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DE RUEHUNV #0659/01 2491734
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O 061734Z SEP 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5398

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000659 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: "LIKE-MINDED" DISCUSS DG REPORT, 
UPCOMING BOARD 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (U) This is a guidance request; please see para 9. 
 
¶2. (C)  Ambassador Schulte met with the group of 
"like-minded" countries (EU3, CAN, AUS, NZ, NOR, ROK, JAP, 
ARG) on September 6, with all parties agreeing that the DG's 
August 31 report clearly shows Iranian defiance of UNSCR 1696 
(even though some thought the report could have been more 
specific and tougher).  All concurred that UNSCR 1696 makes 
suspension a legally binding requirement, as opposed to a 
"voluntary confidence measure." Regarding the upcoming Board 
meeting, there was general agreement on the need for tough 
country statements and a more hard-hitting Chairman's summary 
that contained less "NAM-like" text.  The Board may need to 
cut-off technical cooperation to Iran at the November Board, 
if not before, especially in light of the Secretariat's 
decision not to deny Iran's request for TC assistance on the 
heavy water reactor at Arak.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
DG's August 31 Report "Provides What We Need" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The various countries all agreed that the DG's report 
generally served our interests in highlighting Iran's 
defiance of UNSCR 1696.  Australia, however, expressed 
concerns that the Secretariat seemed to have "glossed over" 
and downplayed Iran's denial of access to the underground 
enrichment halls at Natanz, which Canberra's Safeguards 
experts viewed as a "high-level Safeguards breach."  The 
Australian Embassy promised to provide us a copy of 
Canberra's assessment, which we will forward separately. 
Ambassador Schulte echoed these concerns, noting that the 
Secretariat was arguing that the Iranians had only "delayed 
 
SIPDIS 
access" as a way to mitigate this action and avoid a 
confrontation with the IAEA.  Schulte also noted that the 
Agency could have pushed back harder when Iran denied access 
to several senior inspectors.  The UK and France opined that 
the report could have been more specific in addressing Iran's 
shortfalls, but the latter indicated that it "provides what 
we need." 
 
----------------------------------- 
UNSCR 1696: Legally Binding Mandate 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) There were no dissenting views with our assessment 
that UNSCR 1696 is a legally binding document that takes 
precedence over Iran's Article IV "right" to peaceful nuclear 
technologies.  Suspension is no longer a voluntary, 
confidence-building measure, but a legally binding 
requirement to restore international confidence in Iran's 
program.  The French ambassador expressed concern that the 
IAEA Secretariat was acting as though UNSCR 1696 was never 
adopted, and argued that OP6 gave new authority and 
responsibility to the Agency with respect to transparency 
measures. The French conveyed that during a meeting on 
September 4, the DG said that, in his view, UNSCR 1696 does 
not provide the Secretariat with additional legal 
authorities.  The DG also noted that he did not need 
additional authorities at this time, which the French said 
was "a very bad argument."  The UK noted that the DG is 
reticent to push Iran on inspection-related issues so as not 
to impinge on ongoing political discussions.  Ambassador 
Schulte emphasized that we all need to remind the DG of his 
role as a nuclear watchdog-not as a nuclear negotiator.  The 
Australian ambassador suggested that "like-minded" countries 
might want, at the Board meeting, to specify areas in which 
the Secretariat should use existing authority, or any new 
authority from UNSCR 1696, to press their investigation. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Arak Technical Cooperation: "Very Strange" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) The French also presaged what they viewed as a very 
contentious Board meeting in November, at which they 
envisioned the Board having to make a decision on Iran's 
request for TC-related assistance on the heavy water reactor 
at Arak -- which the Board and UNSC have asked Iran to 
suspend. He said that it would have been better if the Agency 
had shut this request down, labeling the Iranian request as a 
"very strange try." Ambassador Schulte agreed, noting that 
the UNSC will likely take this issue up and that the Board 
may need to consider cutting off the Agency's TC-related 
assistance to Iran at the November Board, if not before, 
though we would probably take our lead from the Security 
 
Council. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
September Board: Tough Statements, Better Chairman's Summary 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Noting that the Board will likely not take any 
decisions this month, Australia emphasized the need for tough 
country statements, while encouraging the EU to "speak out" 
instead of just having a single, coordinated statement on 
behalf of the entire EU. The French and UK offered up weak 
rebuttals; the former said that the EU statement will 
represent about 30 countries, while the latter cautioned 
about possible "daylight" between the statements that would 
provide fodder for the media.  The US and Australia both 
pushed back, encouraging them to reconsider this approach. 
 
¶7. (C) Australia, echoing our concern that Chairman Amano's 
summary at the June Board was unbalanced in favor of Iran, 
encouraged all of the EU countries to speak.  Ambassador 
Schulte noted that, at the June Board, the Iranians seemed 
shocked by  the DG's tougher-than-usual report, but were then 
comforted by the Chairman's unbalanced summary, which 
contained an inordinate amount of NAM-like language relative 
to like-minded concerns. He also recommended individual EU 
statements to "help" the Chairman write a better summary.  At 
the end of the meeting, our Japanese counterparts clearly 
took the concerns on board and indicated that they would 
convey them to Amano. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
P3 plus Germany Circumspect on Iran Response, Next Steps 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8. (C) In response to several inquiries about our reactions 
to Iran's response and the UNSC's next steps, the French 
noted that the PolDirs are planning to meet in Berlin on 
September 7, while providing no details of planned actions. 
The French also handed out a copy of talking points on their 
reactions to Iran's response (complete text para 10.) 
Ambassador Schulte noted that the UNSC will now need to move 
to a sanctions resolution, as explicitly anticipated in UNSCR 
¶1696. 
 
---------------- 
Guidance Request 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Request Washington guidance on: a) whether we share 
Australia's view that Iran's denial of access to the Fuel 
Enrichment Plant at Natanz was a major Safeguards violation, 
even though access was subsequently granted, and whether this 
should be a major point in our Board intervention; b) whether 
and in what areas we should be pressing the Secretariat to 
exploit existing authorities, and any additional authority 
conferred by UNSCR 1696 to investigate outstanding issues 
associated with Iran's nuclear program. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
French Reactions to Iran's Response to P5 plus One 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶10. (C) Begin Text of French Talking Points: 
 
Larijani handed over Iran's formal reply to the E3 plus 3 
proposal on 22 August. In handing it over, Larijani stressed 
that we respect the confidentiality of the reply, so we are 
not in a position to share it with you at this stage. But, as 
a country with which we have maintained a close dialogue, we 
wanted to brief you on the main points. 
The reply itself is long (21 pages), verbose and complicated, 
and ambiguous in many places. Much of the reply is devoted to 
setting out Iranian positions on the history of the 
negotiations, its rights under the NPT, and its rejection of 
international pressure in familiar terms. 
On the key substantive points, Iran says it is prepared to 
discuss the suspension in the course of negotiations, but not 
before. In addition, Larijani set out conditions for entering 
into a discussion of this subject: 
a. The "termination" of Iran's dossier in the Security 
Council and its return to the IAEA. 
b. Normalisation of Iran's nuclear case in the IAEA. 
c. A commitment not to "pursue the limitation of Iran's 
peaceful activities as the result of negotiations, but to aim 
for achieving the mutually agreed methods to provide more 
assurances on the peaceful nature and non-diversion of these 
activities." 
Contrary to previous Iranian positions, the reply makes no 
reference to past Iranian failures to comply with its 
obligations or address outstanding questions about its 
fissile missile programme, and at one stage even suggests 
that normalisation of Iran's file at the IAEA means dropping 
discussion of Iran's file by the Board of Governors. 
In sum, the reply is along the lines of previous Iranian 
statements in that typically it neither accepts nor rejects 
outright the E3 plus 3 proposals. By offering various 
carrots, like the hint that Iran is prepared to resume the 
suspension or resume Additional Protocol Co-operation (if a 
series of very difficult to meet conditions is fulfilled) the 
Iranian goal obviously is to split the international 
community and draw us into a process of talks about talks, on 
Iranian terms, while making no commitments of its own while 
continuing with its enrichment programme. 
On substance the reply as it stands implies that Iran is not 
prepared to meet the critical IAEA Board requirement, now 
made mandatory by SCR 1696, that Iran suspend all 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including R 
and D until remaining questions are resolved and confidence 
in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme has been 
re-established. In effect, it amounts to rejection of the E3 
plus 3 approach, which made clear that suspension of 
enrichment is necessary for confidence and a key element of 
good faith for the resumption of negotiations. 
However, despite our disappointment, we do not intend to 
reject the Iranian reply out of hand. The next step is 31 
August when Mohammed EIBaradei will report on the process of 
Iranian compliance with SCR 1696. The E3, with Russia and 
China, if they wish, are seeking to meet with the Iranians at 
Political Director level before then to obtain further 
clarification on the Iranian reply and to urge them to take 
the action legally required by the Security Council. 
If Iran does not comply with the Resolution, the UNSC will 
have to consider further steps as required by the Resolution. 
We will keep you closely informed of developments. 
SCHULTE