VZCZCXRO6971
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4576/01 3501210
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161210Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8515
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 
TAGS: ECON ETLN EWWT EAGR ETRD PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AT IRAQI PORTS OF ENTRY 
 
Classified By: Edward W. Kloth, Acting Economic Minister 
Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The GOI is plagued by what seems a never 
ending stream of problems involving imports of vitally needed 
goods from petroleum products to grain.  Smugglers, including 
terrorists and militias, seem to have little difficulty 
bringing people and weapons into the country.  The Ports of 
Entry (POE) system in Iraq is poorly managed, and corruption 
is a major impediment to the passage of goods into Iraq.  The 
problems are legion, including inadequate and ineffective 
control over cross border human and commercial traffic, and 
multiple layers of corruption by officials, militias and 
local political parties.  There is no apparent central 
government control of the system.    Solving the systemic 
problems will require considerable political authority that 
is beyond the national government's power for the foreseeable 
future.  End Summary 
 
-------------------- 
Who's in Charge 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The organization of the existing Iraqi border 
operations appear designed for failure and abuse.  No central 
national control over POEs exists.  Authority over land Ports 
of Entry (POE) resides in the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). 
 The Ministry of Transportation (MOTrans) has authority over 
the sea and air POEs.  Customs occupies space inside the 
facilities of the ministry (MOI or MOTrans) in control of the 
POE.  As far as can be determined, Baghdad headquartered 
ministries exercise no authority over customs/POE operations 
in KRG administered northern Iraq.  In most cases, but not 
all, the MOI has the authority to hire and fire the 
non-Kurdish POE director.  In some cases, but not all, the 
Baghdad headquarters of the General Commission for Customs 
(GCC) has the authority to hire and fire the non-Kurdish 
Customs POE directors.  In most cases, ministries 
headquartered in Baghdad have control over POEs in the 
central region of Iraq, but have less control of POEs than 
the local governor or mayor in Shiite areas in southern Iraq. 
 MOTrans has taken control of the sea POEs to extent that it 
hires and fires Customs and Border Police (CBPolice) officers 
inside the ports. 
 
---------------- 
Golconda of Cash 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) A POE is often the largest employer and non-oil income 
generator in a particular governorate or town.  The local 
mayor or governor therefore usually assert considerable 
influence over the staffing and practices of "their" POE. 
Many POE employees are either members or the local militia or 
tribe or both, and in the border areas the local 
militia/tribe engages in cross-border smuggling. 
Consequently having a militia/tribe member at the POE 
provides:  1) income from salaries though salaries are low, 
2) facilitation of smuggling activities, and 3) funds for the 
local militia or political parties from a share of the bribes 
extracted from other shippers or civilians. 
 
¶4. (C) Even if the POE staff wanted to do so, border 
facilities are ill-equipped to exercise effective control 
over traffic because most facilities are not compliant with 
minimal requirements (with the exception of Habur Gate and 
other areas in northern Iraq) for such duties.  Loading and 
inspection docks are non-existent and inspections are 
cursory.  X-ray scanners at commercially operable POEs are 
often deliberately "out-of-service" or lack the necessary 
electricity.  Manifest data is poor.  Weigh scales and 
inspection pits are non-existent.  No formal structure for 
broker offices exists.  There is no formal badge system or 
control of non-official people working in the POE.  Officials 
wear no uniforms.  There is poor control of vehicular traffic 
and human flow.  Facilities and sanitation (with some 
exceptions) are very poor. 
 
------------ 
Fee for All 
------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Officially a 5% customs levy is believed to be 
collected everywhere, although no data is available from 
northern Iraq.  A parking or trans-shipment fee may be 
occasionally charged.  An additional 5% fee is charged in 
POEs located in southern Iraq and is retained by the local 
governor/mayor.  Brokers negotiate with Customs officials 
what will be paid for a shipment.  Unofficially cash may be 
demanded or offered upon entering a POE, at the 3-5 paperwork 
 
BAGHDAD 00004576  002 OF 002 
 
 
"checkpoints" inside the POE, for what are in any case 
cursory inspections.  Passports are often returned only after 
money is paid.  Under the Iraqi system customs officials are 
allowed to retain 40% of confiscated "illegal" goods leading 
to further abuses in the POE system. 
 
¶6. (C) Such "unofficial" fees are inevitable because POE 
budgets do not seem to be distributed to POEs for management 
and maintenance.  At a minimum, the budgeted amounts are 
inadequate.  POE directors are forced to obtain funds to 
operate their POEs; however, it does not appear that much, if 
any, of these funds are actually used for facilities 
maintenance.  (Note: Significant USG funds have been spent 
for basic border facilities and equipment over the last two 
years, but without regular maintenance, equipment inevitably 
deteriorates and becomes inoperable. End Note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) It has been reported that individuals who have tried 
to make a difference and do their jobs have had family 
members threatened, kidnapped, or simply disappeared.  The 
former Acting Customs Director General and his driver were 
assassinated in June 2006 while driving to work.  The current 
Customs Director General's two sons were subjects of an 
attempted (though failed) kidnapping.  The pervading feeling 
in the POEs is fear. 
 
---------------- 
The Way Forward 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Comment.  Internationally recognized best practices 
(inspections, personnel control, etc. exist for each issue in 
the current POE system.  An interagency group, the Border 
Security Enhancement Working Group (BSEWG), led by the 
Department of Homeland Security, is currently addressing the 
challenges of border control in Iraq.  The BSEWG is working 
with the GOI to have a strategy defined by May 2007.  It has 
also been reported that the Prime Minister's office is 
currently exploring the possibility of creating a Port 
Authority to manage the sea and air POEs.  Although more 
training would be useful, it would be a waste of time and 
money, if the newly trained POE employees are not permitted 
to use this training on the job.  Infrastructure fixes and 
process changes are simple and well known to professionals 
inside Iraq, but corruption and incompetence throughout the 
organizations involved, combined with the GOI's limited 
authority outside the capital make it unlikely needed changes 
can or will be made any time soon.  End Comment. 
KHALILZAD