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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU
SUBJECT: ERITREA: DETERMINED TO PLAY ON DARFUR MEDIATION 
 
REF: ASMARA 838 
 
Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Only one day after the signing of the 
Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), Eritrea turned its 
attention to Darfur, meeting a National Congress Party 
(NCP) delegation led by Presidential Assistant Nafie ali 
Nafie and NCP Director of Intelligence and Security Saleh 
Gosh.  Reports indicate that the visit was intended to 
begin discussions between the NCP and GSE about a Darfur 
mediation led by Eritrea.  The DPA non-signatories in 
Eritrea are offering us the same message: a durable 
solution to the crisis in Darfur will require more 
discussion of wealth and power sharing, humanitarian 
relief, security, and compensation.  They also agree that 
the international community will need to play a key role in 
the mediation.  At the same time, the personalities who 
comprise the leadership of the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), and 
National Redemption Front (NRF), may make it difficult for 
the non-signatories to come together effectively in a 
mediation.  The GSE remains uncertain about its next steps 
and is pressing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) to engage more actively to help balance NCP 
influence in a mediation effort.  Despite the challenges, 
however, the GSE seems determined to be a key player in any 
mediation effort and looks to begin the process as soon as 
possible.  End Summary. 
 
ERITREA TO MEDIATE ... BUT NOT JUST YET 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) While reports in the press suggest that Eritrea has 
actually started mediating between the NCP and DPA non- 
signatories; the GSE adamantly denies that any course of 
action on Darfur has been agreed to.  In a meeting with 
visiting UK Khartoum Poloff and UK Ambassador on October 
18, Yemane Ghebreab (the GSE's primary voice on Sudan) 
denied that a decision had been made on the GSE taking lead 
role in a Darfur mediation but reaffirmed that the GSE is 
willing to assist in whatever way they can to help solve 
the problems of Darfur (see reftel).  However, in 
discussions with other members of the diplomatic community, 
GSE officials have confirmed that they intend at least to 
discuss a possible mediation with each side individually to 
get a sense of each side's positions and the possible 
parameters for negotiations.  In the second phase they 
would engage certain member of the international community 
and then begin an official mediation. 
 
NCP DELEGATION RETURNS TO ASMARA WITHOUT SPLM 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Emboff was informed by Sudan contacts that an NCP 
delegation led by Nafie ali Nafie and Saleh Gosh visited 
Asmara Monday, October 16 and departed early the following 
day.  The purpose of the visit was to follow up on a visit 
made just one week earlier (see reftel) which reportedly 
gave the GSE the green light to move ahead with a mediation 
between the NCP and DPA non-signatories.  The Egyptian DCM 
as well as other Sudan sources report that the NCP and GSE 
engaged in preliminary discussions for a possible Eritrean 
led mediation.  Reportedly, the NCP told the Eritreans that 
a new mediation cannot reopen the DPA - it can only discuss 
amendments to it.  The NCP also reportedly told the 
Eritreans that the negotiations could not discuss the 
establishment of a Darfur region nor could they offer any 
additional presidential positions. 
 
¶4. (C)  Many believe the visit was the direct result of a 
request by President Isaias who, following the ESPA signing 
on October 14, reportedly asked both the NCP and SPLM to 
send delegations back to Asmara to discuss a future 
Eritrean-led mediation on Darfur.  We are told that Isaias' 
meeting with the SPLM's Salva Kiir occurred after the 
departure of Sudanese President Al-Bashir from Asmara on 
October 14.  Isaias reportedly told Kiir that although the 
GSE was intent on keeping the SPLM involved in the process, 
the SPLM needed to follow through on its proposals and more 
actively demonstrate its interest in playing a role in 
Darfur.  Isaias cautioned Kiir that the NCP was seeking to 
sideline the SPLM's engagement on Darfur and could succeed 
in its efforts if the SPLM did not become more engaged. 
Isaias made it clear that the SPLM needed to send a senior- 
level delegation to work with the GSE on Darfur.  To date, 
no delegation has arrived in Asmara. 
 
DPA NON-SIGNATORIES UNITY TENUOUS AT BEST 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) While a majority of the DPA non-signatories are 
presently in Asmara, their unity is tenuous at best.  In 
discussions with DPA non-signatories all have highlighted 
concerns over security, humanitarian relief, compensation 
and power sharing, and they believe that these issues were 
not addressed adequately in the DPA.  They all also 
emphasize that the role of international actors/observers 
will be critical in any renewed mediation.  The non- 
signatories we have met with have also all publicly or 
privately accepted Eritrea as a mediator for possible talks 
and all have highlighted their desire to return to Darfur 
and consult with Darfurians.  They diverge, however, on who 
the relevant stakeholders in Darfur actually are. 
 
¶6. (C) The differences among the non-signatories are 
equally clear, however, and could threaten their ability to 
participate effectively in a mediation.  For example, in 
early October, Abdulwahid al-Nur and Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) representatives met with EU Special 
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto and provided him a 
copy of a "Comprehensive Roadmap for Resolving the Sudanese 
Conflict in Darfur."  The document itself, signed by the 
NRF and Abdulwahid for the SLM, is much more demanding in 
terms of power sharing and wealth sharing than they are in 
private discussions, and calls for more concessions from 
the government.  Additionally, it calls for Sudan to return 
to the federal structure and demarcation lines of 1956. 
(Note: Post will forward document to AF/SPG and Khartoum. 
End Note). 
 
¶7. (C) Despite this joint document, Abdulwahid al-Nur told 
Emboff on October 13 that his alignment with the JEM and 
NRF has been purely to please the Eritreans and that as 
soon as he is able to leave Eritrea he will denounce the 
JEM.  He explained that he wanted to work on uniting the 
SLM and would not be opposed to working though problems 
with Ahmed Abdulshaffi.  He also said he would welcome the 
return of Sharif Harir and Khamis Abdalla Ababr from the 
NRF, but was clear that he did not want JEM's Khalil 
Ibrahim involved.  Nor did he think that the NRF's Ahmed 
Diraige retains any credibility in Darfur.  Despite, his 
remarks to us on the 13th, however, Abdulwahid has, on any 
given day, declared his support for or alliance with any of 
the above and has told other interlocutors in Asmara that 
he is committed to the NRF, to an NRF-SLM alignment, etc. 
 
¶8. (C) In meetings with Sharif, Emboff was told that while 
all the DPA non-signatories want to achieve the same goals, 
there is some divergence on who they want to consult with 
in the field.  Sharif explained that he believed the NRF 
and Abdulwahid and Shaffi should come to a common position 
here in Asmara and then return to consult with the people 
of Darfur.  He was adamant that it should not be focused on 
the SLM, which he believes already has split into possibly 
five entities.  When pushed, Sharif hinted that he believed 
they should hold a consultative meeting in North Darfur and 
seemed to intimate that the key stakeholders would be the 
military commanders.  Sharif also explained that in a 
recent meeting with Shaffi, the NRF commanders had called 
to ask Shaffi to formally join the NRF.  He has declined 
for the moment, but agreed that they had the same goals in 
mind. 
 
¶9. (C) Meanwhile, in meetings with UK colleagues, Shaffi 
remained firm that he does not intend on giving up his SLM 
allegiances to join the NRF, but confirmed Sharif's 
assertion that he sees common ground between the DPA non- 
signatories.  As he did throughout July, Shaffi highlighted 
the need for an SLM leadership conference, acknowledging 
that more than one individual may come out on top.  He 
believes this needs to be done immediately and until that 
happens the SLM will not be able to work with other DPA 
non-signatories on issues related to mediation. 
 
CAN ABDULWAHID AND SHAFFI LEAVE ASMARA? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In the October 13 meeting with Abdulwahid, he 
explained to Emboff that he had obtained a visa to travel 
to Europe and was planning on going to Paris, but when he 
tried to depart Asmara on October 11, the Eritreans blocked 
him from leaving.  The EU's Haavisto told us on October 16, 
that he understood that Abdulwahid had attempted to depart 
the country again on October 14 and was again turned 
around.  It is unclear why Abdulwahid wishes to leave 
Asmara now.  There are a number of rumors, including wide- 
spread speculation that his urgency is fueled by a bribe 
from the NCP (or Libya) to keep him from aligning with the 
NRF.  In any event, rumor has him seeking to travel to 
Paris to meet French authorities; to attend an NCP 
sponsored meeting in Paris between him, Minni Minawi and 
Khalil Ibrahim; or, even to travel on to Tripoli for a 
meeting with the Libyans.  Abdulwahid refused to tell 
Emboff why he needed to leave so urgently.  Meanwhile, 
Emboff also learned from UK colleagues, that Shaffi too has 
complained of being unable to depart Asmara and claims that 
the GSE is holding his travel documents. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The DPA non-signatories all seem willing to at 
least talk about talks with the GSE and all share a common 
perception on the core issues for discussion.  However, it 
seems equally clear that the personalities vying for 
dominance will continue to clash and will continue to get 
in the way of unity among the non-signatories.  That said, 
the Eritreans - despite their disclaimers - seem intent on 
playing a role in any Darfur mediation.  They appear to 
recognize the challenges and that they may need help, 
including having the SPLM play a role balancing the NCP. 
Thus they are all the more frustrated with Kiir's seeming 
inability to follow through on previous proposals and 
discussions with the Eritreans on Darfur.  The next steps 
remain very much uncertain.  Post believes, however, that 
the Eritreans consider themselves to be, in essence, the 
designated mediator and are intent on beginning 
negotiations as soon as possible.  End Comment. 
DELISI