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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO/FRENCH MOD:  AMBASSADOR DUNN'S OCTOBER 24 
CONSULTATIONS 
 
Classified By:  Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn met 
with French Ministry of Defense officials on August 24.  The 
discussion focused on Togo's military and how to decrease its 
involvement in internal security affairs, which should be 
handled by the police and gendarmerie.  However, defining a 
strictly military role for the army and assigning 
responsibility for internal security to the police and 
gendarmerie were not simple matters, given the leading role 
the army had played in Togo's politics and the relatively 
limited capabilities of the police and gendarmerie.  There 
was general agreement that Faure was proving to be a better 
leader than his father had been, with the June 2007 
legislative elections an important indicator of the course 
Togo would take.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The French Defense Ministry's Strategic Affairs 
Delegation hosted visiting U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn 
for discussions on August 24.  Colonel Denis Opplert (Deputy 
Director for Regional Affairs-Africa), Jerome Spinoza (Charge 
de Mission for Sub-Saharan Africa), and Major Michel Raoult 
(Gendarmerie, West Africa Desk Officer, French Joint Staff 
Directorate of International Relations) attended the meeting, 
along with Embassy Assistant Army Attache and Africa Watcher. 
 
¶3.  (C)  After opening pleasantries, Ambassador Dunn provided 
a quick overview of Togo.  Faure was making an effort to 
reform but was hampered by "old guard" members of his 
entourage.  Retired military officers continued to have 
influence.  That said, the army and government seemed open to 
concepts of good governance.  Ambassador Dunn noted the 
importance of French forces in Togo as support for French 
forces in Cote d,Ivoire and the value of Lome airport as a 
rear base for French transport aircraft operating in Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Spinoza added that French forces in Togo could 
also support evacuations that might take place in the broader 
region. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Major Raoult agreed on the important role played by 
Togo's army.  All agreed that the army had been playing too 
large a role in providing internal security.  The army should 
perform military tasks and leave international security to an 
enhanced police or gendarmerie presence.  Spinoza remarked 
that the June legislative elections would be a key test -- 
would the army remain in its barracks or take to the streets? 
 Ambassador Dunn noted that the Global Political Agreement of 
August 20 called for a "traditional" role for the army and he 
said that the Togolese had indicated their desire to 
diversify the military and had requested assistance/advice on 
how to do so. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Opplert commented that one problem was the fact that 
it was not easy identifying strictly "military" roles for 
Togo's army, given Togo's actual military security concerns. 
Togo's army was, in per capita terms, already bigger than the 
armies of most other West African countries.  Ambassador Dunn 
and his French interlocutors expressed misgivings about 
adapting the military to civilian tasks, and did not want to 
see the military involved in the ports and customs services, 
for example.  Raoult identified one problem on the civilian 
side -- the quite irregular and ineffective police recruiting 
system.  He described police personnel and recruiting as 
severely deficient.  Spinoza said that ethnic issues and the 
lack of diversity among ethnic groups were among the serious 
problems, with the Kabye overrepresented in the military and 
police.  Ambassador Dunn commented on the stereotypes 
depicting northerners as "military" in nature and southerners 
as "non-military."   Ambassador Dunn described UFC leader 
Gilchrist Olympio's advice to reform the military but to 
avoid going "too fast."  Togo's ethnic issues were real, but 
nowhere near the level as in places such as Burundi, 
Ambassador Dunn observed.  Fortunately, the Togolese people 
had a strong sense of "Togolese" identity that could be used 
as a unifying force. 
 
¶6.  (C)    Spinoza commented on the differences between Faure 
and Eyadema, noting that the son was much better educated, 
worldly, and seemingly more open minded than his father had 
been.  Spinoza believed that Faure was a more credible leader 
than Olympio.  Ambassador Dunn believed that Faure sought to 
change and advance Togo but that he needed and was seeking 
 
help from the international community, from which Togo had 
been isolated for quite some time.  The French observed that 
Eyadema, for better or worse, had been a strong leader. 
Faure was coming into power on a different basis and would 
rule differently, which provided opportunities for progress. 
On the positive side, Ambassador Dunn commented that Togo's 
involvement in drug trafficking seemed to decrease with 
Faure's arrival, although Spinoza reminded that there was 
evidence indicating that the broader Gnassingbe clan was 
engaged in many questionable activities. 
 
¶7.  (C)  After Spinoza mentioned China, Ambassador Dunn 
described China's growing presence in Togo and across Africa. 
 He noted Chinese engagement in the sugar and transportation 
industries, with a leading role in Togo's thriving motor 
scooter sector.  Spinoza said that Togo-PRC diplomacy was 
active, with Faure already having visited China and military 
exchanges now taking place. 
 
¶8.  (C)  When asked about U.S. interest in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Ambassador Dunn discussed the upcoming conference on 
that topic and Togo's likely participation.  Spinoza 
indicated that France would attend the conference and wanted 
to work with the U.S. on issues concerning the Gulf. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The French expressed concern about Nigeria, noting 
ties between Nigerian and Togolese criminal groups. 
Ambassador Dunn said that in his view most Togolese where 
interested more in immediate neighbors Ghana and Benin and 
tended to blame Nigerian nationals for many of Togo's social 
problems.  The French were concerned about Nigeria's weight 
and effect on the region.  The debate over allowing President 
Obasanjo had a destabilizing potential.  Referring to Niger 
as "Nigeria's 37th province," the French said that its 
problems were social and political, and not military. 
Ambassador Dunn said that Togo's relations with its other 
neighbors (Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso) were relatively good. 
The French expressed concern about Cote d,Ivoire's Gbagbo 
and his apparent attempt to woo Faure into supporting him. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON