VZCZCXRO2084
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2060/01 2491016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061016Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4320
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE (HOH, 
SAINZ, FOOKS) AND EUR PPD, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016 
TAGS: PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED 
BY DIVIDED BOSNIAKS, CROATS, AND SERBS 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 2039 
     ¶B. SARAJEVO 1762 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY, REASONS 1 
.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: September 1, the first official day of the 
campaign season in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was characterized 
by high-profile events emphasizing ethnic interests.  Serb 
and Croat parties are seeking the support of their 
electorates by courting patrons in Belgrade and Zagreb.  The 
Bosniak political debate is focused on issues of Islamic 
identity and the intersection of political and religious 
spheres. The common thread in the political discourse is 
criticism of the March constitutional reform package as 
candidates compete to be seen as the most reliable advocates 
for their ethnic group's interests.  For now, the pragmatic 
approach to reform and capacity building that characterized 
constitutional reform negotiations, and will be crucial for 
Bosnia after the elections, has fallen victim to 
lowest-common-denominator electioneering.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RS Premier Dodik in Belgrade 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik launched 
his electoral campaign with a visit to Belgrade August 31 and 
September 1, where he met with Serbian President Boris Tadic 
and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica.  Despite conciliatory 
joint statements with his Serbian colleagues on their shared 
commitment to the prosecution of war criminals, most of 
Dodik,s comments were directed towards a pan-Serb 
constituency and designed to appeal to RS-based Serb 
nationalism.  Dodik endorsed Belgrade,s position on Kosovo, 
stating that his government believes Kosovo should remain a 
part of the Republic of Serbia.  He added that citizens of 
the RS were watching Kosovo negotiations closely and a 
decision creating an independent Kosovo would lead to 
"discontent" in the RS.  Dodik also joined Serbian PM 
Kostunica,s condemnation of Chief Kosovo Negotiator Martti 
Ahtisaari,s statements on the collective responsibility of 
the Serb people, saying that as a UN representative, 
Ahtisaari,s role is to "conduct negotiations in an unbiased 
way and to represent both sides equally." 
 
¶3.  (C) Dodik,s appeal to RS nationalism, including his 
regular references to a possible referendum on RS 
independence, is prompting other RS-based political parties 
to ratchet up their nationalist rhetoric as well.  Though 
Serb Democratic Party leader and RS President Dragan Cavic's 
public statements remain relatively conciliatory, SDS Vice 
President and SDS Tri-Presidency candidate Mladen Bosic 
asserted last week that the RS electorate no longer supported 
the package of constitutional reforms agreed to in March.  He 
went on to suggest that post-election constitutional reform 
negotiations should start anew.  On August 30, the Serbian 
Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS-RS), with support from 
SDS, sought to convene a special session of the RS National 
Assembly (RSNA) to debate several politically explosive 
issues related to the RS,s status within BiH, including 
constitutional reform and police reform (ref A). 
 
Bosnian Croats Compete for Zagreb,s Blessing 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) As Dodik and his colleagues look to Belgrade, 
Bosnia,s Croat parties have been vying for endorsements from 
Zagreb, which they see as critical to energizing apathetic 
Croat voters (Note: Only 28% of Bosnian Croats voted in the 
2002 national election. End Note).  Croatian Democratic Union 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina-1990 (HDZ-1990), which split from 
HDZ-BiH over constitutional reform and built its campaign 
around opposition to the March package, has aggressively 
courted Zagreb, particularly Croatian PM Ivo Sanader.  For 
example, in mid-August HDZ-1990 leaders Bozo Ljubic and 
Martin Raguz attended mass with Sanader in the southern 
Croatian town of Prolozac.  Afterwards several Sanader 
advisors appeared at HDZ-1990 election rallies.  The 
courtship paid its biggest dividend at the September 2-3 
HDZ-1990 party conference when Sanader addressed the 
gathering via video-link and wished Ljubic, Raguz and their 
followers "election victory." 
 
¶5.  (C) HDZ-1990,s anti-constitutional reform rhetoric and 
 
SARAJEVO 00002060  002 OF 002 
 
 
its support from Zagreb have put HDZ-BiH and its leader 
Dragan Covic on the defensive.  According to press reports, 
Covic is "desperately" trying to find political allies in 
Croatia to offset Sanader,s support for HDZ-1990.  Covic has 
also steadily escalated his nationalist rhetoric.  In a 
meeting with us several weeks ago, Covic privately criticized 
Sanader,s proposal to hold an international conference on 
the future of BiH in Zagreb (ref. B), but early in the week 
of August 28, Covic publicly endorsed it. (Note: Bosnians, 
particularly Croats, interpret the Sanader initiative as an 
implicit rejection of the March constitutional reform 
package. End Note).  Covic went a step further in an August 
31 interview by claiming, "we, the Croats, will have our own 
entity as well" and suggesting that he would seek an end to 
entity voting when constitutional reform talks resumed after 
the elections. 
 
Tihic Versus Ceric 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) On August 31, the Islamic Community (IC) leader Reis 
Mustafa ef. Ceric chaired a session of the Riaset, 
essentially a legislative body that consists of the Reis, 
Muftis, Imams, and professors from Islamic schools.  The 
Riaset announced that the IC would not endorse any political 
party or candidate.  Despite this, and earlier promises not 
to interfere in politics, the Reis has appeared at religious 
ceremonies to which government leaders were not invited with 
Party for BiH (SBiH) leader and Tri-Presidency candidate 
Haris Silajdzic.  The appearances with Silajdzic are often 
coupled with the Reis, public criticism of the Bosniak 
political leadership,s (read President Sulejman Tihic,s) 
failure to defend Bosniak interests within BiH (i.e., during 
constitutional reform talks).  Several of Tihic,s allies 
within the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) have begun to 
fight back, however.  In a letter subsequently leaked to the 
press, SDA Main Board President Irfan Ajanovic criticized the 
Reis for meddling in Bosniak politics and accused him of 
being linked to organized crime. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) As this snapshot of current election-related events 
makes clear, the general tone of the campaign (reported 
reftels) has not improved. The major political parties 
(except the Social Democratic Party) are neglecting 
issues-based campaigning in favor of scapegoating ethnic and 
religious rivals for the problems facing the country.  Ten 
years after Dayton we had hoped to see an expansion of 
national political discourse, but what we see, in effect, is 
three distinct campaigns.  Unfortunately, much of the 
campaign rhetoric has focused on criticism of the 
constitutional reforms negotiated in March rather than 
inter-ethnic civic or economic interests.  This portends an 
election that will have little to do with resolving questions 
important to Bosnia,s Euro-Atlantic future, but rather 
reinforcing longstanding patterns of fractious identity 
politics. 
MCELHANEY