VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #1955/01 2441724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011724Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5994
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0418
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3588
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0017

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 001955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CU CI CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA ON CUBAN TRANSITION: WE,LL DO IT OUR WAY 
 
REF: A. STATE 139584 
     ¶B. WHA-SAN JOSE EMAIL 8/16/06 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On August 28, Ambassador and DCM called on 
FM Bruno Stagno to discuss how to further bilateral and 
regional cooperation in support of a democratic transition in 
Cuba.  Stagno was receptive to the suggestion that Arias and 
the GOCR use Costa Rica,s "moral stature" to advocate change 
in Cuba, but with caveats.  He said the GOCR is not convinced 
a genuine transition us underway; Costa Rica has limited 
moral authority with Cuba, anyway; Arias will have to focus 
more on domestic or other pressing international issues (such 
as relations with Nicaragua); and Mexico,s domestic 
political uncertainties have hampered efforts to form a 
contact group with Chile and Costa Rica.  Stagno raised the 
notion of first lifting the U.S. embargo as a catalyst for 
motivating the Cuban "street." The Ambassador made clear that 
this was decidedly not the USG view.  The FM dismissed the 
September 1 SICA meeting as "technical," and thus not the 
venue for crafting a common approach on Cuba.  Neither he nor 
President Arias will attend.  Instead, the UNGA will be an 
"important opportunity" to discuss Cuba.   For his part, 
Arias penned an Op-ed on August 29 which helpfully described 
Cuba as a dictatorship and called for creating the conditions 
for the Cuban people to choose a course for themselves, but 
which unhelpfully urged lifting the embargo and a U.S. 
withdrawal from Guantanamo Bay.  Despite the latter aspect, 
Arias, stance on Cuba has been the most forward-leaning in 
region.  We will encourage him to continue leaning in the 
right direction.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
STAGNO:  LIMITS TO MORAL AUTHORITY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 28, Ambassador and DCM called on FM Bruno 
Stagno to discuss how to further bilateral and regional 
cooperation in support of a democratic transition in Cuba. 
Drawing from refs, the Ambassador stressed the need for 
regional solidarity with the people of Cuba, and applauded 
President Arias, recent statements in support of democracy 
on the island.  The Ambassador also pointed to A/S Shannon,s 
August 23 Washington press conference and DVC with Costa 
Rican media on the issue, and noted that USOAS Ambassador 
Maisto,s visit to San Jose in September would likely touch 
on Cuba-related issues (and other topics). 
 
¶3.  (C) Stagno was receptive to the suggestion that Arias and 
the GOCR use Costa Rica,s "moral stature" to advocate change 
in Cuba, but with the following caveats: 
 
-- The GOCR is not convinced that a genuine transition is 
underway.  The last four weeks could be a "test run," 
measuring both domestic Cuban and international reaction. 
Even if Fidel,s illness marked the start of a true 
transition, in the GOCR,s view,  Raul Castro, FM Perez-Roque 
and other senior figures in the regime were likely prepared 
to "ride out the storm" for some time.  Stagno agreed that 
the regime was on "unsure footing," however; 
 
-- The GOCR,s "moral authority" is hobbled because Cuba 
views Costa Rica as "an enemy" and the two countries lack 
full diplomatic relations.  Although the GOCR,s CG in Havana 
is very active, doing what he can with the contacts that he 
has, Costa Rica feels "alone and outgunned" in dealing with 
the regime and reaching out to dissidents.  The public 
Arias-VP Lage contretemps over a possible meeting in Bogot 
during the Uribe inauguration had made matters worse. 
According to Stagno, Arias wanted a "quiet conversation" with 
Castro in which he would stress that "the world had changed" 
and it was therefore time for Castro to "stop sacrificing 
himself" for the sake of the revolution.  When Fidel became 
indisposed, the notion of a meeting with Lage seemed 
appropriate.  Arias never intended to present a "letter" to 
Lage, but once the story appeared in the Costa Rican media, 
the meeting was off; 
 
-- President Arias is constrained by the need to be perceived 
as primarily a "domestic president," in order to achieve 
other parts of his agenda.  If the GOCR focuses on any 
regional issue, it will be Nicaragua.  As the November 
elections approach, and especially if Ortega remains 
positioned for a possible victory, Costa Rica will have to 
turn its attention in that direction (instead of worrying 
Cuba); and 
 
-- Although Chile and Mexico could be helpful, efforts to 
form a regional contact group on Cuba with Costa Rica and 
languished because of the domestic political uncertainty in 
Mexico. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
STAGNO:  WHAT ABOUT THE EMBARGO? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (C) The FM raised the notion of first lifting the U.S. 
embargo as a catalyst for motivating the Cuban "street" to 
voice its opposition to the Raul succession and the regime. 
The Ambassador made clear that this was decidedly not the USG 
view.  The sequence would have to be the reverse; much would 
have to change on the island before the President would 
consider approaching Congress about the embargo.  Referring 
back to A/S Shannon,s public remarks, the Ambassador 
reminded Stagno that a presidential offer to approach 
Congress about the embargo had been on the table (although 
rejected by Fidel) since 2002.  The Ambassador stressed that 
this was not the time to "give" anything to Cuba, but a time 
to "push," using tools such as the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter.  Cuba can be pushed off balance, he concluded. 
 
¶5.  (C) Stagno dismissed the September 1 SICA meeting as 
"technical," and thus not a venue for crafting a common 
approach on Cuba.  Neither he nor President Arias will 
attend.  Instead, Stagno will attend the NAM meeting in 
Havana September 13-16 as an observer, before joining Arias 
in New York for UNGA-related events the week of September 17. 
 The NAM meeting would offer Stagno a first-hand look at what 
is going on in Cuba, he said, plus provide an opportunity to 
lobby for Costa Rica,s UNSC seat in 2008.  The UNGA, he 
stressed, will be an "important opportunity" to discuss Cuba. 
 Stagno added that Perez-Roque,s invitation to attend the 
NAM was a surprising volte-face, given the brouhaha with Lage 
in Bogot. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ARIAS:  THE GUANTAMO GAMBIT? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Although Stagno never mentioned Guantanamo (or 
hinted that Arias was about to write anything about Cuba), 
the President,s August 29 op-ed in leading daily La Nacion 
called for regional efforts "in every international forum" to 
press for lifting the embargo and  closing Guantanamo Bay and 
returning the base,s territory to Cuba.  These two arguments 
marred what was otherwise an impassioned, articulate 
description of Cuba as ". . . plain and simple, a 
dictatorship," and a call to ". . . creat(e) the conditions 
for the Cuban people to truly choose a course for 
themselves." 
 
---------- 
COMMENT: 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite the op-ed (which was 95 percent helpful), 
Arias, stance on Cuba has been the most forward-leaning in 
region.  We will encourage him to continue leaning in the 
right direction; the Ambassador has requested a meeting with 
Arias to clarify what he meant in the op-ed.  Interjecting a 
Guantanamo argument makes no sense (and has found little 
resonance here).  Arias, comments may reflect some tactical 
distancing from the U.S., and we have heard this explanation 
from some contacts here.  Although the president agrees in 
general on the need for democracy in Cuba, he can,t be seen 
as a U.S. lackey, on Cuba or any other issue.  On the other 
hand, Arias, foreign policy objectives in this 
administration already seem to be filtered through the prism 
of the 2008 UNSC race.  If so, potential vote-getting 
legalisms, however far-fetched (such as pushing for USG 
withdrawal from Guantanamo) may increasingly color GOCR 
thinking. 
LANGDALE