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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130942Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0261
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0243
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0343
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0259
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0266
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5003

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 006518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM 
NSC FOR WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH KN
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS ON NORTH KOREA 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer,  , US 
Consulate Shanghai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Five of Shanghai's North Korea Scholars told 
Poloffs that China would support a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution to punish North Korea, but would oppose including any 
military action in the resolution.  While one scholar said that 
China might also move its humanitarian assistance from bilateral 
to multilateral channels, others said that China would not cut 
back its bilateral assistance; in particular, oil deliveries 
were already at the minimum level needed to maintain the 
pipeline.  Scholars also said that the nuclear test clearly 
demonstrated that China had little leverage over North Korea and 
the United States needed to be flexible if there was any hope of 
resolving the crisis.  Most scholars said North Korean conducted 
the test to improve their national security and prevent an 
attack from the United States.  One scholar believed that North 
Korean President Kim Jong-Il had agreed to the test to secure 
support from the military not only to remain in power but to 
ensure succession of one of his sons.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
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UNSC Sanctions 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) 
Department of Strategic Studies Director Xia Liping told DPO 
during a lunch on October 12 that China would support 
"punishing" North Korea through a UNSC resolution, but would not 
support military action against the DPRK.  During a meeting with 
Poloff on October 12, SIIS Research Fellow Gong Keyu had the 
same view as Xia and said that China needed to see how these 
sanctions would be used before it could support them.  It was 
important that any action be effective.  She added that China 
might support military action, if it was focused and short term. 
 There would be no support for an Iraq or Afghan style military 
action. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Center for 
Korean Peninsular Studies Director Liu Ming in his conversation 
with Poloff on October 13 added that if sanctions were too 
severe, then they would be counterproductive since North Korea 
was an abnormal country.  Instead of giving in, North Korea 
would react strongly to the sanctions and might accelerate its 
nuclear program.  Xia thought that North Korea might respond to 
sanctions with another test.  Their ultimate goal was a nuclear 
warhead on a long-range missile, and they had now tested both 
the missile and the warhead separately - so perhaps they would 
try to test them together.  The low yield of last weekend's test 
might mean that the test was a failure, but it could also mean 
that the North's technology was advanced enough to produce a 
small warhead. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
China's Leverage Limited 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Jiaotong University Shanghai Center for RIMPAC Strategic 
and International Studies Deputy Director Zhuang Jianzhong in a 
meeting with Deputy Principal Officer (DPO) and Poloff on 
October 11, said that China's attitude toward North Korea had 
changed.  North Korea was certainly not a friend of China. 
China would continue to advise, persuade and criticize North 
Korea to get it to return to the Six-Party talks, but that the 
United States should not totally depend on China.  SASS Liu went 
further and asserted that China's leverage over North Korea was 
limited.  The one thing that North Korea wanted was a 
 
SHANGHAI 00006518  002 OF 003 
 
 
relationship with the United States.  It had created the current 
crisis to get the United States' attention.  He urged that the 
United States be more flexible towards North Korea and find a 
way to provide the North Koreans with a face saving way out. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Xia said that from a strategic perspective, North Korea 
believed it must have a good relationship with the United States 
in order to survive.  The DPRK saw itself in a similar position 
to the Yi dynasty at the end of the nineteenth century, too weak 
to protect itself from Japan, China, or the ROK.  It made sense, 
therefore, to ally with someone far away (the United States); 
nearby states were always threats, real or potential. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
Assistance Will Continue 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Most of the scholars said that China would not 
significantly reduce its assistance to North Korea.  Zhuang said 
that while China might take some economic actions, the 
assistance China provided was for North Korean people's basic 
needs.  One must differentiate between humanitarian and 
political assistance.  Both Gong and Liu told us that if China 
cut off its humanitarian assistance, this would only affect the 
common people and not the North Korean leadership.  Liu added 
that the level of assistance, oil in particular, from China was 
the minimum needed to maintain the pipeline from North Korea to 
China.  Decreasing assistance would jeopardize the pipeline 
infrastructure.  In addition, China wanted to punish North 
Korea, but did not want to cut off all relations with the DPRK. 
It wanted to leave room for future contact.  According to Xia, 
China would continue humanitarian aid, but might stop providing 
it on a bilateral basis and instead have it delivered through 
multilateral agencies. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
North Korean Motivations 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Xia told DPO that there was a split in the North Korean 
leadership, which had influenced the timing of the DPRK nuclear 
test.  The military wanted to develop and test nuclear weapons, 
while Kim Jong-il was less eager to, preferring to concentrate 
on economic reform.  Kim did not fully control the military, 
which in turn did not trust him to the same extent that they had 
trusted his father.  Because of concern over succession issues, 
Kim had to give in to the military leadership on the nuclear 
test.  Kim had three sons, none of whom were particularly 
satisfactory as successors - the oldest was a playboy, the 
middle was "something like a woman," and the youngest was still 
too young to be seriously considered as a successor.  The 
military leadership preferred, as successor - or even as leader 
- Kim's younger brother, who was currently serving as Ambassador 
to Poland.  This younger brother resembled Kim Il-Sung much more 
than Kim Jong-Il.  In any case, because he needed military 
support both to remain in power himself and to arrange for a 
succession by one of his sons, Kim had to go along with the 
military's desire to test its nuclear weapons. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Xia added that China was very concerned about 
instability in North Korea and that any general who might 
succeed Kim would be more hard-line than Kim.   Kim was very 
conscious of threats to his personal security; he refused to fly 
and when he took trains, frequently changed his plans at the 
last minute to thwart assassination attempts.  Liu had also 
heard the rumors about succession issues and added that some 
factions supported Kim's illegitimate son who was adopted by his 
sister.  He said for now Kim was in complete control of North 
 
SHANGHAI 00006518  003 OF 003 
 
 
Korea and the country was reasonably stable. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) SASS Research Fellow Liu Aming, who participated in 
Poloff's October 13 conversation with Liu Ming, noted rumors 
that Kim agreed to the test to please different factions, but 
believed that the main reason for the test was North Korea's 
desire to increase its own security.  North Korea had learned 
from the Iraq war that the United State was willing to invade 
other countries and it believed that if it had nuclear weapons, 
the United States would not attack it.  According to Gong, North 
Korea felt that having nuclear weapons would make it more equal 
to the United States in status.  Also, since the United States 
was so fixated on nuclear weapons, even the smallest compromise 
by North Korea would lead to big concessions from the United 
States. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  All the scholars agreed that the best solution would 
be to resume the 6-Party Talks.  Liu Ming said he was 
pessimistic about the prospects of restarting talks.  He heard 
that North Korea did not trust President Bush and wanted to wait 
until the 2008 elections.  All scholars hoped that the talks 
would resume quickly as they were the best way to resolve the 
crisis. 
JARRETT