VZCZCXRO9784
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #7393/01 3191518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151518Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3119
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 1027
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0120
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0498
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5668
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1814
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3683
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0996

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MOPS IV TO BO RS UP FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE/FRANCE:  INVESTIGATION OF NOVEMBER 
2004 BOMBING WINDING DOWN? 
 
REF: A. OSC RESTON VA 331395 (DTG 070940Z JUL 06) 
     ¶B. PARIS 553 
     ¶C. PARIS 741 
     ¶D. PARIS 1118 
     ¶E. PARIS 5544 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  France's judicial investigation of the 
November 6, 2004, bombing of French forces in Cote d'Ivoire 
by the Ivoirian Air Force may be drawing to a close, 
according to recent developments reported by the press.  Nine 
French military personnel and an Amcit civilian were killed 
in the bombing.  For reasons that are not entirely clear but 
which may well be political, the prosecutor in the case has 
reportedly decided not to seek international arrest warrants 
against two Belarusians believed to have piloted the planes 
used in the bombing and against Robert Montoya, a French 
citizen operating in Togo, who allegedly helped procure the 
planes and pilots from Belarus.  The decision to desist may 
spare the French government from further potentially 
embarrassing disclosures concerning its failure to prevent 
the bombing, obtain custody over the Belarusians, and impede 
their departure from the region.  Closing the case may also 
allow the French, on the eve of a presidential election 
cycle, to avoid addressing a difficult issue during a renewed 
period of French-Ivoirian tension following adoption of UNSCR 
1721, as well as avoid complications with Togo, Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine.  But it may also limit or render moot 
claims for compensation sought by the victims' families.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2.  (U)  On November 6, 2004, during a period of severe 
unrest and violence in Cote d'Ivoire, two Sukhoi-25 
fighter-bombers of the Ivoirian Air Force bombed French 
forces stationed in Bouake, killing nine French military 
personnel and one Amcit civilian.  These planes had been 
conducting missions for several days against rebel forces in 
Cote d'Ivoire as part of a government offensive against the 
rebels.  The French retaliated soon after, destroying Cote 
d'Ivoire's Air Force and other assets, and began evacuating 
French citizens in response to the unrest. 
 
¶3.  (U)  The French were well aware that the planes used in 
the Bouake bombing had been obtained from Belarus and were 
flown by Belarusian pilots, with Ivoirians sitting in the 
second seat.  Russian and Ukrainian personnel were reportedly 
part of the support package for the Sukhoi aircraft. 
According to press reports (e.g., ref A, a good overview of 
the incident and subsequent investigation), French military 
personnel in Cote d'Ivoire took custody of the pilots and 
support personnel, held them for four days, and then released 
them to a Russian Consul on November 13, reportedly on 
instructions from the French General Staff. 
 
¶4.  (U)  The French judiciary in Paris, in conjunction with 
legal actions brought by the French victims' families, soon 
opened an investigation, with investigative judge Brigitte 
Raynaud of the Army Tribunal for Paris (which has 
jurisdiction over claims involving the French military) 
taking the case two and a half months after the incident.  In 
the French system, the investigative judge builds a case, 
which is then presented to the Tribunal's prosecutor, who 
decides whether to proceed. 
 
¶5.  (C)  By all accounts, Raynaud led an aggressive 
investigation.  The Belarusian/Russian/Ukrainian team, 
including the pilots, arrived in Togo after their release 
from custody in Cote d'Ivoire.  In Togo, they were 
apprehended by Togolese authorities under the supervision of 
the Minister of the Interior, who at that time was Francois 
Boko.  Boko, who later fled Togo after calling for the 
postponement of the April 2005 elections, has reported 
several times on his involvement in the case, including his 
assertion that French authorities advised him that the 
detainees could be released (see refs B-E), which Boko then 
ordered.  Boko has stated that the planes used in the bombing 
and their crew and support personnel were procured on behalf 
of the Cote d'Ivoire government by French citizen Robert 
Montoya, a former French official and former member of the 
French Presidency's anti-terrorism unit who has since moved 
 
PARIS 00007393  002 OF 003 
 
 
to Togo and has reportedly been involved in arms trafficking. 
 Boko has also asserted that he informed the French, well 
before the bombing, of the arrival of the planes and crew in 
Togo and their transfer to Cote d'Ivoire.  Boko has also 
stated that Montoya assisted the detainees and helped them 
leave Togo once the Togolese had released them. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Raynaud expanded her investigation to include 
Montoya, his links to the bombing, and the arms trafficking 
link between him, Cote d'Ivoire, and Belarus/Russia/Ukraine. 
Montoya has since told the press that he was an honest broker 
bears no responsibility for the bombing. 
 
¶7.  (U)  In addition to investigating the Cote d'Ivoire 
bombing and its connection with Togo and 
Belarus/Russia/Ukraine, Raynaud was involved in several other 
investigations involving French military activities in 
Africa.  These include the killing of suspected bandit Firmin 
Mahe in Cote d'Ivoire by members of the French military and 
claims against the French government and military for 
France's roles in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (ref B). 
 
¶8.  (U)  Investigative judge Raynaud was transferred 
(apparently at her own request) from her functions at the 
Army Tribunal for Paris in February 2006 shortly after her 
interview with Boko (who complained that Raynaud's office had 
leaked the substance of his interview to the press, exposing 
him to possible danger).  Raynaud took up new duties at the 
Inter-Ministerial Commission for City Affairs.  Florence 
Michon succeeded Raynaud, with the press suggesting that she 
was less experienced, and hence less likely to be effective, 
than Raynaud in view of her age (32-years old at the time 
Michon succeeded Raynaud). 
 
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
¶9.  (U)  Paris dailies Le Figaro (November 6) and Liberation 
(November 8) reported that on September 5 Jacques Baillet, 
the prosecutor at the Army Tribunal for Paris, exercised his 
discretion and declined to issue international arrest 
warrants against the two Belarusian pilots (Youri Sushin and 
Barys Smahin) for their alleged role in carrying out the 
November 2004 bombings.  Baillet also declined to issue a 
warrant against Montoya.  A member of the Army Tribunal for 
Paris stated that "the investigations led by the 
investigative judge have not permitted, at this stage, the 
formal establishment of the identities of these pilots." 
However, Le Figaro noted that on February 10, 
then-investigative judge Raynaud stated that "the results of 
the investigation, in particular certain DGSE documents, 
establish that the two pilots who proceeded to attack the 
Lycee Descartes, were named Youri Sushin and Barys Smahin." 
Le Figaro remarked that this "divergence of appreciation" 
resulted in part from the confusion that followed the attack, 
and then reported on other evidence tending to confirm the 
identities of the pilots. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Liberation's follow-up article noted the 
possibility that the decision not to act against the pilots, 
crew, and Montoya probably meant that the case might 
effectively have ended.  Jean Balan, a lawyer for the 
families, said that "I fear they want to let this drop.  They 
(the Belarusian pilots) benefit from the presumption of 
innocence, but why forbid us from hearing from them?  In 
reality, the French authorities don't want us to know who 
gave the order, and why, to bomb (Operation) Licorne and 
Bouake."  Liberation noted that "since the investigation by 
judge Florence Michon (Raynaud's successor as investigative 
judge) appears dead, certain relatives of the soldiers who 
were killed are beginning to express openly their doubts as 
to the willingness of the government to shed light on the 
bombing of Bouake." 
 
¶11.  (C)  MFA Cote d'Ivoire deskoff Charlotte Montel offered 
very brief comments when asked about these developments on 
November 8.  As she and her colleagues have frequently stated 
in cases involving judicial investigations and African 
countries, Montel stressed that this was a matter for the 
judiciary and that the MFA was not involved in the case.  She 
refrained from confirming that the case would soon be closed. 
 Confirming another recent press report, she said that a team 
of judicial investigators would soon travel to Cote d'Ivoire 
to investigate claims by several French citizens that they 
were the victims of violence committed against them by 
 
PARIS 00007393  003 OF 003 
 
 
Ivoirians during the unrest that followed the November 2004 
bombings.  Ivoirian authorities are reported to be 
cooperating with the French in this new series of 
investigations. 
 
¶12.  (C)  COMMENT:  The way this matter has progressed raises 
questions as to whether the GOF has intervened to close a 
case with possibly embarrassing political repercussions, 
including such issues as: 
 
--  apparent French foreknowledge of the arrival of the 
planes and crew from Belarus via Togo and their likely use by 
the Cote d'Ivoire government; 
--  whether the bombing of French forces by the Cote d'Ivoire 
Air Force was intentional or accidental; 
--  the decision to release the pilots and crew from French 
custody in Cote d'Ivoire; 
--  the decision to advise the Togolese to release them; 
--  the role of French citizen and former Elysee official 
Robert Montoya in obtaining the planes and crew, and his role 
in trafficking arms to Cote d'Ivoire; 
--  the decision by the GOF to destroy Cote d'Ivoire's Air 
Force in retaliation for the bombing of French forces; and 
--  the subsequent violence directed at French interests and 
citizens in Cote d'Ivoire, requiring a military evacuation of 
French residents. 
 
If the judicial inquiry ends, discomfiting questions such as 
these may now remain unanswered and take their place among 
the hobbyhorses of conspiracy theorists. 
 
¶13.  (C)  COMMENT CONT'D:  The closing of the case may well 
be intended to allow the GOF to avoid worsening relations not 
only with Cote d'Ivoire but also with Togo (Montoya's base of 
operations and apparent transit point for the planes and 
pilots), as well as with Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (source 
of the planes and crew), at a time when France is embroiled 
in many other sensitive issues regarding Cote d'Ivoire (e.g., 
UNSCR 1721).  Although the French would never acknowledge 
political intervention to quash such a case, it seems 
possible that such concerns may well have outweighed purely 
judicial factors, perhaps even trumping the GOF's interest 
vis-a-vis its own citizens in supporting efforts by the 
victims' survivors to determine what happened, assess 
responsibility, and obtain compensation.  Moreover, avoiding 
such issues may appear particularly attractive as the French 
enter into a presidential election cycle, with candidates not 
eager to address uncomfortable questions from the recent 
past.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON