VZCZCXRO3968
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHKL #1976/01 2921013
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191013Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7818
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH MY
SUBJECT: SURAYUD'S VISIT TO MALAYSIA FOCUSES ON SOUTHERN 
THAI UNREST 
 
REF: KUALA LUMPUR 1764 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND 
 D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Thai interim Prime Minister Surayud's October 18 
visit to Malaysia focused on unrest in Thailand's ethnic 
Malay/Muslim south.  Surayud pledged Thailand would 
increasingly consult with Malaysia regarding efforts to end 
the southern conflict, according to a Thai diplomat, but 
Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah and Surayud did not 
establish any specific role for Malaysia in a future peace 
process.  Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir continues 
to meet with southern Thai Muslim figures.  End Summary. 
 
Surayud Explains New Approach to the South 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Interim Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont visited 
Kuala Lumpur on October 18 as part of his initial calls on 
ASEAN capitals.  Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram, 
Defense Minister Boonrward Somtas, and Deputy Interior 
Minister Banyat Jansena accompanied Surayud.  The Thai PM's 
nine-hour mission included a meeting with his Malaysian 
counterpart Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, a joint press 
conference featuring the two leaders, and a separate 
discussion with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak. 
Malaysian press generated upbeat reports focused on Surayud's 
comments in support of a peaceful resolution to conflict, 
drawing contrasts with the perceived heavy-handed approach of 
ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  Speaking at the 
press conference, Surayud said, "I told the Malaysian Prime 
Minister that I will talk to the Muslim leaders in the south, 
talk to kids in the schools....  My strategy in trying to 
solve the problem is through peaceful means and I will try to 
seek advice and sometimes comments from Malaysia, get in 
touch personally and find a way through the troubled waters 
in southern Thailand." 
 
Malaysia: Ready to Help, But Only if Asked 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) PM Abdullah's public comments reinforced the view 
that Malaysia and Thailand had agreed to consult more closely 
to resolve the situation in southern Thailand.  Speaking to 
reporters, Abdullah said, "We will be available to contact 
each other...when our attention is needed immediately to 
resolve some of the problems that may arise in southern 
Thailand....  Any program to be introduced in the region that 
requires our support, we will extend (such support)." 
Abdullah and his deputy Najib were at pains to reiterate that 
Malaysia would not impose itself into a peace process or 
meddle in its neighbor's affairs.  Najib, quoted in the 
official state news agency Bernama, explained that, "we are 
willing to play a helpful, positive role but it is entirely 
up to (Thailand) to determine what kind of role.  We are 
quite happy to just sit back and watch the development 
because it's purely the Thai's internal problem." 
 
Mahathir Continues Meetings with Southern Figures 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (C) In the run-up to Surayud's visit, former Prime 
Minister Mahathir and his son Mukhriz publicly detailed their 
role in brokering talks between the Thai military and 
southern opposition leaders in late 2005 and early 2006. 
They described the initiative as completed and said it would 
be Thailand's decision to take any follow-up actions. 
(Comment:  According to a Thai diplomat, Abdullah personally 
approved of this activity prior to his bitter, open feud with 
Mahathir.  End Comment.)  Mahathir, however, has continued to 
keep contact with southern Thai leaders.  On October 17, 
Mahathir met with the head of a Muslim school in Pattani, 
reportedly to discuss the needs of the Thai Muslim community 
and to firm up Mahathir's commitment to fund the building of 
a mosque.  Mahathir explained he was not carrying out a peace 
mandate from any party. 
 
Thailand-Malaysia Agree on Contacts, Not Peace Role 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (C) A Thai diplomat involved in the visit told Polcouns 
October 19 that Surayud's agenda in Kuala Lumpur focused 
exclusively on the conflict in southern Thailand.  Surayud 
had informed Abdullah that Thailand would step up its 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001976  002 OF 002 
 
 
consultations with Malaysia, and actively seek Malaysian 
advice on ways to end the southern insurgency.  Surayud, 
however, did not describe this as leading to a specific 
Malaysian role in a peace process, and the Malaysians did not 
press for one.  The diplomat did not know what had transpired 
in the four-eyes meeting between the two leaders.  The 
diplomat offered that former Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir's activities with southern Thai leaders (below) had 
"nothing to do with the Malaysian Government."  In this and 
previous conversations, the Thai diplomat downplayed the 
importance of Mahathir's actions and questioned whether his 
southern Thai interlocutors were relevant to ending the 
violence.  Informed Malaysian Foreign Ministry officials were 
not available to us for comment on Surayud's visit. 
 
Malaysia to Continue Cautious Approach 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ISIS, a government-linked think tank) Chairman Jawhar bin 
Hassan told Polcouns October 18 that Malaysia would continue 
to be very cautious in terms of the unrest in southern 
Thailand.  Despite strong ethnic and religious bonds between 
the southern Thai and Malaysia's dominant Malay/Muslim 
majority, the GOM would do nothing to challenge Thailand's 
sovereignty or to incite further unrest.  If forced to choose 
between relations with Bangkok and those with restive 
southern Muslim leaders, Malaysia would choose Bangkok "hands 
down."  He noted that Thai leaders should avoid casting blame 
on Malaysia for violence within Thailand's borders, as this 
was a sure-fire way to infuriate Kuala Lumpur.  Jawhar 
commented that Mahathir's political opposition to Abdullah 
would not necessarily result in the GOM blocking a Mahathir 
effort to broker peace across the border.  Jawhar believed 
that there was strong consensus among Malaysian leaders, 
including Abdullah and Mahathir, regarding ways to stop the 
conflict in southern Thailand, so there was little risk 
Mahathir would carry such an effort in a way contrary to GOM 
policy.  Jawhar endorsed coordinated economic development 
strategies along the Malaysia-Thai border as one measure to 
encourage peace.  He advised, however, against Thailand 
bringing over Malaysian religious teachers with the intention 
of spreading moderate Islam among the southern Thai because 
most of Malaysia's current religious instructors were 
"intolerant" and "fundamentalist" in their outlook. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Malaysia has welcomed the Thai Government's post-coup 
focus on dialogue and peaceful means to resolve on-going 
violence affecting Malaysia's cousins across the border. 
Many Malaysians blamed Thaksin for the escalation of violence 
in southern Thailand and privately or openly cheered his 
ouster (reftel).  Surayud's October 18 visit reinforced 
Malaysians' hope that Bangkok has adopted a fresh, more 
conciliatory approach.  This may or may not translate into 
any important mediating role for Malaysia.  Our sense from 
contacts here is that the Thai have a healthy skepticism 
about Malaysia's ability to serve as a useful, honest broker 
and the GOM itself is not chomping at the bit to get too 
heavily involved. 
LAFLEUR