VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0634 2300650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180650Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0274
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5193
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1571
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0132
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2415
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2207
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0436

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON CH MG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE DALAI LAMA 
VISIT 
 
REF: A. STATE 134383 
 
     ¶B. ULAANBAATAR 608 
     ¶C. ULAANBAATAR 625 
 
Classified By: Classified by Economic/Political Chief Patrick J. 
Freeman, for reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador met with Foreign Minister on August 17 to 
deliver the paper conveyed in ref a, which responded to the 
Foreign Minister's request for U.S. perspectives on the 
likely Chinese reaction to a Dalai Lama visit (ref b).  FM 
Enkhbold expressed appreciation for the report.  He did not 
quite confirm that the Dalai Lama is expected to visit next 
week (ref c), saying that issuance of the visa was "still 
under consideration."  Enkhbold indicated that the decision 
to issue a visa for the visit was not an easy one, and was 
visibly worried over what the Chinese reaction might be.  He 
said the Chinese government had inquired about the press 
reports the Dalai Lama would visit, but so far had not come 
in formally; he expected that would happen soon. Enkhbold 
quoted from a Dalai Lama speech in March which underlined 
that he sought autonomy for Tibet, but not independence; 
would that moderate the Chinese reaction, he wondered. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Foreign Minister commented that, in view of an 
expected negative Chinese reaction, he was still struggling 
with how to explain the decision to all Mongolian 
constituencies, such as business interests who may be 
negatively affected.  He said that the decision is not even 
without controversy in Mongolian Buddhist circles, since the 
Bogd Gegen, Rinpoche, is regarded as the head figure of 
Mongolian Buddhism. 
 
¶3.  (C) Enkhbold asked how the U.S. would respond in the 
event of Chinese pressure on Mongolia, such as a repetition 
of the train service interuption in 2002.  Ambassador 
responded that the U.S. likely would reiterate publicly our 
belief that the Dalai Lama is an international man of peace 
who should be allowed freedom to travel.  Such statements 
would be unlikely to deter any Chinese pressure -- and any 
effort at direct U.S. intervention with China probably would 
worsen matters, not help them. 
 
¶4.  (C) COMMENT: While we do believe that Mongolia will grant 
permission for the Dalai Lama to visit, the Foreign Minister 
and his government are clearly nervous while they await 
China's reaction: what will be the price to pay in relations 
with their much bigger and economically powerful neighbor to 
the south?  We have no doubt that China will soon let them 
know.  Months after the last visit of the Dalai Lama in 
November 2002, relations had recovered sufficiently for Hu 
Jintao to visit Ulaanbaatar, which may be a history that 
comforts Mongolian leaders as they await China's response. 
MFA Americas, Africa, and Middle East Director General (A/S 
equivalent) Jambaldorj told the Ambassador over lunch on 
August 18 that he doubted China would again suspend rail 
traffic as it had for a few days in 2002, but would, no 
doubt, respond in some fashion.  END COMMENT. 
SLUTZ