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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2386

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS KPKO ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: RELEASE OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS 
 
REF: Dili 487 
 
DILI 00000518  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. Summary: The Report of the United Nations Independent Special 
Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste was released today to the 
National Parliament of East Timor and to the public.  The UN 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) will now commence with 
an effort to distribute it widely throughout the country.  The 
release was followed by a joint appearance by the President, 
Prime Minister, and President of Parliament, commending the work 
of the Commission and urging the Timorese public and 
institutions to now seriously consider the findings and 
recommendations. There has so far been no notable change in 
Dili's security environment, but we will continue to closely 
monitor the situation over the coming days. The key findings of 
the report are consistent with the information we received in 
advance.  Although not directly recommended for  prosecution, 
former Prime Minister Alkatiri is described as holding the 
greatest political responsibility for the crisis and the report 
finds that there is sufficient evidence to merit further 
investigation of his possible role in unlawful arms 
distributions.  High profile individuals recommended for 
criminal prosecution include: former Minister of Interior 
Rogerio Lobato, dissident armed forces Major Alfredo Reinado, 
former Minister of Defence Roque Rodrigues and the Chief of 
Defence Force Taur Matan Ruak.  End summary. 
 
¶2. The Report of the United Nations Independent Special 
Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste was officially issued to 
the National Parliament today at 4:00pm Dili time.  The 
Commission was established in response to a request by the 
Government of East Timor to conduct a fact-finding mission on 
the events of April 28-29 and May 23-25, and to establish 
responsibility for the events and recommend accountability 
measures.  Acting Special Representative for the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Finn Reske-Nielsen delivered the Report to 
President of Parliament, Francisco "Lu'olo" Guterres.  Hard 
copies of the Tetum translation were delivered to all Members of 
Parliament.  No other hard copies were immediately available to 
the public, but according to sources in UNMIT, a campaign will 
now commence to distribute the report widely, including to all 
the districts, channeling it through churches, political 
parties, and NGOs as well as local government offices .  The 
report has also been posted on line in its original English as 
well as the three languages into which it was translated: Tetum, 
Portuguese and Indonesian.  However, very few Timorese have 
internet access. 
 
¶3. Following the release in Parliament, President Xanana Gusmao, 
President of Parliament Lu'olo and Prime Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta made a joint appearance to deliver a national 
message on the Report.  Speaking on behalf of all three, Gusmao 
commended the writers of the report for their impartiality and 
good analysis and encouraged all branches of government to 
immediately review the recommendations relevant to them, noting 
that the responsibility to respond to the Report now lay in 
Timorese hands.  He also called on all groups involved in 
violence to immediately end such activities.  This is only the 
second time that these three have appeared together since the 
crisis began.  The first time, last week, was also to deliver a 
national message in advance of the Report's release.  It is 
hoped that these appearances will discourage divisiveness in 
response to the report. 
 
No change in security environment so far 
---------------------------------------- 
¶4. Timorese residents of Dili have been increasingly nervous 
this past week about the issuance of the report.  Many have been 
afraid that the release will initiate a round of increased 
violence and there has been a renewed trend of people leaving 
Dili to return to the districts.  The ambiguity that surrounded 
the timing of the report release also fed an increasingly active 
rumor mill as people began conjecturing that the delay was 
caused by manipulation to change the contents of the report. 
The release of the report has, however, not produced an 
immediate change in the security environment as of this writing. 
 So far, Timorese we have spoken to who have had a chance to 
review the Report have responded positively, noting that it 
 
DILI 00000518  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
seems to be an impartial document.  However, Emboffs observed 
that many shops closed down early this afternoon, and many 
people opted to leave work early.  The American citizen 
community, who were yesterday invited for a security briefing at 
the Embassy in preparation for the Report, were informed this 
afternoon of the release and advised to refer to the most recent 
warden message for current security advice.  We will continue to 
monitor the situation in the coming days. 
 
Key findings of the Report 
-------------------------- 
¶5. The content of the report appears to largely conform with the 
information we received earlier from a Commission source (see 
reftel).  The key findings of the Report were provided in a 
press release from the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Geneva and are excerpted below: 
 
a) Regarding the events of April 28-29: 
-- That the Government failed to follow the requisite 
legislative procedures in calling out the F-FDTL on 28 April 
2006, a matter for which those members of the Crisis Cabinet who 
made the decision, and in particular the former Prime Minister 
bears responsibility. 
-- That there was no massacre by the F-FDTL of 60 people at Taci 
Tolu on 28-29 April. 
 
b) Regarding the events of May 23: 
-- That the evidence establishes that Major Reinado and the men 
who comprised his group are reasonably suspected of having 
committed crimes against life and the person during the armed 
confrontation in Fatu Ahi. 
-- That although the President should have shown more restraint 
and respect for institutional channels in communicating directly 
with Major Reinado after his desertion, the President did not 
order or authorize the armed group of men under the command of 
Major Reinado to carry out criminal actions. 
 
c) Regarding the events of May 25: 
-- That the Chief of Defence Force Taur Matan Ruak cannot be 
held criminally responsible for the shooting of the unarmed PNTL 
officers by F-FDTL soldiers after the ceasefire had been 
established on 25 May, although he failed to exhaust all avenues 
to either prevent or stop the confrontation between the F-FDTL 
and PNTL. 
 
d) Regarding weapons distribution: 
-- That both PNTL and F-FDTL weapons were distributed to 
civilians. 
-- That there was an absence of systematic control over weapons 
and ammunition within the security sector, particularly within 
the PNTL. The Commission finds that the Minister of Interior 
Rogerio Lobato and the General Commander Paulo Martins bypassed 
institutional procedures by transferring irregularly weapons 
within the institution. 
-- That in arming civilians, the Minister of Interior Rogerio 
Lobato, the Minister of Defence Roque Rodrigues and the Chief of 
Defence Force Taur Matan Ruak acted without lawful authority and 
created a situation of significant potential danger. They should 
be held accountable for illegal transfer of weapons. 
 
e) Regarding former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri: 
-- That he failed to use his firm authority to denounce the 
transfer of security sector weapons to civilians in the face of 
credible information that such transfer was ongoing and involved 
members of the Government.> 
-- That there is no evidence before the Commission which could 
lead to a recommendation that the former Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri be prosecuted for being personally involved in the 
illegal movement, possession or use of weapons. Nevertheless, 
there is information before the Commission giving rise to a 
suspicion that he knew about the illegal arming of civilians 
with PNTL weapons by Rogerio Lobato. Accordingly, the Commission 
has recommended further investigation to determine whether the 
former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri bears any criminal 
responsibility with respect to weapons offences. 
GRAY