VZCZCXRO3516
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHEK #1297/01 2500955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 070955Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8109
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0610
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1701
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1175
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0244
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2113
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1494
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001297 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS AND S/CT 
DEPT FOR SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2031 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC MARR KG PINR
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE BISHKEK EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE 
ON SEPTEMBER 6 2006 
 
BISHKEK 00001297  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch for Reason 1.4 (c) and ( 
d) 
 
NOTE: THIS IS A REPEAT OF BISHKEK 1292, PROVIDING BROADER 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) on September 6, 2006 to review the 
disappearance of Major Jill Metzger, assigned to Manas 
Airbase.  Present at the EAC were the DCM, RSO, POL/ECON, 
POL/RA, AID, DAO, PAS, CONS, MGT, RLA, GSO and Base 
Representative. 
 
Background to the Incident 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At approximately 1530 September 5, 2006, six 
personnel assigned to Manas Airbase departed the airbase to 
go to the central downtown Tsum Department store.  The group 
arrived at Tsum at approximately 1615.  At this time four 
members of the group walked to the Hyatt Hotel to exchange 
money.  The group agreed to meet at 1700 and proceed to the 
restaurant.  Major Metzger and Sgt Barnes (both female) 
entered Tsum at 1616 according to video evidence.  Major 
Metzger was observed on four additional occasions on the Tsum 
CCTV.  The last image was at 1629.  At 1629 Major Metzger 
walked out of Tsum unaccompanied.  Investigative review of 
the CCTV is ongoing.  Multiple copies of the CCTV tapes are 
being reproduced for further investigative analysis. 
 
¶3.  (S) Major Metzger did not appear at a predetermined rally 
point in Tsum at 1700.  Major Metzger was in possession of 
the only cell phone in the six-person group.  At 1735 Sgt 
Barnes used the driver,s cell phone to attempt to contact 
Major Metzger.  Subsequent investigative development based on 
cell phone traces placed Major Metzger,s cell phone in the 
vicinity of Bishkek,s Eastern Bus Station at 1735. 
Additional cell phone traces placed Major Metzger,s cell 
phone in the vicinity of the Tyngooch micro district in the 
southwest quadrant of Bishkek at 1907. 
 
¶4.  (S) At 1800 four base Office of Special Investigations 
(OSI) Agents passed by Tsum on their way to dinner and were 
stopped by members of Major Metzger,s tour group who 
informed them that she was missing.  The OSI Agents and the 
tour group searched through Tsum,s 4 floors until 2000 and 
were unable to locate any sign of Major Metzger. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) At 2000 hours OSI Agents called ARSO requesting 
assistance. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) At 2010 ARSO notified FSNI and requested that FSNI 
contact police, militia, traffic police and patrol police and 
the office of crimes against foreigners to begin searching 
for Major Metzger. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) At 2015 ARSO notified RSO.  RSO instructed ARSO to 
contact hospitals, morgues and the ambulance service.  RSO 
requested ARSO to contact the DCM. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At 2020 ARSO contacted DCM.  DCM instructed ARSO to 
provide situational updates as they occurred. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) At 2050 DATT called ARSO and offered vehicular and 
personnel assistance if needed.  The DATT recommended that 
ARSO contact the Ambassador. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) At 2100 OSI Agent,s met with Lieutenant Colonel 
Nurlan Sulanaliev from the office of crimes against 
foreigners and requested investigative assistance. 
 
BISHKEK 00001297  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) At 2115 ARSO contacted FSNI and requested a 
situation update.  FSNI stated that all available law 
enforcement assets were assisting. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) At 2130 ARSO contacted RSO.  RSO instructed ARSO 
to verify that roadblocks and vehicle inspections were being 
conducted on roads leading out of Bishkek.  RSO requested 
ARSO to inquire into host nation,s canine support abilities. 
 RSO also recommended ARSO notify the Ambassador and POL/RA. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) At 2150 ARSO notified Ambassador.  Ambassador 
requested that ARSO contact POL/RA and recommended that ARSO 
contact DOS operations.  Ambassador offered to contact host 
nation ministerial level officials. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) At 2200 ARSO contacted RSO.  RSO recommended ARSO 
contact DS Command Center. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) At 2205 ARSO contacted DS Command Center and DOS 
Operations. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) At 2215 ARSO contacted POL/RA.  POL/RA offered to 
contact National Security Service 
 
 ¶17.  (SBU) At 2245 ARSO and FSNI arrived at Tsum and 
requested to view CCTV.  ARSO was advised that the Security 
Coordinator was not available until 0800 September 06, 2006 
to assist with the CCTV investigation. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) At 0030 PAS contacted ARSO regarding the airbase 
recommendation for a monetary award.  ARSO advised against 
the recommendation this early in the investigation.  PAS also 
requested ARSO to provide a contact number at the Embassy for 
a tip line. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) At 0130 OSI contacted ARSO and stated that the 
Base Commander would contact the Ambassador regarding the 
proposed monetary reward. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) At 0135 DCM contacted RSO to request update on the 
situation. 
 
¶21. (SBU) At 0200 Ambassador contacted RSO to inquire about 
the proposed monetary award.  RSO advised that it was too 
early in the investigation to recommend a monetary award. 
Ambassador also stated the she would chair a meeting of the 
EAC at opening of business. 
 
¶22.  (S) At 0730 Joint Prisoner Recovery Agency (JPRA) 
contacted RSO office and stated that a Repatriation Team (one 
female psychologist and one female SERE (Survival Evasion 
Resistance and Escape) specialist) would arrive on September 
08, 2006.  Additionally, OSI briefed that a support team of 
22 agents will arrive in the next few days. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) At 0810 ARSO and FSNI met OSI at Tsum to review 
CCTV. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) At 0945 OSI and host nation investigators began 
questioning Tsum tenants. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) At 1010 the Ambassador chaired a meeting of the 
EAC.  The EAC reviewed the facts of the case and agreed to 
take the following actions: 
 
    Prepare a factual statement announcing the disappearance 
of an individual from the base, develop a checklist of 
precautionary steps Amcits should take as the investigation 
proceeded, and issue this information to Embassy staff, to 
 
BISHKEK 00001297  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Peace Corps Volunteers, to all Amcits via a Warden message, 
and the two local schools where dependent children are 
enrolled.  In addition, the Ambassador, in coordination with 
the base, agreed to hold a press conference with Kyrgyz 
television media to outline the incident and appeal to the 
public for information leading to finding Major Metzger. 
Embassy has taken all of the actions outlined above. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) At 1100 ARSO and FSNI filed an Official Claim on 
the behalf of the Airbase with the Sverdlozsky District 
Police station, requesting cooperation in the investigation 
of the incident. 
 
¶27.  (S) At 1130 host nation investigators began search of 
the East Bus Station and Tyngooch Micro district based on the 
information obtained from the cell phone traces. 
 
¶28.  (S) At 1600 FSNI informed RSO section that the last 
individual called by Major Metzger is possibly a Kyrgyz male. 
 Host country law enforcement will conduct interview. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Over the course of the day, the Ambassador called 
Acting Foreign Minister Kadyrov, SNB Chairman Tabaldiyev, 
Minister of the Interior Sutalinov, and the President,s 
Deputy Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov to thank them for the 
outstanding cooperation of the Kyrgyz law enforcement 
organizations and request continued assistance in the 
on-going investigation. 
 
¶30.  (SBU) Embassy Bishkek will continue to support the 
investigation as requested by the airbase.  Post is still 
evaluating the LEGATT in Almaty  offer to provide an advanced 
Fly Team (4 agents and support personnel who set up a 
Situation Command Center) and a Hostage Negotiation team from 
the Crisis Negotiations unit.  FBI support is dependent upon 
request from the Ambassador.  Host nation has trained hostage 
negotiators and are prepared to assist as needed.  RSO 
section, OSI and host nation continue to investigate the 
disappearance and follow-up on all leads.  RSO section 
formally requested investigative assistance from all host 
nation law enforcement entities as required in accordance 
with Kyrgyz law. 
YOVANOVITCH