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Viewing cable 06SANTIAGO2269, FOXLEY: CHILE NOT INTERESTED IN UNSC SEAT,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SANTIAGO2269 2006-10-27 22:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #2269/01 3002218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272218Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0277
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2709
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1564
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 3366
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3281
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1153
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0292
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ OCT LIMA 4784
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1106
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3412
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0208
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1613
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0813
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0180
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 002269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 
TAGS: IO PGOV PREF UNGA CI
SUBJECT: FOXLEY: CHILE NOT INTERESTED IN UNSC SEAT, 
ABSTENTION POSITION VINDICATED 
 
Classified By: DCM Emi Yamauchi for reasons 1.5 (b and d). 
 
------ 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Foreign Minister Foxley told visiting senior SFRC 
staffer Meacham Chile is not a candidate for the UNSC seat, 
said its decision to abstain had been proven correct by the 
ongoing stalemate between Guatemala and Venezuela, and that 
Chile would continue to play the role of "honest broker" in 
the search for a consensus candidate.  He appreciated the 
Secretary's phone call seeking out his assessment of the UNSC 
 
SIPDIS 
situation and mentioned Panama, the Dominican Republic, and 
Uruguay as possible consensus candidates.  Chile wants a 
quick resolution of the UNSC election as further delay will 
tarnish Latin America's image.  Foxley noted that the UNSC 
issue had, initially, been a low priority matter for Chile, 
whose focus was on regional integration and Latin 
American-Asia commercial ties.  But given the importance of 
the UNSC on key international issues, Chile sought to be 
helpful.  The FM also touched on Chile's relations with 
Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, observing that Brazil needed to do 
more to exercise regional leadership.  He also discussed with 
Meacham the relative merits of executive-legislative 
relations in the U.S. and Chile.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley met in his office 
October 27 with senior SFRC staffer Carl Meacham.  Foxley was 
joined by the MFA's U.S. desk officer.  Meacham was 
accompanied by DCM, E/POL Counselor and PA. 
 
---------------------- 
Chile as Honest Broker 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Meacham observed that after several days in Chile he 
had come to a better appreciation of the internal political 
dynamic that had led the Bachelet administration to abstain 
on the UNSC vote.  He congratulated the FonMin on his 
handling of a delicate situation.  While Washington 
observers, including Senator Lugar, had been perplexed that 
Chile had given consideration at all to voting for Venezuela, 
in the end Chile's analysis that neither Guatemala nor 
Venezuela could carry the vote had proven astute.  Guatemala 
remained a good candidate but Meacham understood Chile's 
position.  But now Chile had to work for consensus.  It is a 
regional leader, economically and politically, and must step 
up to that role.  That was the message he intended to bring 
back to Washington, adding Chile and the U.S. would continue 
to work together. 
 
4. (C) Foxley replied Chile lived within a democratic, open 
system of government and had to balance a diversity of views 
with a need for ordered decision-making.  The several 
Concertacion coalition governments had always been able to 
reach consensus.  But the matter of the UNSC vote had proven 
very difficult.  Building consensus had taken time and 
President Bachelet had carefully considered distinct party 
positions as well as changing developments, "such as Chavez' 
declarations."  She waited until the last moment so as to be 
able to take all factors into account.  It was the best 
possible choice and, in the end, "We have been vindicated." 
It has not been possible to reach consensus in Latin America 
"between two blocs."  And Chile is a small country that must 
have relations with all. 
 
5. (C) The FonMin raised the Secretary's phone call to him 
earlier in the week.  She had told him GRULAC must make a 
decision and the USG would not intervene in GRULAC's 
decision-making process.  She also asked for his assessment 
of the situation and wondered what Chile was doing to help 
resolve the impasse.  Foxley told her he appreciated the 
USG's willingness to step back and said Chile was "talking to 
everyone."  He emphasized that Chile "is not a candidate." 
Foxley said that Chile would not be credible if it "on the 
one hand pushed for a consensus candidate and, on the other, 
 
offered itself as that candidate."  He mentioned as possible 
consensus candidates Panama, the Dominican Republic, and 
Uruguay.  Bolivia's own candidacy, Foxley wryly observed, had 
likely been aborted by "Chavez' usual prudence and discretion. 
 
6. (C) Foxley said he was in daily contact with Chile's UN 
Ambassador Heraldo Munoz, who reported the October 26 GRULAC 
meeting had "gone badly" and resolved nothing.  Guatemala 
seemed willing to hold on to its candidacy at least into the 
Ibero-American Summit scheduled for November 3 in Montevideo, 
where it could presumably approach regional leaders.  Foxley 
hoped that it wouldn't take that long.  It is a dispute that 
doesn't help Latin America's image. 
 
 
7. (C) Meacham disputed Foxley's (falsely modest) 
characterization of Chile as "small and irrelevant."  Chile 
can play the role of honest broker.  Regional players such as 
Brazil and Argentina look to Chile for leadership.  While 
Chile cannot fill the entire void, it can "grease the 
wheels."  Foxley agreed, adding "That's why we can't be seen 
to be taking sides.  We have 'soft power.'"  Chile 
understands that it is envied by some countries, but these 
countries also listen for Chile's views.  In the words of 
Brazilian FonMin Amorian, "Chile's conceptual power far 
outstrips its politcal and economic power." 
 
------------------ 
Regional Relations 
------------------ 
 
8. (C) Foxley animatedly turned to the just concluded "2 plus 
2" talks between Chile and Peru's Foreign and Defense 
ministers (reftel).  He noted that Peru had brought along 
"nearly half of its cabinet," for talks he characterized as 
"very good."  Agreements had been reached on social, 
economic, and defense matters.  Given the often tense 
relations between the two neighbors, these successful 
negotiations set a good example for the rest of Latin 
America.  Chile's relations with Bolivia were also improving. 
 Foxley said he had met the previous day with a Brazilan 
business delegation to discuss Asia-Latin American commercial 
integration.  The way to unify Latin America is through 
commerce, especially by reaching out to the Pacific.  Chile, 
a country of 15 million, now had trade agreements with 
countries and markets totaling over 3.8 billion people. 
Business had to take the lead, with markets open to all. 
 
9. (C) Returning briefly to the UNSC election, Foxley said 
the issue had intially been "far down" on Chile's foreign 
policy agenda, with its focus instead on regional integration 
and Asia-Pacific commercial ties.  But when it became clear 
that the election had "global implications" Chile had decided 
to do what it could to help.  For this, he added, "I was 
deeply criticized by some in Concertacion who insisted on a 
vote for Venezuela." 
 
10. (C) Foxley noted the polls showing Lula winning second 
round elections in Brazil handily, but said Lula would be 
weakened by Cardozo's relatively strong showing and would 
have to reach out to him.  Nonetheless, he stressed that 
Brazil must take a more assertive leadership in the region. 
 
------------------------------- 
Executive-Legislative Relations 
------------------------------- 
 
11.(C) Meacham and Foxley also discussed briefly the relative 
merits of the U.S. and Chilean systems of government. 
Meacham noted that Chile's "very strong executive power" 
diminished the role of "checks and balances," which 
characterized U.S. executive-legislative branch relations. 
He also observed that Chile's legislators lacked the "thirty 
or so" legislative assistants that U.S. congressmen and 
senators have to help them shape legislation.  Foxley, a 
former senator himself, laughed and said "Thirty?  I wish I 
had had three!"  Foxley agreed on the relative role of 
 
governing institutions in the two countries.  He noted for 
example, that the executive branch controls the budget 
process in Chile.  The parliamant cannot raise the funding 
levels proposed by La Moneda, only lower them.  As a result, 
he said, Chile has only had budget surpluses and no tradition 
of "pork barrel" projects.  On the less positive side, 
Chile's electoral system needs reform to end the practice of 
minority parties being over-represented. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) Foxley's categoric rejection of a Chilean candidacy 
for the UNSC is at odds with what we have been hearing from 
others, who suggest that Chile is on standby and will serve 
if asked.  Moreover, we understand Ambassador Munoz has been 
far less categoric, reflecting his relative independence of 
the Foreign Ministry or his own agenda.  What is clear is 
that Chile will maintain its abstention, as it seeks to play 
out its role as "honest broker."  End comment. 
13. (U) Mr. Meacham has cleared this message. 
KELLY