  The group's concerns regarding the growing popularity 
of Islamists throughout the country are shared by Casablanca's 
business community, intellectuals, and reformists.  End Comment 
 
Greene