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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBJ #2919/01 3031301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADDEE ON FORMAT LINE 7 - MSI4785 - AD3FFFFB)
O 301301Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1139
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3953

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 022919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF, EAP, EAP/CM 
INR FOR GILLES 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - COLLECTIVE CORRECTED ON FORMAT LINE 7 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AGOA ECON EAID CH
SUBJECT: PRC/AFRICA: CHINA-AFRICA FORUM GOALS: POLITICS, 
OPTICS AND TAIWAN 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 22370 
     ¶B. BEIJING 22713 
     ¶C. BEIJING 02952 
 
Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan.  Reasons 1.4 
 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Politics remains the cornerstone of Sino-African 
relations even though the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC)(Ref A) will tout extensive economic ties, including 
burgeoning two-way trade and as many as 2,500 bilateral 
agreements, Chinese scholars have told us.  As China 
increasingly asserts itself on the international stage, FOCAC 
has become China's most visible framework for advancing its 
interests in Africa by enabling China to group cohesively 
numerous and disparate bilateral initiatives for greatest 
optical effect.  The PRC still implements its Africa policies 
through strictly bilateral agreements.  The PRC's desire to 
isolate Taiwan diplomatically was perhaps the driving force 
behind FOCAC's creation in 2000 and Chinese leadership's 
decision to host this year's forum as a summit reflects the 
PRC's intent to maximize political pressure on the five 
African countries still in Taiwan's camp.  However, with the 
rapid growth of China's economy and Sino-African economic 
relations, as well as the PRC's recent success in expanding 
its one-China policy in Africa, the PRC now views FOCAC and 
its overall efforts in Africa as opportunities to "build its 
international reputation" and show China has become an active 
participant in such areas as international security 
cooperation, Chinese scholars assert.  China is willing to 
consider specific proposals from the West for cooperating on 
development initiatives in Africa but is wary of being too 
closely associated with Western conditionality, according to 
MFA officials and Chinese scholars.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs separately discussed Sino-African relations in 
the FOCAC context with Xu Weizhong, Director of the 
Department of African Studies of the Ministry of State 
Security-affiliated China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR), Wang Yingying, Senior 
Research Fellow at the MFA-affiliated Chinese Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS), Wang Hongyi, CIIS Associate 
Research Fellow, An Hongquan, Deputy Director of the State 
Council Development Research Institute (an in-house think 
tank for the State Council), Professor Xiao Bai of Renmin 
University's Institute for Strategic Studies, MFA officials 
and a number of Beijing-based African diplomats. 
 
A Political Cornerstone 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Politics remains the cornerstone of Sino-African 
relations even though FOCAC's Beijing Summit will tout 
extensive economic ties, including burgeoning two-way trade 
and as many as 2,500 bilateral agreements (Ref B), CIIS's 
Wang Yingying and Wang Hongyi said.  Chinese scholars have 
told us that for many years China's primary diplomatic 
concerns in Africa were Taiwan and more general ideological 
support (such as "South-South cooperation").  As China 
increasingly asserts itself on the international stage, the 
PRC now sees FOCAC and China's efforts in Africa as 
opportunities to "build its international reputation" and 
show China has become an active participant in such areas as 
international security cooperation, according to Wang 
Yingying and Wang Hongyi.  FOCAC has become China's most 
visible mechanism for forging a "strategic partnership" with 
Africa, reflecting Beijing's views that Africa is an 
increasingly important political bloc for the PRC both to 
protect its interests and "democratize" international 
relations, Wang Yingying said.  China's attention to the 
Africa bloc paid dividends in PRC efforts to stifle what it 
viewed as unfavorable United Nations Security Council 
reforms.  MFA officials have told us that China lobbied 
African countries bilaterally to thwart possible African 
Union proposals on UNSC reform that could potentially lead to 
political compromises resulting in a permanent Security 
Council seat for Japan (Ref C). 
 
¶4. (C) With China's preeminent foreign policy goal to create 
a relatively stable international environment in order to 
ensure China's internal development will continue unchecked, 
Africa plays an important role in China's national security 
strategy, Wang Hongyi said.  By way of illustration, Wang 
cited the link between China's energy needs and possible 
 
 
market disruptions caused by political chaos in the Sudan or 
the Horn of Africa.  In Africa, "stability is of paramount 
importance," MFA Deputy Africa Department Division Director 
Hu Zhangliang told us (in response to a discussion on China's 
frequent opposition to targeted sanctions). 
 
Taiwan's Significance 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Renmin University Institute for Strategic Studies 
Professor Xiao Bai told us that competition with Taiwan 
continues to be an important factor in PRC Africa policy. 
The State Council Development Research Institute's An 
Hongquan stressed that China's desire to isolate Taiwan 
diplomatically was perhaps the driving force behind China's 
decision to establish FOCAC in 2000.  The PRC's success at 
bringing African countries under its one-China policy over 
the past several years (including Liberia, Senegal and Chad), 
as well as the rapid growth of both its own economy and 
Sino-African economic relations, have created the opportunity 
to broaden FOCAC's scope, An said.  Noting that he had 
attended an October 26 internal meeting at the People's Daily 
to discuss the FOCAC Summit, Xiao said that the PRC 
leadership's decision to hold a summit-level forum this year 
in Beijing reflects not only the intention to show China as a 
major player in Africa but also to place maximum political 
pressure on African countries still in the Taiwan camp.  Xiao 
commented that the PRC expects most if not all five to send 
observer delegations at the Foreign Minister or Vice Minister 
level. 
 
¶6. (C) African diplomats in Beijing generally say they 
believe that China will run the table in the near future and 
establish diplomatic ties all 53 African countries, shutting 
out Taiwan.  "The economic incentives are great," a South 
African diplomat said, while noting that African countris 
also face some pressures from counterparts n sub-regional 
organizations to abandon Taiwa for the sake of both protocol 
and convenience.  The PRC also vigilantly guards against 
backsliding on Taiwan.  "During high-level visits, we always 
lead off with the one-China policy," an Egyptian diplomat 
said, "but after that we turn to a broad range of substantive 
issues." 
 
Omnibus Framework 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Practically, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation 
has become China's most visible framework for advancing its 
interests in Africa by enabling the PRC to group cohesively 
numerous and disparate bilateral initiatives for greatest 
optical effect, Chinese academics and African diplomats have 
told us.  Africa policy continues to be implemented on a 
strictly bilateral basis through government-to-government 
agreements and PRC support for Chinese enterprises, but China 
uses the FOCAC mechanism to maintain and improve 
continent-wide relations, CICIR's Xu Weizhong said.  "We 
conduct serious business bilaterally," Xu added by way of 
underscoring constraints on the Forum's potential to evolve 
into a broader multilateral mechanism. 
 
¶8. (C) A Ugandan diplomat told us the Forum's principle value 
is that it demonstrates that China takes Africa seriously, 
both politically and economically.  While initiatives such as 
debt reduction or special preferential treatment (SPT) for 
African imports will not necessarily benefit every country, 
China encourages many African countries to strengthen 
bilateral ties, an Ethiopian diplomat stated.  On a more 
cautionary note, a Nigerian diplomat said some African 
delegations may view the Beijing Summit as "another jamboree" 
but expressed his confidence that China will "pursue 
aggressively" any bilateral commitments undertaken.  The PRC 
is not concerned that African countries will seek to co-opt 
the Forum for any particular cause because the Africans 
respect China and are generally constrained by parochial 
concerns from speaking with one voice, according to a South 
African diplomat, who added that "there is simply no African 
consensus on Sino-African relations." 
 
Opportunities To Cooperate? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Beijing Summit is largely closed to Western 
participation.  In public and private, Chinese and African 
officials vigorously refute Western criticism that 
Sino-African relations are mercantile, neo-colonial or 
otherwise tilted sharply in China's favor at the expense of 
 
 
African economic sovereignty.  Asked whether the FOCAC 
mechanism presents opportunities for cooperation with the 
West on African development initiatives, Chinese academics 
and officials generally answer that China seeks cooperation 
"on an equal basis."  The Chinese view FOCAC as a bilateral 
mechanism.  CIIS's Wang Hongyi said that "China sees more and 
more cooperation with the West on African development 
initiatives, but generally will seek cooperation through 
United Nations agencies and other multilateral mechanisms." 
Wang said that China has long-expressed a desire to cooperate 
with Western pharmaceutical companies for the provision of 
medicines to Africa but has received little interest.  When 
pressed as to why the PRC Ministry of Commerce will not 
provide basic information on country-specific assistance, 
making it difficult for Western aid donors to build trust or 
coordinate development initiatives, Wang conceded that "China 
lags in information flow" but argued that current leadership 
is trying to improve China's transparency. 
 
¶10. (C) CICIR's Xu said China is "thinking seriously of 
expanding international cooperation on Africa but is hesitant 
to become associated with Western conditionality."  In 
addition, Xu said, the "West is not willing to have equal 
cooperation."  When pressed that on-the-ground efforts to 
involve China in donor coordination mechanisms in Africa are 
often not successful, Xu cited China's gradualist approach to 
economic initiatives, such as the introduction of Special 
Economic Zones.  Xu said China's wariness of Western 
intentions may be overcome through discrete development 
proposals that can build trust through their implementation. 
"The Chinese way is to start small, see if something works, 
then expand," Xu added.  MFA Deputy Division Director Hu said 
China will "attach great importance" to specific Western aid 
proposals, particularly in the areas of health, agriculture 
or infrastructure development.  A Zimbabwean diplomat noted 
that China is keen to access Western donor funds for its 
construction projects in Africa.  However, Chinese academics 
and officials generally say that the onus is on Western 
countries or companies to propose initiatives, stressing that 
any China cooperation with the West on Africa must include 
African input.  "The ball is in (the West's) court," MFA 
Deputy Division Director Hu said, arguing that China and the 
West do not have any major conflicts of interest in Africa. 
Randt