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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SU ER
SUBJECT: EASTERN FRONT NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED; OPTIMISM 
OVERSTATED 
 
Classified By: CDA Jennifer McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Negotiations between the Sudanese 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and Eastern Front (EF) are 
proceeding apace with the third and final committee currently 
in session.  While the GNU, the Government of the State of 
Eritrea (GSE) mediator and many in the diplomatic community 
seem pleased with the progress of negotiations since their 
resumption August 8, advisors for the Eastern Front and other 
outside observers continue to articulate concern about the 
direction of the discussions and the ability of the Eastern 
Front to implement the agreement.  The divisions within the 
Eastern Front have grown.  All parties believe an agreement 
will be reached soon, possibly within the next month. 
However, the terms of the agreement indicate the GNU is 
railroading the Eastern Front and with the weaknesses within 
the Eastern Front concerns regarding implementation arise. 
End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
GSE MEDIATOR:  ALL IS WELL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On September 20, PFDJ Political Head and Chief 
mediator Yemane Ghebreab briefed the diplomatic corps on the 
status of negotiations.  Ghebreab characterized the work of 
the committees as largely successful with a &narrowing gap8 
for all outstanding issues.   While the negotiations will not 
conclude prior to Ramadan,s start on September 24 as 
originally hoped, he believes an agreement can be reached 
within a short timeframe. 
 
¶3. (C) Ghebreab outlined the outstanding issues still 
remaining from each of the three committees: wealth-sharing, 
security arrangements and power-sharing (the committee 
currently meeting).  With regards to wealth sharing, the 
primary issue for resolution is the amount to be provided by 
the GNU for the national development fund.  Ghebreab 
expressed optimism that both sides would be able to negotiate 
an acceptable figure shortly.  On issues of security, he 
noted that an agreement is nearly complete and the mechanisms 
for monitoring compliance, after an agreement is signed are 
being discussed. 
 
¶4. (C) In discussions on power-sharing, Ghebreab said that 
the Eastern Front and GNU remain at loggerheads.  The Eastern 
Front continues to push for a single state structure while 
the GNU maintains they cannot change the whole national 
system of three levels of government to accommodate a 
different system only for the East.  Ghebreab said that one 
compromise under discussion is the possible establishment of 
a ®ional coordinating body8 for the East in lieu of a 
formal regional government, however, details have yet to be 
articulated.  He also mentioned that the GNU is considering a 
nation-wide conference to review the whole government 
structure in light of its political commitments under the 
Naivasha agreements and demands for greater political 
representation from Darfur entities.  Ghebreab posited that 
the one-state issue for the East will likely be postponed 
beyond these negotiations for future resolution. 
 
¶5. (C) In an interesting aside, Ghebreab noted that as a 
result of the negotiations the Eastern Front has been 
consolidating itself into a unified political entity which 
will enable it to work effectively with the GNU on 
implementation. (Comment:  This upbeat assessment contradicts 
what we are hearing about Eastern Front relationships, 
described further below.  End Comment.) 
 
---------------------------- 
SUDANESE CHARGE: ALL IS WELL 
---------------------------- 
¶6. (C) On September 14, Charge and Poloff met with Sudanese 
Charge Hussein Mohamed Hussein. Hussein said the negotiations 
were going well and agreements on wealth-sharing and security 
were nearly complete.  On wealth-sharing, he noted that the 
GNU proposal of USD 300 million fell far short of the Eastern 
Front,s expectation of USD 1 billion, however, the GNU had 
on-going projects they felt should be credited.  He did 
concede the GNU might be willing to provide as much as USD 
500 million for the fund over a three-phased, seven-year 
period, the first year being a grace period during which a 
feasibility study would be conducted. 
 
¶7. (C) On the security arrangements, he acknowledged a 
standoff between the Eastern Front and the GNU on the Eastern 
Front,s unwillingness to release the location and number of 
their military forces.  According to Hussein, the GNU needs 
to have this information to develop appropriate plans to 
either incorporate the Eastern Front forces into the Sudanese 
military, security or police forces or integrate them into 
civil society.  He emphasized GNU interest in increasing 
representation from the East (not necessarily the Eastern 
Front) in the SAF, police and security forces, noting that 
the East is currently underrepresented in these services. 
 
¶8. (C) Hussein underscored the GNU position against the 
establishment of a single Eastern state, which would create 
too many governmental levels.  Hussein believes that the 
Eastern Front will relinquish this demand as the GNU is 
offering &very good representation at all levels of 
government.8  Moreover, Hussein went on, there are already 
representatives from the East in the central and state 
governments and that this must be considered in the 
negotiations (thus insinuating that the Eastern Front should 
not get too greedy in their requests as the GNU considers 
anybody from the East, whether or not they are members of the 
groups represented by the Eastern Front, to be part of the 
agreement).  Ultimately, he claimed the Eastern Front &will 
accept the situation as it is.8 
 
¶9. (C) Hussein praised the GSE mediators for their efforts 
although he repeated the GNU refrain that the GSE are &most 
likely in favor of the opposition.8  He claimed the Eastern 
Front is also &very happy8 so far with the mediators and 
felt that the Eastern Front and the GNU had &built strong 
relations.8 
 
------------------------------ 
NORWEGIAN ADVISOR: ALL IS WELL 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Also on September 14, the Norwegian Ambassador 
convened an Eritrean-based Sudan Contact Group, with 
membership paralleling the membership of the group who 
recently met in Oslo.  Dr. Kjell Hodnebo, Senior Advisor on 
Sudan for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, briefed 
the group on the negotiations noting, &good progress had 
been made over the summer8.  While he echoed much of what 
was said by the Sudanese Charge, he added some new 
information. First, the decision not to discuss the pipeline, 
mineral wealth and Port Sudan as part of a wealth-sharing 
agreement was made by the GNU with the reluctant consent of 
the Eastern Front, and not a mutual decision as claimed by 
the GNU.  Secondly, he confirmed that the GNU is adamant 
about keeping the East divided into three states and noted 
that the Eastern Front has indicated that it would be willing 
to concede this point in end-game negotiations, so long as a 
future referendum could be held in the East on this point. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Kjell commented that the Eastern Front negotiations 
were proving much easier than those in Abuja, He cited as 
reasons: the relatively peaceful security situation in the 
East versus Darfur; the willingness of the GNU to engage in 
 
negotiations and eagerness to reach resolution; and greater 
SPLM influence with the GNU in the EF negotiations; the 
greater unity of the Eastern Front than the parties in 
Darfur; and finally the effectiveness of the GSE as mediator. 
 He also passed on that the Eastern Front members, namely Dr. 
Dirar, told him they were pleased with the mediator and had 
not been &rolled over8 by the mediator. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
EASTERN FRONT ADVISOR:  ALL IS NOT WELL 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Dr. Taisier Ali (protect) of the Center for 
Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa, a key advisor for the 
Eastern Front with close relationships to SPLM members of the 
GNU negotiating team, relayed his concerns to Poloff about 
breakdowns within the Eastern Front negotiating team. 
According to Dr. Ali, the Eastern Front negotiators have no 
common approach and do not meet to strategize before 
committee meetings.  During the discussions on 
wealth-sharing, disagreements on strategy and desired 
outcomes within the Eastern Front nearly resulted in Dr. Amna 
Dirar,s departure from the team.  Musa Muhammed Ahmed, the 
Chair of the Eastern Front, has refused to make any plans for 
implementation or accept any offers of training.  In 
addition, the week of September 10, Musa insisted that the 
Eastern Front did not want face-to-face negotiations with the 
GNU because it would result in insults and recriminations, 
and insisted that that the mediators meet separately with the 
parties. 
 
¶13. (C) Dr. Ali shared with Poloff parts of his conversation 
with Malik Agar Ayar, the GNU,s Minister of Investment, SPLM 
member and part of the GNU,s negotiating team. Malik told 
Ali that the Eastern Front &had gotten a good deal8 with 
regards to the security arrangements, but admitted the GNU 
was playing on the tribal divisions, disorganization and 
weaknesses of the Eastern Front. Politically, the GNU is 
seeking to control the allotments of local government 
positions as a means to isolate specific communities in the 
East.  Dr. Ali described Malik,s interpretation of the 
proposed national development fund as &dangling a carrot8 
in front of individual members of the Eastern Front and 
commented that some EF members seem to be willingly 
participating in the GNU,s buy-off. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UNMIS AND EU:  ALL MAY NOT BE WHAT IT SEEMS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) In separate conversations with UNMIS Political 
Affairs Officer Judith Goetz and the EU Special 
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto, both expressed their 
concerns to Poloff about the Eastern Front,s capacity in 
negotiations and noted that the GNU seems to be calling the 
shots with the full cooperation of the GSE.  Both speculated 
whether the GSE,s position, initially seen as being 
pro-Eastern Front, has in fact shifted given the recent 
normalization of relations between the GSE and Sudan.  Both 
feel that the GNU is exploiting weaknesses in the Eastern 
Front and offering proposals that reinforce the tribal divide 
within the Eastern Front. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) If obtaining a GNU/EF signed agreement is the sole 
benchmark for success, then the negotiations by all accounts 
are proceeding admirably well.  However, despite the upbeat 
assessments of the GSE and many in the diplomatic community, 
the negotiations do not seem to be moving in favor of Eastern 
interests.  While initially post was hopeful that the Eastern 
Front would maintain a strong negotiating position, the 
Eastern Front team is showing cracks as talks continue and 
individual members appear to be ready to accept side offers 
from the GNU.  The GNU clearly will not consent in the 
negotiations to one state in the East and seems to have 
correctly assessed that they eventually will be offered a 
compromise proposal.  Few in the community seem to recognize, 
or are willing to admit to, the splits occurring within the 
Eastern Front negotiating group.  These splits promise to 
present even greater challenges to the Eastern Front after 
the negotiations conclude and implementation begins.  End 
Comment. 
MCINTYRE