VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0866 2911419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181419Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8501
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 6006
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0170
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2888
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1239
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1414
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0571

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000866 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO MOPS PINR UNSC ER
SUBJECT: ISAIAS: WE COULD WAIT NO LONGER; ERITREA,S TROOPS 
LIKELY TO REMAIN IN TSZ 
 
REF: ASMARA 861 
 
Classified By: AMB. Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1) (U) As of 15:00 (8:00 EDT) on October 18, the situation on 
the ground in the Western Sector of the TSZ has not changed. 
1000 troops and estimated 10 tanks remain near Om Hajer and 
an estimated 500 troops and 4 tanks remain outside of 
Shambiko.  Earlier reports of up to 50 tanks and 5000 troops 
have not been corroborated by UN or other sources.  At most 
it appears that two more tanks may have entered the TSZ.  At 
the same time, at least some of the restrictions on movement 
of UNMEE in the western sector appear to have eased. 
 
2) (C) The clearest statement so far of the intentions that 
led the GSE to move into the TSZ came from President Isaias 
in an October 17 meeting with UN Special Envoy for 
Humanitarian Affairs for the Horn of Africa, Kjell Magne 
Bondevik.  Isaias forcefully informed Bondevik that Eritrea 
has waited four and a half years for action by the 
international community in implementing the Algiers Accord 
and that they are tired of waiting.  Isaias declared that 
Eritrea is disappointed with the UN and international 
partners for not enforcing the binding decision of the EEBC 
and would, in essence, reassert its sovereignty over the TSZ 
(which is, and has always been recognized as, Eritrean 
territory.) 
 
¶3. (C) The Netherlands Ambassador, Nelleke Linssen(protect), 
told Ambassador the evening of October 17 that she had heard 
much the same argument from Yemane Ghebremeskel of the Office 
of the President.  Yemane, asserting Eritrean sovereignty 
over the TSZ, emphasized that it needed to be fully developed 
and that it represents some of the nation,s most rich and 
fertile land.  He stated specifically that the Eritrean goal 
was to bring about the end of the TSZ.  Ghebremeskel told the 
Ambassador much the same in a separate conversation much the 
same but stopped short of affirming that the GSE wanted to 
collapse the TSZ ) despite being asked specifically several 
times.  Ghebremeskel equally was unwilling to offer his views 
on whether Eritrea was, in essence, telling UNMEE to leave 
Eritrea ) though he appeared unfazed when Ambassador and 
others suggested that this might be one of the possible 
outcomes if the GSE was no longer prepared to recognize or 
respect the TSZ. 
 
¶4. (C) The comments by Isaias and  Ghebremeskel expand upon 
statements made in the press by other GSE officials (reftel) 
and conversations with Col. Zacharias Ogbagaber, the GSE 
Commissioner to UNMEE.  Col. Zacharias told Poloff that the 
soldiers were there to help with the harvest and that armies 
always move with their equipment.  He further explained that 
they needed the tanks for protection because there were tanks 
on the other side of the border.  At a meeting with UNMEE 
SRSG Azouz Ennifar, Col. Zacharias reiterated this statement 
claiming the military was charged with the management of all 
development projects and that the land needs to be developed. 
 UNMEE staff also told Poloff that President Isaias 
reportedly had forwarded a letter to UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, however, the text of the letter was unknown. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: We anticipate a growing assertion of GSE 
control over the TSZ, especially in the fertile west and 
central sectors.  The implications of the GSE,s action 
remain uncertain, however, especially in regard to the 
Cessation of Hostilities agreement, the Algiers Accord and 
even the EEBC decision.  Although the military implications 
of this action appear, for now, benign the political and 
diplomatic fallout in terns of the further efforts to resolve 
the border standoff could be considerable.  End comment. 
DELISI