VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #2071 3391507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051507Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2462
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0410
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0382
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6382
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1525
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2010
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5870
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1448
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8502
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2796

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 002071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM WI MO AG
SUBJECT: MFA SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS CREATIVE SOLUTION 
NEEDED ON WESTERN SAHARA 
 
 
Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton for reasons 1.4 b, d. 
 
¶1. (C) In a December 4 meeting devoted to several issues, the 
Ambassador reviewed for MFA Secretary General Ramtane Lamamra 
U.S. views on the Western Sahara.  The Ambassador noted that 
Washington would look favorably on a serious Moroccan 
autonomy proposal for the disputed area, provided that it had 
Sahrawi support.  He stressed that we had made clear to the 
Moroccans the need for dialogue between the GOM and Polisario 
on any Moroccan proposal and said that the U.S. continued to 
support the Sahrawi right to self-determination.  The 
Ambassador asked Lamamra for current GOA thinking on the 
Western Sahara, in particular its views on a Sahrawi 
expression of self-determination. 
 
¶2. (C) Lamamra asserted that while Morocco had played a 
positive role on some issues in the wider region, it would be 
a mistake to reward it, as the occupying power, for its 
intransigence on the dispute in the Western Sahara. 
Resolving the Western Sahara dispute was not a war of 
attrition in Algeria's view, and it was important that 
Morocco act in accordance with international law to dispel 
doubts about its motives and build confidence in the Maghreb. 
 Lamamra underscored that Morocco and the Polisario could not 
be expected to achieve what skilled UN negotiators had not 
accomplished over many years.  Fair mediation was needed in 
addressing the genuine concerns of all parties. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador pushed Lamamra to be more specific as 
to what self-determination mechanism might be acceptable.  In 
response, Lamamra offered Andorra as an example of how 
creative diplomacy by Spain and France, two governments with 
important interests in North Africa, could create a win-win 
solution.  Lamamra said to his knowledge Andorra had two 
heads of state: the French president and a Spanish 
archbishop.  The creative diplomacy between France and Spain 
that created the Andorran solution could surely be employed, 
in conjunction with other parties, in the Western Sahara. 
Lamamra cautioned that Morocco's "swallowing" the territory 
whole would create problems in the Maghreb for years to come. 
 Creativity was needed.  Self-determination in the Algerian 
view required the endorsement of the Sahrawi people.  Lamamra 
observed that the endorsement could take two forms.  In one, 
the Sahrawis would vote on a series of choices presented to 
them in a referendum.  In the other, the Sahrawis would 
endorse by referendum an agreement between two parties. 
 
¶4. (C) Noting that any lasting solution would likely fall 
somewhere between Sahrawi independence and integration into 
Morocco, the Ambassador asked if the UNSYG's personal envoy 
might help to formulate a solution involving some form of 
autonomy.  Lamamra responded that in Algeria's view the 
personal envoy had not taken the right approach.  While 
Algeria believed that autonomy could not substitute for the 
right to self-determination, autonomy could be a component of 
self-determination.  Lamamra doubted the Polisario would 
embrace a Moroccan autonomy proposal that deprived the 
Sahrawis of their right to self-determination.  He stressed 
the need for a creative solution, citing Andorra again as an 
example of agile diplomacy.  Any such solution would have to 
be acceptable to the Sahrawis and be consistent with UN 
obligations in ensuring that the Sahrawis' rights were 
respected.  Any solution that lacked the buy-in of the 
Sahrawis would not succeed, he opined, and would likely lead 
to renewed violence. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment:  Lamamra was more forward-leaning early in 
the discussion, but became more cautious as it proceeded. 
His emphasis on the merits of an Andorra-type solution 
nonetheless suggests that a creative Moroccan autonomy 
proposal, if presented to the Sahrawis for their endorsement 
by referendum after acceptance of it by the Polisario, would 
be acceptable to Algeria.  Lamamra also implied that Algeria 
would be willing to take tangible steps toward greater 
Maghreb cooperation -- such as opening its border with 
Morocco -- if Morocco cut an acceptable deal with the 
Polisario on the Western Sahara. 
DAUGHTON