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Jeffrey Rathke  12/08/2006 02:14:42 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Jeffrey Rathke

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S E C R E T        BERLIN 03452

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS AID ECON AF PK GM
SUBJECT: GETTING MORE FROM GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  Germany remains a key partner in 
Afghanistan and Chancellor Merkel is committed to succeeding, 
but we need to find new ways to increase German resolve and 
resources.  Post believes the Germans can do more in the near 
term in many of the key areas Embassy Kabul has identified in 
recent messages, such as police training, development 
assistance, and counter-narcotics.  More military support 
might be possible in the longer term, but it would require 
engagement at the highest levels to strengthen Chancellor 
Merkel's personal investment in Afghanistan, as well as a 
renewed effort to convince the German public and parliament 
that NATO and the international community have an integrated 
strategy for success that is making progress.  Germany's 2007 
EU and G-8 presidencies present an opportunity now to 
redouble our efforts.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel is the key decision-maker on 
overall Afghanistan policy (Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
appears to be the other key voice).  The pre-Riga debate over 
German military flexibility in northern Afghanistan made this 
clear, as the Chancellor repeatedly spoke out publicly to 
stress the limits of Germany's ISAF mandate, even as some 
other parts of the government (including within her 
chancellery staff) were considering ways Germany might do 
more.  A more forthcoming German position on Afghanistan will 
happen only if the Chancellor presses for it; we should 
engage accordingly and consider making use of the EU and G-8 
summits to this end.  Merkel has never visited Afghanistan as 
Chancellor, although the Afghanistan team at the chancellery 
has advocated a trip.  A visit there -- especially if it were 
not confined only to the German-commanded northern region -- 
could increase Merkel's personal investment in success, her 
appreciation of the challenges, and perhaps her government's 
readiness to do more.  We should do what we can to encourage 
a visit. 
 
"Comprehensive Approach" Key for Germans 
---------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (S/NF) Merkel and her government pride themselves on 
their "comprehensive" policy in Afghanistan, fusing 
political, military, and development efforts in a "networked 
security" approach.  Germans at times may need to be reminded 
that we also follow the concept; there is little in the 
German media about what the U.S. in doing there, other than 
militarily.  In discussing Afghanistan with the Germans, we 
should agree with their concept but identify specific areas 
where the civilian effort is falling short, and ask them what 
they can do to help, especially on reconstruction and 
development, counternarcotics, and police training. 
 
2007 Summit Opportunities 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Germany will assume January 1 the presidencies of 
the EU (for six months) and G-8 (for twelve months); this 
presents an opportunity to leverage our strong relations to 
achieve greater commitment by other partners as well.  Berlin 
is  ready to address Afghanistan in both fora, urging EU 
consideration of an expanded ESDP police training role and 
raising the possibility of inviting Presidents Karzai and 
Musharraf to attend part of the June 6-8 G-8 Summit in 
Germany. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Merkel's team is particularly interested in a 
successful U.S.-EU summit in Washington this spring; we 
should use this desire to spur greater German activism and 
leadership on Afghanistan within the EU.  The European 
Commission recently proposed an increase of 32 percent in EC 
assistance through its "Neighborhood Policy" (which does not 
include Afghanistan).  We should explore whether Germany 
could seek similar increases in EC and member-state 
assistance to Afghanistan, which we could profile in the 
U.S.-EU summit. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Some German initiatives, such as hosting a 
late-January 2007 meeting of the G-8/Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board (JCMB) at the Political Director level, 
present opportunities but also pose the risk of showing the 
appearance of action without the substance.  We should make 
clear to the Germans that we support their efforts and are 
ready to work with them in the expectation they will yield 
concrete results rather than a duplication of existing 
mechanisms. 
 
Reconstruction/Development 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel, in parrying suggestions that 
Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan, has made a 
point of emphasizing that Germany is the lead provider of 
security in an area that is home to 40 percent of the Afghan 
population.  We should use this rhetorical point to encourage 
greater German bilateral support for reconstruction and 
development.  German aid to Afghanistan (including German 
payments through the EU) between 2002 and 2006 will amount to 
about 1.5 billion euro, compared to our announced 10.3 
billion at the London Conference between FY 2001 and FY 2006. 
 We should particularly encourage greater German civilian 
assistance in the south and east. 
 
Military and Civilian Efforts 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) There is a widespread notion in Germany that ISAF 
(as well as OEF) operations in the south and east amount to 
an attempt to achieve a purely military solution.  The strong 
public perception is that Germany is doing the "right" things 
in the north and the U.S., Canada, and the UK are doing the 
"wrong" things in the south and east.  Chancellor Merkel and 
her government have done little to counteract this perception 
and at times have encouraged it.  Our task is complicated by 
the possibility (supported by reporting in more sensitive 
channels) that some senior Afghan officials have offered this 
interpretation to German counterparts as well.  The visit 
December 14 of the delegation led by SCA DAS John Gastright 
will be a valuable opportunity to help reverse these 
misperceptions.  In particular, post recommends we focus to 
the extent we can publicly on progress in the east that 
demonstrates our own concerted effort in civilian and 
military areas. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) In the short term, we expect Chancellor Merkel to 
stick to a strict interpretation of Germany's ISAF mandate, 
which allows German forces to support deployments outside the 
north and Kabul only temporarily and when absolutely 
necessary for fulfillment of the mission.  As frustrating as 
we find this position, Germany has made tiny steps in the 
direction of more flexibility:  German officials refused two 
months ago even to acknowledge their C-160 flights to 
Kandahar, fearing a negative public reaction (which never 
came).  Now Merkel openly cites this support as evidence that 
Germany is not hunkered down exclusively in the north.  We 
should continue to encourage Berlin to fill -- even if only 
temporarily -- ISAF shortfalls such as reconnaissance 
aircraft, UAVs, or MEDEVAC.  Keeping up the pressure will 
help expand the public and official readiness to discuss 
increasing flexibility more generally. 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) In the longer term, we should work to surmount 
German caveats.  The upcoming visit of to Washington of NSA 
Christoph Heusgen should leave him with a clear understanding 
of how we would like to see German policy develop.  We should 
also focus on key German parliamentarians, who have indicated 
more creativity than Merkel's government on this issue. 
Senior Foreign Affairs Committee members have suggested that 
they could support a re-evaluation of Germany's posture -- 
and possibly raising the 3,000-troop ceiling by another 500 
or 1,000 -- if it were part of an ISAF-wide re-evaluation of 
its requirements and if other Allies did their part.  The 
Bundestag could possibly address the matter in conjunction 
with an early renewal of the ISAF mandate in the spring 
(which would be several months before the current mandate 
runs out in September 2007).  An early renewal is a hotly 
debated topic within government security circles and would 
have to be approved by Merkel.  Her decision would be the 
key, but the obstacle of public opinion would remain -- this 
would be an uphill battle for the government.  Merkel has 
demonstrated that she is capable of this sort of leadership, 
however -- she orchestrated support for Germany's 
unprecedented UNIFIL deployment last summer, turning 
two-thirds public opposition into majority support over the 
course of several weeks. 
 
Police Training and Counter-Narcotics 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Germany has 40 police trainers in Afghanistan in 
its capacity as G-8 lead nation (compared to approximately 
400 U.S./contract personnel in the USG police training 
effort).  There is discussion of raising this perhaps to 50, 
but the MFA pins more hopes on the current EU fact-finding 
mission enabling a doubling of trainers -- but even that 
amount is modest.  We continue to encourage Germany to find 
creative ways to put more police officials at federal 
government disposal, especially since the need for 
international police forces and trainers is only increasing, 
including in places like Kosovo.  We should keep up this 
pressure, and make clear what we expect from Berlin in its EU 
Presidency role:  it is not clear whether the additional 
European police officials that the Germans think might be 
within reach would lead to a qualitative difference in the 
effort in Afghanistan. 
 
¶12.  (S/NF) The Germans have been cautious on 
counter-narcotics issues, fearing ill-will that could 
endanger their relatively small number of forces in places 
like Badakhshan.  They adhere to their opposition to 
eradication and the need for alternative livelihoods.  With 
indications of increased Afghan government commitment to 
implementing its counter-narcotics strategy, now is the time 
to stress with Berlin the importance of eradication this year 
in Badakhshan and the need for Germany to find ways to 
support all aspects of the CN program. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) The Germans have done a lot in Afghanistan since 
¶2002.  In our discussions with them, we should recognize 
those contributions while underscoring that there is a 
difference between doing a lot and doing enough:  it is the 
latter that we and the rest of the international community 
should strive for together.    End comment. 
 
¶14.  (U) Post provides below a timeline of some key events in 
upcoming months in which increased commitment to Afghanistan 
could be advanced: 
 
December 8:  Visit of Foreign Minister Steinmeier to the U.S. 
 
January 11-12 Meeting of U.S.-EU Political Directors (Dresden) 
 
January 29 EU-Afghanistan troika meeting (Afghan attendee: 
FM Spanta) (Berlin) 
 
January 30 Meeting of JCMB Political Directors (Berlin) 
 
January 31 G-8 Political Directors (Berlin) 
 
Mid-February  EU-Pakistan troika meeting (Berlin). 
 
 
TIMKEN JR