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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
STATE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN SUDAN AGREEMENT: TWO DOWN, ONE TO GO 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 164613 
 
     ¶B. B. ASMARA 787 
 
Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Over the past week, the Eastern 
Front and Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU) 
have agreed in principle to the wealth sharing and 
security arrangement components of an agreement on 
the future of eastern Sudan.  The parties are 
finalizing power sharing arrangements, the final 
component of the agreement, and hope to have all 
three drafts initialed by the end of the week. 
Current plans call for signing the agreement in mid- 
October with the Eastern Front holding a conference 
to explain the agreement to its constituencies in 
Tesseney, Eritrea in early November.  All parties 
seem happy with the agreement's draft elements thus 
far.  While not meeting all of their initial goals, 
the Eastern Front members believe the agreement is a 
stepping stone towards strengthening the Eastern 
Front as a political party and achieving future 
development in eastern Sudan.  Barring any surprises 
in the final version, Post believes the Department 
should support the agreement as a step towards 
stability in the region and should consider carefully 
providing funding for training and capacity-building 
programs. End Summary. 
 
SECURITY ARRANGEMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On September 28, the Eastern Front and the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) initialed the 
agreement's security arrangement document.  Dr. Amna 
Dirar, vice chairman of the Eastern Front, told 
Emboff that the Eastern Front was pleased with the 
outcome and provided details of the security 
arrangements.  The document outlines the integration 
of the majority of the Eastern Front troops - 
estimated at just over 5,000 - into the national army 
and police forces.  It stipulates that there will be 
three main units in the east.  Each of these units 
will draw at least 33 percent of its members from the 
Beja and Rashaida tribes.  These individuals will be 
required to serve in units in eastern Sudan for a 
minimum of five years, after which, they may possibly 
be moved to other areas of the country. 
 
¶3. (C) The Eastern Front believes that approximately 
one quarter of the Eastern Front troops will choose 
to be demobilized prior to integration.  A program to 
reintegrate these individuals back into society is in 
the planning stages.  Dirar believes the process for 
integration and demobilization will take six to eight 
months in total.  She also explained that a side 
agreement was reached, not included in the security 
arrangement document, which would provide the Eastern 
Front with 250 seats in the military and police 
academies in Khartoum over the next three years. 
 
WEALTH SHARING 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The draft for the wealth sharing agreement was 
finalized and initialed on October 1.  Many of the 
details of the agreement were made available in the 
Khartoum daily, al-Sahafa. (Note: Article was sent to 
AF/SPG and Embassy Khartoum. End Note.)  The wealth 
sharing draft appears to focus solely on the 
development fund, excluding initial Eastern Front 
requests for percentages of revenues. 
¶5. (C) Dr. Taisir Ali of the Peacebuilding Center in 
the Horn of Africa (PCHA) told Emboff that the GNU, 
under the terms of the draft agreement, will provide 
600 million USD into the Development Fund for Eastern 
Sudan over the next five years.  This amount falls 
significantly below the Eastern Front's request for 1 
billion USD, but above the GNU's initial offer of 300 
million USD spread over seven years.  The draft 
agreement states that Federal Minister of Finance Al- 
Zubeir Ahmed al-Hassan will administer the fund, with 
oversight by a committee responsible for approving 
expenditures and programs.  The nine-person committee 
will include: three individuals appointed by the 
Eastern Front, the three governors (Walis) of eastern 
Sudan, and three individuals from eastern Sudan 
appointed by President Bashir.  The day-to-day 
running of the fund will be handled by an expert 
economist from eastern Sudan, although no specifics 
were given on who this individual will be. 
 
¶6. (C) The arrangement does not include any of the 
Eastern Front's initial demands for a percentage of 
revenues from the gold mines, oil or Port Sudan 
income.  Taisir pointed out that while the wealth 
sharing agreement failed to address the issue of 
revenue sharing, there was a memorandum of 
understanding on affirmative action regarding 
industries in eastern Sudan witnessed by the 
mediator.  He said that the GNU also committed to 
providing employment opportunities for all national 
projects in eastern Sudan, specifically in the gold 
mines, oil industry and Port Sudan; however, no 
specifics on numbers are included in the draft 
memorandum of understanding. 
 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON POWER SHARING 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Since the outset of negotiations, the issue of 
creating one region from the three states of eastern 
Sudan has been the biggest obstacle to an agreement. 
All along, the GNU has clearly indicated that it was 
unlikely to concede to such a demand.  The Eastern 
Front has offered two compromise proposals to the 
GNU.  Dirar told Emboff that both the Eastern Front 
and GNU had agreed in principle to create a 
coordinating body for eastern Sudan, which would link 
the three states together.  The coordinating body 
would include the governors (Walis) from each state 
and would be headed up by an additional, currently 
unidentified individual. 
 
¶8. (C) The second proposal is for the GNU to hold a 
national conference on the issue of regionalism in 
Sudan in the next year.  The conference would discuss 
returning to a model from Sudan's past, which would 
create, among other things, distinct regions in the 
east and Darfur and a more decentralized national 
government.  A national referendum on the issue would 
be held before the next election.  (Comment: This 
approach could, according to some observers including 
Taisir, backfire on the Eastern Front and Darfurians, 
as the NCP holds a majority in many regions outside 
of southern Sudan.  End Comment.) 
 
¶9. (C) On political representation, Dirar said the 
Eastern Front and GNU have agreed in principle to one 
central minister, one state minister, five MPs in the 
GNU and 10 MPs in each of the regional governments. 
The parties are still discussing whether the Eastern 
Front will be given an assistant or advisor position 
to the president similar to the one created for 
Darfur. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) The eastern Sudan negotiations are expected 
to conclude with the initialing of a final draft on 
power sharing by the end of this week.  Post has 
heard that President Bashir will travel to Asmara to 
sign the agreement; the timing of the signing will 
depend on his schedule but is expected to occur 
within the upcoming week.  The Eastern Front is 
already discussing a conference to be held in early 
November in Tesseney, Eritrea, to legitimize the 
process and work on completing the structures of the 
Eastern Front before heading to Khartoum and back to 
the field to garner support for the agreement. 
 
EASTERN FRONT INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Post notes that the lack of cohesion within 
the Eastern Front over the last year has arisen 
primarily as the result of a personality clash 
between Musa Muhammed Ahmed, Chairman of the Eastern 
Front and Dr. Amna Dirar, and not due to inter-clan 
divisions between the Rashiada and Beja.  In fact, 
both Musa and Amna are members of the Beja tribe, 
although from different sub-clans.  Their 
disagreements stem more from differences in 
backgrounds, experience and world views than from 
tribal or clan allegiances. 
 
¶12. (C) While nuances of clan affiliations and 
tensions need to be taken into account during the 
implementation phase, most of post's Sudan contacts 
believe an agreement will help to unify the Eastern 
Front as an organization.  As for the current Eastern 
Front team, Musa Muhammed Ahmed, Abdallah Kuna and 
Ali Safi have all been given general officer postings 
in the army.  The agreement stipulates that any 
individual holding a post in the army cannot hold a 
post in the political party.  As a result, their 
future move to the army will mean that the current 
divisions are unlikely to factor as prominently in 
future Eastern Front party politics. 
 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND SUPPORT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The international community has been meeting 
regularly to discuss the agreement and the challenges 
facing the Eastern Front.  While no one believes the 
agreement is perfect or without flaw, the diplomatic 
community does believe the agreement is a step in the 
right direction and should be supported.  Post is 
focusing with our EU colleagues on ways to enhance 
the capabilities of the Eastern Front as a political 
party, ways to educate the populations of Eastern 
Sudan on the agreement and the need for greater 
involvement of the Eastern population in future 
elections. 
 
¶14. (C) The Eastern Front has asked for the 
international community to witness the agreement and 
for specific assistance on oversight and 
implementation of the development fund as well as 
assistance in sponsoring the upcoming conference in 
Tesseney.  Most observers in the diplomatic community 
have expressed hesitation toward witnessing an 
agreement which they have not helped create, but all 
agree on the need to support the agreement and its 
future implementation. 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶15. (C) Post agrees with the international community 
that the agreement, while not perfect, is a step in 
the right direction.  While the Eastern Front has not 
been able to achieve all the goals that were set 
forth at the outset, they can build on this 
agreement.  Achieving their goals in the future will 
require the international community's assistance. 
Post shares the general reluctance to formally 
witnessing the agreement and notes that we have not, 
in any event, been requested to do so formally by the 
mediator.  Nor is it clear that the GNU would agree 
to international signatories to this agreement in any 
capacity.  We urge, however, that the Department 
consider supporting the agreement and its 
implementation through capacity building assistance 
for the Eastern Front among other options. 
DELISI