VZCZCXRO1665
OO RUEHMJ RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0943/01 3330714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290714Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4632
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0101
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0622
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0542
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0482
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EUR/RPM, AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD JESSICA POWERS 
PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 
TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV FJ NZ
SUBJECT: GNZ SAYS FIJI TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT IS TAKING NO 
CHANCES 
 
REF: WELLINGTON 938 
 
Classified By: DCM David J. Keegan. Reasons: E.O. 12958, 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Fiji Prime Minister Qarase and Commodore 
Bainimarama today met for two and a quarter hours at Government 
House in Wellington. New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFAT) characterized the meeting as a "considered and 
serious discussion" of Bainimarama's nine demands, with 
substantial progress made on each issue discussed.  The most 
difficult issue was Fiji's domestic legislation.  Qarase's 
position that due process and constitutionality be followed 
clashed with Bainimarama's demands.  While the meeting was on 
the "upper end" of GNZ expectations going into the meeting, MFAT 
remains uncertain about any real outcomes.  Deputy Secretary 
Alan Williams, who participated in the meeting, said that 
Bainimarama privately indicated he would delay any actions until 
at least mid-day on December 4 to give Qarase time to show 
"signs of earnest movement" The challenge remains for Qarase to 
find an adroit way to satisfy the military without exceeding 
what his domestic political base will tolerate. PM Qarase 
departed New Zealand at 3 p.m. on a Royal New Zealand Air Force 
plane.  Bainimarama was scheduled to depart at 6:05 on an Air 
New Zealand flight. 
 
¶2.  (C) MFAT at this stage is making no assumptions that the 
meeting will alter the Commodore's plans for a December 4 coup, 
and will be working to encourage both sides to show continued 
flexibility as PM Qarase and Commodore Bainimarama return to 
Suva.  In the meantime, MFAT is proceeding to plan for all 
contingencies, and has authorized departure for any NZ High 
Commission dependents who wish to leave Fiji.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Today, Fiji's Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase met with 
commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Frank 
Bainimarama at Government House.  The meeting resulted from the 
efforts of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and Foreign 
Minister Winston Peters to advert a coup in Fiji (reftel).  The 
talks lasted about two and a quarter hours, after which 
Bainimarama left to catch his commercial flight back to Suva via 
Auckland.  PM Qarase left for Fiji via a Royal NZ Air Force 
plane. 
 
¶4. (U) In a press release he read to the media a few hours after 
the meeting, FM Peters said that the talks had been 
"constructive" with a "positive character." He added that New 
Zealand hosted the meeting because it recognizes "that resolving 
the current situation in Fiji is fundamentally important to its 
future, and to the future of the wider Pacific." 
 
¶5. (C) MFAT Deputy Secretary Alan Williams was the fourth 
participant in the talks. He told the DCM after Qarase and 
Bainimarama had departed that the meeting saw "a really good 
substantive, detailed, and serious discussion focused on the 
nine Fijian military demands" -- once the ice was broken. He 
noted that this had been the first conversation between the two 
in nine months, a painful reminder of the depth of their 
antagonism. In the days prior to the meeting, both Foreign 
Minister Peters and Williams had engaged both leaders in an 
intensive series of preparatory discussions by telephone. New 
Zealand's first objective in the meeting was to avoid giving 
Bainimarama any pretext for walking out in the wake of his 
threat the day before to the media to make this a five-minute 
meeting.  Once the meeting shifted to a substantive discussion, 
PM Qarase showed flexibility, while insisting on due process and 
constitutionality.  Bainimarama was hard-nosed, but substantial 
progress was made on each of the issues discussed. 
 
¶6. (C) The most difficult issue was FijiQs domestic legislation, 
specifically two laws increasing the control by indigenous 
Fijians, in one case over foreshore areas (the "qoliqoli" bill), 
and in another over native land titles. Both laws confront the 
complex interplay of private and communal ownership in Fijian 
law. Bainimarama wants both bills to be struck down. Qarase has 
agreed to accelerate a constitutional review of this 
legislation, and New Zealand has promised to assist. 
 
 
WELLINGTON 00000943  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) As the meeting concluded and both leaders prepared to 
depart, MFAT arranged for Bainimarama to avoid the media as he 
boarded his plane in Wellington and then transferred to a 
Fiji-bound flight in Auckland. The objective was to give Qarase 
sufficient space to shape the public perception of the meeting 
and signal that he is prepared to reach out to the military, the 
media, and civil society in ways that will give Bainimarama 
reason to conclude that further steps toward a coup are not 
warranted. 
 
¶8. (C) Williams said that he had an extensive conversation with 
Bainimarama as the two left the meeting and proceeded to the 
airport for Bainimarama's flight. The Commodore remains heavily 
skeptical of the Fijian government, but said that he is prepared 
to test the government by waiting until mid-day on December 4 
before deciding whether to proceed with a threatened coup. He 
said that he is looking for "signs of earnest movement." The 
question, Williams suggested, is whether both sides, but 
particularly Qarase, are sufficiently astute, adroit, and 
determined to bridge the divide between the two sides. 
Recognizing that many of the issues raised by Bainimarama are 
valid, Williams says he wonders whether the PM can open a public 
dialogue that deals with legal issues and the aftermath of the 
2000 coup in ways that persuade many in the military to step 
back. Williams confessed he is "less than overconfident" about 
whether a coup can be avoided. 
 
¶9. (C) Other MFAT staff commented separately to Emboffs that it 
was not an easy meeting, but that outcomes were at the "upper 
end of (our) expectations."  MFAT is uncertain about whether the 
meeting will really achieve anything or how either party will 
characterize their exchange.  GNZ does not intend to speak 
publicly about the substance of the meeting, leaving that to 
Qarase and Bainimarama.  In the meantime, Foreign Minister 
Peters has made it clear to both that he is prepared to reengage 
if there is space to do so. Tomorrow, New Zealand will be 
talking to Qarase to urge him to move quickly to show that he is 
using the window before December 4 to render the question of a 
coup moot. But MFAT officials are planning for all 
contingencies, and MFAT Consular Affairs informed post that it 
has authorized evacuation of any NZ High Commission dependents 
who wish to leave Fiji. 
 
¶10. (C) Flying to Auckland en route to Suva for a 
previously-scheduled TDY just as the talks were taking place, a 
staff member from our Defense Attachi's Office sat next to New 
Zealand Defence Minister Phil Goff.  Goff was upbeat about the 
talks, but said he would not be surprised if they failed.  He 
said that if a coup did take place, it would most likely be 
confined to Suva -- adding that its scope would depend on the 
mentality of rioting mobs.  Goff expressed concern that a coup 
could get out of hand quickly and spread to Nadi and other 
places. 
 
McCormick