VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0935 3350902
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010902Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0500
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0024
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2011 
TAGS: AF LO MARR MOPS NATO PGOV PREL
SUBJECT:  FICO SAYS NO TO TROOPS TO KANDAHAR, FOR NOW 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 921 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM Lawrence R. Silverman, for reason 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (U) Prime Minister Robert Fico announced to the media 
November 29 that, so far, neither the security nor technical 
conditions have been met to allow Slovak engineering troops 
to redeploy to southern Afghanistan.  Fico added that the 
Slovak troops were not "mountain rifle fighters who could 
participate in armed actions."  However, if conditions 
changed, especially security conditions, the government would 
reevaluate its decision before the end of March 2007.  Fico's 
announcement was largely criticized in the press and by 
opposition politicians, with headlines implying that Slovakia 
is embarrassing itself by not living up to its NATO 
responsibilities. 
 
¶2. (C) Fico made the statement while President Gasparovic 
DefMin Kasicky and FM Kubis were still flying back from Riga, 
where they had told the media simply that Slovakia likely 
would not make a decision until March.  MFA sources told DCM 
prior to Fico,s statement that Kubis had had not been able 
to bring Fico around on the issue during an 11/28 meeting in 
Bratislava.  Nonetheless, Kubis and Gasparovic were not 
expecting such an announcement by the PM.  Moreover, sources 
within both the MFA and the MOD have told us that the 
British, Dutch and Canadian  governments and militaries had 
offered a very good set of security services/assurances (in 
the words of Kubis,s chef de cabinet, "the same protection 
the Brits give to their own units"), and that the GOS was 
seeking no more security assistance/assurances.  Fico still 
opposed the move.  It is not clear from Fico,s statement 
whether he is theoretically requiring more help from other 
forces, or a change to greater security pervading in southern 
before he is willing to change his mind.  This stance, 
combined with the PM,s comment last week that Slovak troops 
should not be deployed overseas in areas they would be in 
harm,s way, obviously make us wonder whether the 
conditionality Fico spoke of today could ever be met. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador spoke to FM Kubis late 11/29 upon his 
arrival back from Riga.  Kubis had been surprised by FIco's 
announcement, but told the Ambassador that Fico had not made 
a final decision on the redeployment issue.   He and 
Gasparovic had also gotten Fico to agree to leave open other 
options, including augmenting the current force in Kabul. 
Ambassador pointed out the disingenuousness of Fico's 
"mountain rifles" statement (engineers had been requested) 
and the availability of security forces for the mission. 
Kubis responded, with frustration, that we should expect more 
misleading rhetoric from the PM in the future, even though 
the door was still very much open.  We do not yet know 
whether the PM's latest statements indicate a change in 
Slovak intentions to participate in a northern PRT, perhaps 
with the Czechs. 
 
A Precedent for other Deployments, or a "One-Off?" 
 
¶4. (C) Fico's voice is virtually a minority of one in not 
wanting to deploy the troops south, but ultimately the only 
one that counts.  We will continue to push the PM his 
coalition partners, particularly HZDS, to change his view and 
to provide more support to the Afghanistan effort.  FM Kubis 
recognizes that the PM's remarks potentially set a dangerous 
precedent, and says he will continue the fight.  The 
Ambassador will engage President Gasparovic for further help. 
 DefMin Kasicky seems to go along with whatever Fico wants. 
Of late, Fico has been preoccupied with campaigning for Smer 
candidates in the Dec. 2 local elections, and perhaps thought 
his announcement would garner votes (a far-fetched theory, 
for no Slovak voter is linking local garbage pickup and 
Afghanistan).  On the other hand, by February/March, 
elections will be long past and and the PM may view voter 
support as a non-issue.  While the public is negative on 
Iraq, it is largely apathetic on foreign affairs and 
Afghanistan has never been an issue, so Fico may really be 
basing his decisions on long-standing personal convictions 
and a vision of Slovakia as a small, inward-looking country 
that does not need to involve itself outside Europe.  The 
fact that he feels most comfortable with the Slovak National 
Party as a coalition partner speaks not just to practical 
matters of governing, but to Fico's own nationalist 
tendencies.  He has stated that Slovak policy has been too 
oriented toward the West, at the expense of good relations 
with the East (Russia).  Changing this approach will take 
more than moral and logical arguments: marshalling others to 
tell Fico that he risks needless harm to his country's 
international reputation, while trying to trigger a sense of 
statesmanship in the PM himself. 
VALLEE