VZCZCXRO7128
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4328/01 3262219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 222219Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8142
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0167
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0118
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 004328 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IQ
SUBJECT: TALABANI SAYS SYRIA READY TO HELP IN IRAQ; 
SHORTENS TRIP TO IRAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting on November 21 with the 
Ambassador Iraqi President Jalal Talabani expressed the 
conviction that Syria is ready to help secure and stabilize 
Iraq.  He shared a plan drawn up by Vice President Adil 
al-Mahdi to encourage cooperation among political blocs in an 
effort to solve many of Iraq's contentious issues.  He said 
SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim expressed frustration with 
Iran and there is a growing frustration among Shia with Iran. 
 He also gave a brief readout of his trip to France. 
Minister of Water Abd al-Latif Rashid, who also attended the 
meeting, spoke briefly on major issues in the Kurdish Region. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Syrian Foreign Minister Tells Iraq: "We Want to Help" 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (C) Iraqi President Jalal Talabani expressed his view to 
the Ambassador on November 21 that the Syrians are ready to 
help secure and stabilize Iraq.  He said Syrian Foreign 
Minister Walid Muallem admitted Syrian support for the Baath 
party in their meeting in Baghdad earlier in the week but 
claimed that Syria was now ready to do "whatever Iraq asked." 
 Talabani said he told Muallem that it was in Syria's 
interest to support the Iraqi Government and take a public 
stand against those fighting against Iraq.  Talabani said he 
believed that the Syrians are sincere in their interest in 
working with Baghdad and said Muallem had even asked Talabani 
to query the Ambassador about the possibility of reviving the 
US-Iraq-Syria partnership.  Talabani said he had emphasized 
to Muallem that the key to this partnership was stopping 
terrorism in Iraq and that the US could not tolerate the 
continued killing of its soldiers.  The Ambassador responded 
that a true indication of Syrian willingness would be an 
actual improvement in the situation on the ground in Iraq. 
 
¶3. (C) Talabani agreed with the Ambassador that we need 
actions, not words from Syria.  He added that in 
any-carrot-and-stick approach toward Syria, it is also always 
important to emphasize the stick.  Talibani suggested that 
just as everyone seemed to be asking for a timeline for US 
withdrawal, so the US should ask for a timeline from Syria 
and Iran as well.  He urged against any policy of appeasement 
towards either country, opining that Iran is "very 
comfortable right now" because its influence has increased 
and it thinks democracy in the Middle East is finished. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Adil al-Mahdi's "Historic Contract" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Talabani said Vice President Adil al-Mahdi has drawn 
up a broad-ranging "Historic Contract" which calls for 
cooperation among political blocs and lays out solutions for 
many of the problems facing Iraq (see para. 9).  He said this 
plan has his support and that Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi 
is in general agreement with it as well.  (NOTE: In a 
subsequent conversation, Hashimi expressed reservations with 
the plan.  END NOTE.).  The Ambassador asked how this fits 
with Hashimi's alleged statement threatening to withdraw from 
the government and take up arms.  Talabani dismissed it, 
saying Hashimi denied making this statement.  He said 
everyone is frustrated, but this is an opportunity for 
change.  He urged clarity in the in U.S. policy toward the 
Sunni.  At the same time, he stressed that the Sunnis cannot 
speak two languages - the language of government and the 
language of "occupation."  Likewise the Shia cannot speak the 
language of government and of militias.  He emphasized 
reaching agreement with all Iraqi groups.  Talabani expressed 
his view that the Iraqi decision-making body -- including the 
Maliki government -- was "simply not working."  This needed 
to be fixed.  The President and the Ambassador agreed that 
the emergency meeting of the bloc leaders on Friday provided 
the opportunity to focus on these issues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Hakim, Shia Frustrated with Iran; Talabani to Visit 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) According to Talabani, SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz 
al-Hakim visited him on November 20 to express his 
frustration with Iran.  The Iranians are playing a dangerous 
role in Iraq, he said, and are sacrificing the Iraqi Shia for 
their own interests.  Talibani stated that Hakim accused Iran 
 
BAGHDAD 00004328  002 OF 006 
 
 
of encouraging and conspiring with the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) 
militia. Talabani said everyone is worried about Iran because 
they are responsible for the problems in Iraq.  He said there 
is a growing frustration among Shia with Iran.  Iran does not 
want Iraq to be secure and is using it against the Arab 
world.  He told the Ambassador Adil al-Mahdi has gone to Iran 
to issue three demands: stop financing JAM, work with the 
Iraqi government, and stop helping terrorists come into Iraq. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about Talabani's own 
upcoming trip to Iran.  Talabani said he could not cancel it 
but he agreed to shorten it to two days - from November 
25-27.  He mentioned that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad 
refused an invitation for a trilateral meeting in Tehran 
because the Syrians believed it would harm relations with the 
US. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Trip to France, Problems in the Kurdish Region 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (C) Talabani said during his recent trip to France he 
received pledges for help in the United Nations and for the 
counterterrorism training of 1500 Iraqi forces.  He said he 
had asked Prime Minister Maliki to follow up on this.  He met 
three members of the French socialist bloc and had to 
convince them to support Iraq.  When asked about oil issues, 
Talabani said of course they discussed them but deferred most 
of the discussion to the respective Oil Ministries.  He also 
met the head of oil and gas company Total. 
 
¶8. (C) During the meeting Minister of Water Abd al-Latif 
Rashid briefly discussed problems in the Kurdish region.  He 
expressed dissatisfaction with the state of the hydrocarbons 
law and said that demand for goods in the Kurdish region is 
very high and they are getting expensive.  He said there is 
an electricity shortage in the region and mentioned 
negotiations with Turkey over establishing mechanisms for 
importing and downgrading electricity and changing wattages. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Text of Adil al-Mahdi's "Historic Contract" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The following is the translated text of the 
"historical contract": 
 
 
Milestones for solving the Iraqi Crisis or the Political 
Initiative or the Historic Contract 
 
 
First: The Forces that are part of the solution who may 
participate in the Initiative 
 
 
1 - Nationally: 
 
¶1.    All or some of the "Alliance" and the forces outside of 
it whether Islamic or non Islamic such as Al-Iraqiya or other 
national blocs. 
 
¶2.    The Kurds with both their parties. 
 
¶3.    The Tawafuq Front, the Islamic Party , the Muslims 
Scholars Association , the Baath of Iraq, the tribes and 
independent leaders. 
 
¶4.    All these forces, some of them, or in addition to them 
which approve in an absolute and real manner the principles 
stipulated below in "What does the solution aim at". 
 
2 - Regionally: 
 
Neighboring countries in addition to Egypt, the Emirates, the 
Arab 
League, and the Islamic Conference. 
 
3 - Internationally: 
 
¶1.    The United States , Great Britain, and the 
International Coalition forces 
 
¶2.    The European Union. 
 
¶3.    China and Russia. 
 
BAGHDAD 00004328  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶4.    Japan, Korea and Australia. 
 
Presupposed Options 
 
¶1.    Going back to the way things were before March 2003 
 
¶2.    Canceling all of the past whether before March 2003 or 
after it. Start negotiating again in order to identify and 
define the new Iraq which everybody agrees on. 
 
 
¶3.    The prolonging of the current crisis and the 
ramifications, the killing, the death, and the destruction it 
might lead to that threaten everybody without exception. 
 
¶4.    The retreat of each side onto itself and sketching its 
own expectations of its territories, geography, and 
population; Meaning, to walk towards partition. 
 
¶5.    Finding the heavy weights amongst the desiring forces 
capable of moving forward from the current situation of the 
political status quo toward achieving the goals below, in 
order to strengthen sovereignty, combat terrorism and 
violence, put the political process, economic reform and 
constitutional requirements on the right track; and in order 
for the Political Council to play its role in overseeing, 
rationalizing and opening to any political proposal that 
would help to increase participation, interaction and 
solutions and would respect the constitutional guidelines and 
democratic principles. This is the option that we believe 
will receive the backing of the overwhelming Majority and 
reflects the best interest of the country. 
 
What does the solution aim at? 
 
¶A.    Build a just and well guided State that cares for all 
its citizens; not founded on partisan or sectarian or ethnic 
or community allegiances; protects Islam and does not allow 
for any infringement of it; protects individual and communal 
rights as stipulated in the First and the Second sections of 
the Constitution. 
 
¶B.    Adopt democracy in such a way that every citizen has 
one vote; the interests of different communities are 
protected with Constitutional legislations based on the 
Federal system; respect for pluralism in all its forms; 
balanced distribution of interests and rights between 
centralization and decentralization. 
 
¶C.    Adopt the Constitution voted on by the Iraqi people as 
a basis for continuing the process of political building, 
provided that amendments are done in accordance with the 
approved mechanisms and national agreements. 
 
¶D.    Deal with effects of the past with all its 
ramifications and oppressions. 
 
¶E.    Look at the present-day and the future when dealing 
with the past and do not remain confined to its framework. 
 
¶F.    Seek general historical resolutions that allow for 
overcoming the compositions and understandings of the past 
and the opposition mentality. Enter the domain of the 
governing national responsibility and the international 
responsibility that are part of the policies and decision 
making of the region and the world in a peaceful, united and 
just manner. 
 
¶G.    Regional and international equilibrium in defending the 
interest and sovereignty of Iraq. Believe that the new Iraq 
is established on amity with the various nations and 
countries and that making enemies and sharp edged policies 
are remnants of the previous state of things. Be open-minded 
to the surrounding world, the regional and outside world, and 
deal with them positively and cooperatively. 
 
 
Consequently, we can point to what we consider to be key 
milestones for a historical political initiative or for 
foundational contract between the Iraqis: 
 
¶1.    The Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds ( and others of course) 
shall assume the responsibility of security in their areas, 
single-handedly or jointly, based on the situations within a 
circle of legislated frameworks agreed to between the forces 
 
BAGHDAD 00004328  004 OF 006 
 
 
on one hand, and a circle of the governmental solution within 
and not outside the contexts of the State's work on the other 
hand. 
 
¶2.    The joining of the political forces that comprise the 
key components of the political process in the decision of 
providing security for the citizen and country is key for 
preventing the emergence of militias on one hand, and 
benefiting from the nation's capacity on the other hand. 
There exists a comprehensive outlook in that regard. 
 
¶3.    Develop the general view concerning the sovereign, 
regional and joint authorities according to the principles 
stipulated in the Constitution or amend it pursuant to the 
mechanisms suggested therein. 
 
¶4.    Combat terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic emirate and 
other hostile formations. 
 
¶5.    Combat any formations, courts, and authorities that are 
outside the framework of the rule of the State and the Law. 
 
¶6.    The Saddamist Baath shall be banned in accordance with 
the Constitution. 
 
¶7.    All militias and local armies shall be disbanded. 
Commence disbandment, integration and conformation processes. 
Combat the phenomena of carrying of weapons. The rule of law 
shall be imposed. The government shall be the sole entity 
carrying weapons. 
 
¶8.    The De-Ba'athification law shall be annulled in 
accordance with the Constitution after the execution of 
Saddam, if the Cassation Board issued a decision to proceed 
with the execution. This must be understood openly and 
implicitly; the Iraqi Baath is not originally included in the 
law. Going back to the minutes of the Governing Council 
sessions on this issue point to this fact. 
 
¶9.    Displacement shall be prohibited. Criminals shall be 
pursued. The local forces shall be responsible for any acts 
of displacement and killing for sectarian, ethnic or 
political motives. The displacement which took place after 
and before the fall of the regime does not constitute a basis 
for the application of the statute of limitations and for 
these unlawful acts to be accepted. 
 
¶10.   Oil resources fall under the authority of the federal 
government. Oil revenues and its distribution can be used to 
reach settlements that help in accepting the other principles 
and fundamentals that are disagreed on. 
 
¶11.   Regions and Governorates shall be given broad powers to 
grant lands, authorize investments and issue permits in 
accordance with the Investment Law. The rights and powers of 
the Regions shall be clearly defined; Disorderliness or 
independence that harms the Federal State are not allowed; 
Control by the Federal Government that impedes the work of 
the local governments is not permitted. 
 
¶12.   In order to curtail any disagreements concerning 
centralized and decentralized issues, it is possible to 
present the issues as follows: Centralization in regard to 
oil resources and decentralization in regard to investment 
and the economy.. Centralization in regard to political, 
sovereignty, foreign relations and national legislative 
affairs.  And decentralization in administration, rights and 
legislation in defining the powers of  the Regions and 
Governorates.  Decentralization in regard to the citizen's 
security and centralization in regard to National defense. 
 
¶13.   A general Amnesty shall be issued except for those 
referred to the Iraqi Special Tribunal and Private Law. 
 
¶14.   The current Constitution, the Federal System and 
democracy shall be accepted as a permanent system for Iraq. 
 
¶15.   The COR shall be established on the basis of one vote 
for every citizen according to an approved electoral system. 
 
¶16.   The formation of  the "Federation Council" shall 
necessarily mean on the one hand that the COR expresses the 
will of the people according to the one vote for each 
citizen; it will also mean on the other hand, the acceptance 
of pluralism and the communities preserving themselves and 
their private and public rights. A right balance shall be set 
 
BAGHDAD 00004328  005 OF 006 
 
 
between these two institutions and their roles so that these 
balances do not impede the work of the Federal Government. 
Nor shall the COR or the Federal Government or its 
institutions impede the work of the local governments and the 
rights of the different communities in the country.  The 
basis of all this shall be the acceptance of the Federal 
system with all its different Regions, otherwise we have two 
options, either democratic rule according to one vote for 
every citizen whose majority decides the balance of forces .. 
or control, domination or partition. The federal option is 
the balanced and unifying option which joins together these 
two components. 
 
¶17.   It is possible that the Federal system and regions be 
established out of two or more regions. The issue of Kirkuk 
and the rest of the disputed territories can be solved within 
that framework. It is also possible that it would be formed 
out of a number of regions, that alternative remaining 
available. The period of the eighteen months can be used to 
reach an agreement that would satisfy the different sides. 
 
¶18.   The Constitution, the Laws of parliamentarian blocs and 
Elections, are keen to encourage lists that lead to the 
forming of the government out of a national majority that 
circumvents quotas and the delay in choosing a Prime Minister 
and Ministers. It also allows for a widening of the circle of 
competition outside the sectarian and ethnic polarizations. 
It permits the formation of  shadow governments where 
competence and concurrence are  preserved without those 
governments concealing or discrediting the work of parties 
and political entities. 
 
¶19.   Political activity is prohibited in the Government 
agencies.. the basis of  employment is competence and not 
party, community or ethnic allegiances. 
 
¶20.   The National Equilibrium Committee approved by the 
Constitution will complete its work in accordance with the 
population equilibriums, in justice, and achieving progress 
in the work of the State towards greater competency, 
responsibility and the understanding of public service. 
 
¶21.   Article 140 will be applied concerning the boundaries 
of the governorates and Kirkuk; the issue of the areas in 
dispute shall be solved. 
 
¶22.   Governorate elections will take place at the same time 
that the vote on forming new regions will take place and it 
is preferable that it would happen in June 2007. 
 
¶23.   The plan for economic reform will be adopted. 
 
Third: International Issues, the MNF and pending issues, 
 
1)    As soon as the political and security situation is 
organized between the Iraqi forces and the supporting 
regional and international forces, then the timing of the 
withdrawal of the MNF from Iraq will be identified. Those 
dates will be decided in line with the overall national best 
interest and in a principal agreement with the American and 
the British sides. The Iraqi Government will be able to 
decide the shape of those remaining forces or whether it 
wishes to ask for their help. 
 
2)    Relations and agreements will be regulated with the 
countries of the region on the one side and the United States 
and Great Britain on the other; This will be for the purpose 
of increasing the capacities of Iraq and for defending its 
interests, supporting it, as well as defending its 
independence and sovereignty against any outside interference 
whether regionally or internationally. The signing of 
security agreements with another State does not rule out the 
signing of similar agreements that all together will defend 
the internal security and the sovereign, national and 
security rights of Iraq. Such a view will help create a 
balance between our international and regional relations 
which sense contradictions that affect our situation in an 
exceptional manner; This requires in this regard a fresh 
Iraqi perspective. 
 
 
3)    A security agreement shall be organized during the 
remainder of the mandate of  the MNF that will regulate Iraqi 
sovereignty as well as the responsibilities and the 
authorities of the two sides. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00004328  006 OF 006 
 
 
4)    All terrorist organizations shall be eliminated from 
the Iraqi territory, such as Mujahedeen Khalq, the PKK, or 
any organization that wants to make of Iraq's territory a 
battleground to wage war against neighboring countries or to 
carry out terrorist actions. 
 
5)    Provide help to Iraq to cancel out Iraqi debts in a 
final manner. 
 
6)    The work of the Development Fund of Iraq shall end and 
the money will be moved to Iraq's treasury. 
 
The issue of compensation shall be settled either by ending 
it in a final manner, or at least by establishing an Iraqi 
Kuwaiti Fund for investing in Iraq and for making use of 
investment money as an alternative to the principle of 
compensation. 
 
END TEXT. 
KHALILZAD