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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 018917 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2016 
TAGS: KDEM KWMN PGOV PHUM PK
SUBJECT: HUDOOD ORDINANCE AMENDMENTS:  A BIG SLOPPY MESS 
  
SUBJECT: HUDOOD ORDINANCE AMENDMENTS:  A BIG SLOPPY MESS 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 16956 
 
     ¶B. ISLAMABAD 14095 
     ¶C. ISLAMABAD 12517 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, 
Reasons 1.4  (b) and (d) 
 

¶1.  (C)  Summary and Introduction:  With President Musharraf  on official travel in the U.S., the governing Pakistan Muslim  League (PML) announced a tactical retreat in it beleaguered  campaign to amend the Hudood Ordinance, the Sharia-based laws  on criminalizing extramarital sexual relations and  establishing often insurmountable evidentiary requirements  for the prosecution of cases of rape.  As reported previously  (Ref A, B and C), the PML-led government initiated the drive  to amend the Hudood Ordinance in mid-summer, following a  savvy print and broadcast media campaign enlisting a cross  section of respected journalists, Islamic scholars and policy  analysts in support of the need to amend laws widely  perceived by progressive Pakistanis, as well as many in the  international community, as deeply prejudicial to women. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Before introducing the bill to amend the Ordinance  in the National Assembly on August 21, PML floor managers  struck a deal with the opposition populist Pakistan People's  Party (PPP) to move the bill to an all-party Select Committee  for expedited review, with the goal of shielding the text  from extensive revision by the opposition coalition of  Islamist parties, the Muttadidda Majlis-e-Ammal (MMA).  In  this scenario, the Select Committee would consider the bill's  Islamic credentials quietly, while the united opposition  proceeded with an ultimately unsuccessful ""no confidence""  vote against Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz on August 29.  (Ref  C)  External events -- most notably, the August 26 death of  Balochistan nationalist Nawab Aktar Bugti Khan in a  confrontation with Pakistani security forces and subsequent  emboldening of the MMA -- derailed the PML's maneuvering to  rush the Hudood Amendment through parliament before President  Musharraf's September travel to Brussels, Havana and  NYC/WashDC.   What followed was two weeks of political  mayhem, as an MMA threat to resign from the Provincial (NWFP  and Balochistan) and National Assemblies spooked PML leaders  into extra-parliamentary negotiations with MMA figures on  regressive revisions to the proposed Hudood  amendments,  provoking bitter denunciations by PPP, MQM and human rights  activists that the government was (again) caving in to the  mullahs. 
 
¶3.  (C)  A month after the government's Hudood amendments  were first introduced into parliament, the drama has come  full circle:  PML President Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain  announced on Sept 18 that having failed to to reach a  compromise with the MMA, the PML would re-introduce the  Hudood amendments for a National Assembly vote upon President  Musharraf's return to Pakistan in early October.  Senior  officials at PML House and in the Office of the President  have assured the Ambassador and PolCouns that this time  around, the government will see the amendments through  without further delay.  End summary and introduction. 
  Death in Balochistan Opens Door for MMA 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶4.  (C/NF)  At the close of the week following the  government's introduction of the Hudood amendment bill into  the National Assembly, it appeared that -- with the  cooperation of coalition partner Muttahida Quami Movement  (MQM) and the opposition PPP -- the path for the bill's  passage had been smoothly prepared for vote immediately  following the August 29 no confidence vote.   News of the  violent death of Nawab Bugti on August 26, however, injected  a shot of adrenaline into the August 29 debate, racheting up  the anticipated dry opposition accusations of financial  mismanagement against the Prime Minister into a passionate  condemnation of the extrajudicial killing by a military  government of a renowned civilian politician.  The MMA  one-upped calls by Baloch nationalists to withdraw from the  provincial and national parliaments by declaring that its 
  ISLAMABAD 00018917  002 OF 004 
 
  members would resign their seats if the government went  forward with the proposed Hudood amendments. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  The MMA's threat to resign caught the attention  of top PML leaders.  With a majority of seats in the NWFP  Assembly and a coalition partner with nationalist parties in  Balochistan, a united MMA has the clout to bring down both  provincial governments, leaving the center little option  other than imposing Governor's Rule; a walk-out of the MMA's  66 members in the National Assembly would leave the  government vulnerable to calls for early parliamentary  elections.  Shaken by the MMA threat, PML President Chaudhary  Shujaat Hussain agreed to set up an extra-parliamentary PML -  MMA committee to discuss revisions to the Hudood amendments  to make the bill acceptable to some, if not all, of the  Islamist parties.  Privately, Shujaat and other top PML  leaders confided that they hoped to split the MMA, peeling  Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) leader Maulana  Fazl-ur-Rehman away from Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) Amir Qazi  Hussain Ahmed.   Publicly, however, the prevailing perception  in both the press and political circles was that Musharaff  and the PML were succumbing to public pressure by the  Islamists.  Media reports and cocktail party chatter through  the first half of September were rife with speculation over  MMA demands and government concessions on the text of the  proposed amendments. 
  Sound and Fury, Signifying Virtually Nothing 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶6.  (C/NF)  The chatter was not always off the mark.  On  September 12, Federal Information Minister Durrani shared the  text of MMA revisions he said PML negotiators had accepted,  including provisions that would have established parallel  jurisdictions under the Hudood Ordinance and the Pakistan  Penal Code (PPC) in rape cases; injected Sharia-based  standards of evidence in to the PPC for rape cases; and  created a new ""lewdness"" offense into the PPC, essentially  inserting the Islamic concept of ""zina"" (sex outside  marriage) into the PPC.   While European and U.S. diplomats  and human rights activists scurried to discover what deals  were being cut, PML leaders were slowly realizing that  Fazl-ur Rehman was only  engaged in political flirtation in  the PML-MMA negotiations.  Sources in the Office of the  President and PML House told post that by mid-September, it  was clear that efforts to neutralize constituent parties in  the MMA on the Hudood amendments were pointless.  National  Security Advisor Tariq Aziz told the Ambassador that, after a  week or more of political flirtation with Fazl-ur-Rehman,  both he and Qazi Hussain Ahmed were adamant that the Islamist  parties would remain united in their pledge to resign if the  government succeeds in passing the Hudood amendments. 
  Re-Group and Try Again 
-------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C/NF)  On September 19, Ambassador discussed the GOP's  plans to resuscitate the battered amendments bill.  NSA Tariq  Aziz and PML Secretary General Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed  said that PML President Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain has sent a  memo to President Musharraf's traveling party outlining the  state-of-play following the breakdown of negotiations with  the MMA.  Aziz and Hussain said that the government would  re-introduce the amendments following Musharraf's return to  Pakistan on/about October 1, presenting the text that emerged  from the all-party Select Committee, with the addition of the  PPC ""lewdness"" provision plus ""firewalls.""  (Note:  ""Firewalls"" are supplemental clauses crafted to ensure that  rape remains severed from zina, such as language that would  prevent a rape complainant from being charged with any other  crime in connection with the complaint -- i.e., a woman's  rape complaint could not later be used as a  self-incriminatory confession leading to a zina or lewdness  case -- and that would impose automatic perjury penalties on  witnesses who testify in zina cases that that the courts  determine are unfounded.  End note.)  The Government is  confident that the PPP will vote for the Select Committee's  text, and that the MQM can be brought on board.   The  Ambassador was firm in telling Aziz and Hussain that 
  ISLAMABAD 00018917  003 OF 004 
 
  injecting the lewdness provision into the Penal Code will be  perceived as a concession to MMA demands; the time has come  for President Musharraf and the PML-led government to decide  what principals they will stand on.  (Note:  The Ambassador's  words clearly made an impression: in a Sept 21 conversation  with PolCouns, Mushahid Hussain said that the party is now  debating whether to push to move the lewdness provision into  the Penal Code, a move he claimed to oppose personally.  End  note.) 
  Whither the MMA? 
------------------------- 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Despite MMA threats to walk out should the  parliament pass the Hudood amendments, both Aziz and Mushahid  Hussain are skeptical that the MMA would actually follow  through with mass resignations from the Provincial and  National Assemblies:  MMA members in the provincial  assemblies are enjoying the perks of their offices too much  to want to leave prematurely.  In the National Assembly, many  MMA members (particularly those from JUI-F) are presently  sitting under a sword of Damocles, as a Supreme Court hearing  is scheduled for late September on whether madrassa-based  education meet existing laws on the academic qualifications  for elected officials.  Most observers anticipate that when  the Court finally issues a ruling, the decision will go  against the MMA.   This case has been on the Court's docket  for almost four years, in tacit recognition of the  government's desire to avoid a confrontation with the MMA on  the credentials question.  If the MMA does not go through  with the threat to resign,  the government can again signal  the Court that further procedural delays are in order;  alternatively, if the Islamic parties walk out, a Court  ruling disqualifying significant numbers of MMA leaders from  holding public office would not be long to follow. 
  Collateral Damage 
------------------------ 
¶9.  (C/NF)  The political battle between moderates and  conservatives over the Hudood Ordinance amendments has  already claimed one victim:  on September 20, Dr. Javed Ahmed  Ghamdi, a moderate member of the Council of Islamic Ideology  (CII),  resigned his position, saying that the government had  undermined the CII, a constitutionally-established advisory  body, when it formed the extra-parliamentary ""Ulema  Committee"" to review the text of the proposed amendments with  the MMA.  If the government incorporates the revisions  suggested by this committee, Dr. Ghamdi said to the Daily  Times, it will preserve the status quo of laws that  discriminate against women.  Dr. Ghamdi's objections to the  MMA proposed revisions, such as incorporating the lewdness  offense and Sharia evidentiary requirements into the PPC, are  themselves contrary to Islamic injunctions.  (Note:  Dr. Ghamdi's departure is a blow to President Musharraf's efforts  to transform the CII from a bastion of fundamentalism to a  force for enlightened moderation.  A Musharraf- appointee,  Ghamdi was the swing vote on the CII; behind the scenes.  He  worked closely with Attorney General Makhdoom Ali Khan on  drafting the proposed Hudood amendments XXXXXXXXXXXX   approaching the issue as an Islamic scholar.  Mushahid  Hussain told PolCouns he was worried that the CCI chairman,  Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masood, would be the next to resign.  End  note.) 
  Comment 
------------ 
¶10. (C/NF)  The GOP's efforts to advance the Hudood Ordinance  amendments bring to mind the analogy of legislation and  sausage-making;  nobody should have to see what goes into the  finished product.  This unseemly process has re-confirmed the  worst suspicions of the Musharraf regime's many opponents  that the President is not serious about ""enlightened  moderation"" and that the PML-led coalition will always put  its political interests before principal, caving into MMA  fundamentalist demands even when it has the votes to move its  legislation forward. 
  ¶11. (C/NF)  The ups-and-down of the Hudood amendments have 
  ISLAMABAD 00018917  004 OF 004 
 
  been dizzying to follow, but some truths have come home:  other than a thin veneer of political and media progressives,  the human rights community (and, of course, Western  diplomats), there is no broad constituency in Pakistan  clamoring to amend the existing Hudood Ordinance.  A  generation has come of age under General Zia's Hudood and,  despite well-documented cases of abuse and injustice, this is  not an issue that resonates deeply with either Pakistan's  ruling elite or its socially conservative masses.  It is not  just the MMA who oppose amending the Hudood:  both PML and  PPP party whips have their work cut out for them, enforcing  party discipline on parliamentarians who are not inclined to  take up the cause of women's rights. 
  ¶12.  (C/NF)  Post believes that the text that emerged from  the National Assembly Select Committee represents significant  progress in remedying the worst evils of Zia's Hudood  Ordinance, leaving open the possibility of additional  amendments in the future.  As emboffs continue to monitor the  bill's progress, post recommends that the USG takes its cue  from the PPP, MQM and progressive parliamentary leaders:  in  the spirit of not allowing the perfect become the enemy of  the good, if Pakistan's progressive politicians are satisfied  that the proposed amendments enhance legal protections for  women and back the government's bill, then so should we. 
  BODDE 
"