VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVN #1141/01 3320803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280803Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6996
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0134
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0941
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0197
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0670
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1110
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0075
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0572

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 001141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC), PRM/FO (DAS GREENE), 
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT), IO/RHS (MCKEE), IO/EDA (CAROTHERS), 
IO/UNP (MEYER), DRL, EUR/ERA, G-TIP; 
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2106 
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE 
REACH ONE YEAR? 
 
REF: A. VIENTIANE 0928 
     ¶B. VIENTIANE 0894 
     ¶C. VIENTIANE 0801 
     ¶D. VIENTIANE 0660 
     ¶E. AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) This message contains an action request for the 
Department.  Please see paragraph 16. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: The case of the 26 missing children has been 
unresolved since December 2005.  Since then, there have been 
rumors that the children may have been secretly deported back 
to Thailand or even dispersed throughout the Lao countryside. 
 But the overwhelming likelihood remains that they are still 
being detained by the Lao Government.  Until resolved, we 
believe this case must continue to be raised both in 
Vientiane and abroad.  Meetings held by UN Under Secretary 
General Gambari, the raising of the issue at the September 
UNICEF Executive Board meeting, and the possibility of an 
intervention by the UN Secretariat during the UNGA have been 
keeping the pressure on the Lao government to &come clean8 
about the whereabouts of these children.  The next step: we 
believe a senior UN official needs to come to Vientiane to 
press the Lao Government to resolve this case.   End summary. 
 
The Missing 26 Children: The Chronology 
--------------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Since this case has dragged on for so long, we want to 
review the chronology and highlight the facts we know: 
 
Thai Actions 
------------ 
November 28, 2005: Thai police in Petchabun Province arrested 
a group of 29 ethnic Hmong from Laos returning from a 
Christian religious service in Ban Khek Noi.  The group, 
mostly children, was stopped at a roadblock just outside the 
Hmong camp.  Since they were outside the camp, police 
considered them "illegal migrants." 
 
The Thai police held the group members for five days, 
demanding 200,000 baht ($5400) in cash from the families for 
their release, but the families were unable to pay. 
 
December 2, 2005: 27 of the 29 were sent from Petchabun to 
Nong Khai Province where they were held for three more days. 
Two of the older members of the group remained incarcerated 
in Khao Kho District, Petchabun. 
 
¶4. (C) Lao Actions; the beginning of the ordeal: 
 
Arrest and Suspicion 
-------------------- 
December 5, 2005: 27 members of the group (22 females, all 
but one of whom were minors, and five males, all minors) were 
taken to Ban Phak Khad, in Nong Khai Province.  Thai police, 
in conjunction with village officials, sent the 27 across to 
Houay Khoua Phai, Tha Phabat District in Laos, Bolikhamsai 
Province in two small fishing boats. 
 
December 6, 2005: Lao officials in Tha Phabat District 
arrested the group and sent them to Paksane, the Bolikhamsai 
provincial capital, for questioning.  (Note: Sources report 
that Lao police suspected the group members were provocateurs 
sent by the Thai or even by exile Hmong groups to create 
disturbances.  Lao police were especially suspicious because 
the children claimed to be Christians, had studied English, 
and had received assistance from "foreign" organizations in 
Petchabun.  (End note.) 
 
Separating the Boys 
------------------- 
December 8, 2005: The five boys in the group were separated 
from the girls and were sent to Vientiane, where they were 
imprisoned at Phonetong Prison for almost two months. 
 
February 4, 2006: Due to publicity and pressure from the 
international media and diplomatic community, the five boys 
were blindfolded and flown by military aircraft to Phongsaly, 
where they were imprisoned at Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly 
City.  To our knowledge, the boys remain at this facility. 
 
The Girls 
--------- 
Meanwhile the 22 females (one adult and 21 children) were 
held at Ban Thong Noi, Paksane Province, close to military 
encampment number 17, just outside Paksane.  The girls were 
questioned extensively by the Paksane police who reported to 
Vientiane in early January that they suspected the girls had 
been sent to Laos by foreigners (i.e. the U.S.) to create 
disturbances. 
 
¶5. (C) USG and Other Actions during December ) January: 
 
December 6, 2005: The U.S. Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok 
learned of the deportation, made immediate inquiries to Lao 
and Thai authorities, and raised the case with UN 
organizations and other embassies.  In early January, Embassy 
Vientiane obtained a Thai immigration police report on the 
arrest that definitively pointed to the group being in Laos. 
The Thai information included the names and other information 
about each of the group members.  Subsequently the Embassy 
also received a copy of the report completed by the 
Bolikhamsai police after interrogating the group members as 
well as photos of group members behind bars. 
 
January 13, 2006: Convinced that evidence overwhelmingly 
showed the 27 were in Laos, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane 
requested and received Department permission to demarche the 
Government of Laos (GOL) to seek access to them. 
 
January 18, 2006: The Ambassador met with Deputy Prime 
Minister/Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad to convey the 
demarche on the missing children, requesting the GOL to look 
for them and provide immediate access to them by observers 
and doctors from the international community.  The Ambassador 
also gave Somsavat a copy of the Thai immigration police 
report as well as the list of names and other information 
about the group members.  (Note: because of the way the 
Bolikhamsai police report was obtained, that report was not 
given to Somsavat.  End note.) The Foreign Minister replied 
that his government would do all it could to locate the 
children, and requested the USG obtain a Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) pledge to permit the children to return to 
Thailand, if they could be located in Laos. 
 
January 27, 2006: When quiet attempts to get the GOL to send 
the children back were rebuffed, the Ambassador requested a 
second meeting with the Foreign Minister to deliver another 
demarche demanding immediate access to the missing children. 
Because the Foreign Minister was unavailable, the Ambassador 
conveyed the demarche points via letter. 
 
January 30, 2006: The Lao MFA Press Spokesman held a press 
conference to say the GOL had learned of the disappearance of 
the 27 and "was looking for them."  The same day, the UNDP 
Acting Resident Representative delivered a letter to MFA 
offering to assist in caring for the group and returning them 
to Thailand. 
 
Just prior to this press conference, Embassy Vientiane 
learned that Embassy Bangkok had convinced senior RTG members 
to agree to allow the group to return to Petchabun, provided 
it was done quietly.  The Ambassador conveyed this 
information to the Lao MFA Press Spokesman after his press 
conference.  He asked that we attest to this in writing. 
 
January 31, 2006: The Ambassador sent another letter to the 
Foreign Minister, again conveying the RTG pledge regarding 
their return to Thailand. 
 
¶6. (C) February 2006; GOL Demands More Details: 
 
February 1: In response to GOL intransigence and refusal to 
return the children to Thailand as requested in our January 
31 letter, the Department issued a statement sharply critical 
of the GOL and urging immediate access. 
 
February 2: the Lao relayed to the Embassy, via indirect 
channels, that they would now require information from the 
RTG fully explaining details of the deportation before they 
would be able to "find" the group.  Later that day, the Thai 
Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Somsavat and promised to 
relay this request to his Foreign Ministry. 
 
February 3: The Australian Government demarched the GOL on 
the children and requested a meeting with the Foreign 
Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the case. 
(Note: The GOL has refused to the present day to see the 
Government of Australia about this matter ) stating that the 
Foreign Minister,s response to the U.S. Ambassador sufficed. 
 End note.) 
 
February 7: The U.S. demarched the EU, Japan, and selected 
ASEAN countries requesting that they, in turn, demarche the 
GOL demanding the release of the group and their return to 
Thailand.  At the same time, the RTG made public its 
willingness to accept back the group of 27 but added that 
"all Hmong in Thailand illegally" would have to return to 
Laos eventually. 
 
February 10: The EU Mission in Bangkok demarched the RTG on 
the missing children.  The same day, the EU representatives 
in Vientiane (France, Germany and the EU Mission) also 
demarched the Lao Foreign Minister. 
 
February 20: Visiting U.S. Senator Russ Feingold met with RTG 
PM Thaksin and Foreign Minister Kantathi in Bangkok and 
raised the Hmong children issue.  Feingold's office later 
issued a press release urging the GOL and RTG to work 
together to resolve the issue. 
 
February 23: USUN officers met with UNICEF Deputy Executive 
Director Kul Gautam to discuss the children. 
 
¶7. (C) March 2006: UNHCR Becomes Involved: 
 
March 28-30: At the urging of the Department, UNHCR Deputy 
High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin visited Laos.  Both 
Politburo Member Pany Yathoteu and Deputy FM Phongsavath told 
her that the GOL could not look for the children until the 
RTG first provided more details of the deportation.  Both 
before and after her visit, Ms. Chamberlin also met with the 
Thai NSC and MFA in Bangkok. The trip concluded with general 
agreement among the RTG, UNHCR, and interested embassies that 
the Thai would call in the Lao Ambassador to Bangkok to 
explain the deportation, hopefully meeting the GOL demand. 
 
¶8. (C) April 2006: Details ) But Not Enough 
 
April 12: The RTG MFA Deputy PermSec formally but verbally 
informed the Lao Ambassador in Bangkok that the RTG would 
take back the children on an exceptional basis.  The Lao 
Ambassador asked for more details of the circumstances 
surrounding the children's deportation, specifically dates, 
place of deportation, and other additional information.  The 
MFA agreed to try to obtain the additional information. The 
Thai MFA felt the meeting, overall, was "positive." 
 
¶9. (C) May-June 2006: The UNSYG Weighs In ) And Is Rebuffed 
 
May 18:  The UN Secretary General sent a letter to the Lao 
President asking about the missing children and confirming 
the RTG would accept their return. 
 
June 24:  Lao President Choummaly Sayasone responded to the 
UNSYG in a letter saying in part, &... the Lao authorities 
had never been informed by the Thai side about this matter 
and in fact the Thai side has neither handed over those 27 
Hmongs to the Lao authorities8 (unofficial translation from 
 
Lao).  According to UN representatives, the UNSYG considered 
the letter to be arrogant in tone and dissimulating in its 
characterization of the events revolving around the 
children,s disappearance.  UN officials noted that the UN 
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) planned to send a 
high-level official to Laos (probably in mid-August). 
 
¶10. (C) Summer 2006: No progress: 
 
Early July: The Lao Foreign Minister refused to receive a 
joint demarche from &like-minded8 embassies and UN as well 
as international organizations, on the missing children.  The 
GOL said the President,s June response to the UNSYG provided 
the government,s final word on the matter. 
 
¶11. (C) August ) September 2006: UN Pressure ) To No Avail: 
 
Mid-August: Bangkok-based UNICEF Regional Director Singh met 
with Lao Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Thoungloun 
and raised the 26 missing Hmong children.  Singh told the 
Foreign Minister that the UNICEF Executive Board Members, who 
control the level of funding for UNICEF activities in each 
country, would raise the issue of the children.  She informed 
him that the debate regarding funding would not be easy and 
that Laos, funding could be affected by this issue. 
 
August 29-30: UN Under Secretary General for Political 
Affairs Gambari met with the Lao Permrep (Aug 29) and the 
Thai Permrep (Aug 30) to try to resolve the case.  The Lao 
continued to say they lacked precise information from the 
Thai, and the Thai continued to say they had provided all 
information orally.  Gambari asked that all information from 
the Thai be put in writing. 
 
August 31:  UNICEF Executive Director Ann Veneman, in a 
response letter to Ambassador Haslach, noted that if the case 
of the missing children remains unresolved in September the 
&UN Secretariat intends to raise it at the highest level8 
with Lao and Thai representatives at the UNGA. 
 
Early September:  The United States and Sweden raised the 
issue of the missing children on the margins of the UNICEF 
Executive Board meeting. 
 
Mid-September: A plan for the UNSYG to meet separately with 
the Lao and Thai Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA 
is derailed by the coup in Bangkok. 
 
¶12. (C) September 21: The Curious MFA Press Briefing 
 
After ten months of stonewalling on the case of the children, 
Brigadier General Bouasieng Champaphanh, who leads the Lao 
side of the Lao-Thai Joint Sub-Committee for General Border 
Security Cooperation (&the Sub-Committee8), gave a press 
conference at the MFA.  General Bouasieng had just returned 
from an &extra8 plenary meeting of the Sub-Committee held 
in Bangkok on September 19 (ref a).  At this meeting, the 
Thai side had asked the Lao side to: collect information 
about the 27 missing children (note: actually 26 children and 
one adult; end note) and to stop the flow of Hmong who have 
been fleeing to Thailand.  According to General Bouasieng, 
the Lao side agreed to provide &full cooperation8 regarding 
the children but asked the Thais to also provide the 
following information so the Lao &can search for the 
children until they are found:8 
 
-- the list of each of the Thai officials involved in 
arresting and deporting the children to Laos, including 
names, family names, ranks, positions, areas of 
responsibility, and the units they belong to; 
 
-- the place of arrest of the children (in Thailand); 
 
-- the exact places, including village, hamlet, district, and 
province, that the children were deported from in Thailand 
and where they were deported to in Laos; 
 
-- the reason that the Thai officials deported the children, 
and the names, including family names, of the 26 children and 
the one adult who accompanied the children as well as their 
photographs; 
 
-- details of their parents, including names, family names, 
home towns, and present addresses. 
 
(Note: even though the GOL already has been given much of the 
information General Bouasieng listed above, having a senior 
general give a formal MFA press conference which discussed 
the children led to a brief spurt of optimism that the two 
sides had finally agreed on an approach that &saves face8 
for both sides and allows the 26 detained children being able 
to rejoin their families.  On the other hand, that was two 
months ago, and the level of detail demanded by the Lao now 
appears more like another movement of the goal posts.  End 
note.) 
 
Where are they now? 
------------------- 
¶13. (C) To our knowledge, the five boys have never been moved 
from Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City. 
 
The 21 girls have since been rumored to have been moved to 
Savannakhet Province or even trafficked to Thailand, but we 
believe they remain in Laos.  The well-connected French 
Ambassador was &unofficially8 told by senior GOL officials 
in early November 2006 that the children are still in Laos 
and are &in good hands,8 and that some may even be 
attending school.  Officially the GOL is awaiting a written 
response from the Thai on the children, and until they get 
that they will stick with the &official8 line that the 
children have not been found. 
 
An Additional Confirmation 
-------------------------- 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador also asked Richard Childress, former 
Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council 
under President Reagan, to raise the issue of the children 
with Deputy Prime Minister/former Foreign Minister Somsavat 
Lengsavad in a side-bar conversation on October 30.  Mr. 
Childress was visiting Vientiane with National League of 
Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLF) 
Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths; Mr. Childress is 
Senior Advisor to the NLF.  Both Ms. Griffiths and Mr. 
Childress have had long working relationships with senior Lao 
officials on POW/MIA issues. 
 
Somsavat told Childress that &we are in direct discussions 
with the Thai on returning them.8  From his body language 
and what he did not say (&We don,t know where they are, 
etc.), Childress believed the GOL may actually have been in 
discussion on resolving this issue at that point. 
 
Future Action 
------------- 
¶15. (C) A month has passed since the Somsavat-Childress 
conversation.  At this point, we continue to believe that 
only senior UN officials have sufficient weight to move the 
detained children,s case toward resolution.  We appreciate 
USyG Gambari having met with the Lao and Thai permreps in 
late August and are disappointed that a higher-level dialogue 
during the UNGA meant to bring the two sides together was not 
possible due to the coup.  We believe that a visit by Mr. 
Gambari or another senior UN official to Vientiane and 
Bangkok is the only possible lever available to move the case 
to resolution at this time. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
¶16. (C) Embassy Vientiane asks the Department to request USUN 
to contact the UN to push for a visit to Vientiane and 
Bangkok to pursue a resolution to this case. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17. (C) The GOL strategy seems apparent: continue to 
stonewall and the outside world will lose interest.  Make 
information difficult to obtain, move the goal posts, and 
continue intransigence, and the problem becomes just too 
difficult to try to resolve.  In the face of this GOL 
approach, we are pleased that so many officials and agencies 
have worked to help resolve the case of these missing 
children during this past year.  Our view here is that this 
case has become a symbol of how the Lao government operates, 
and whether the Lao government can be trusted to keep its 
commitments.  The support from the international community 
remains vital to keeping the pressure on the Lao, so UN 
efforts -- including the letter from the SYG, support from 
the UNICEF leadership and USyG Gambari,s role -- have been 
most welcome.  We think, unfortunately, they have to continue. 
HASLACH