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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #5544/01 2290905
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 170905Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO:  EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES POLITICAL 
DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By:  Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason 
1.5 (b/d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Togo's ex-Interior Minister Francois Boko 
said on August 16 that he hoped the political dialogue in 
Ouagadougou between the Togolese government and opposition 
would be productive, but he believed the process would result 
only in cosmetic changes designed to improve the 
international acceptability of the Faure regime, now seeking 
legitimation after a period of consolidation.  Boko said that 
the Faure regime, the French government, and elements of the 
opposition asked him to join in the dialogue, but he refused, 
saying that he preferred a role outside the process that 
would allow him to engage in constructive criticism.  Boko 
said the Faure regime was determined to establish itself 
firmly before the May 2007 French presidential elections and 
the almost certain departure from power of President Chirac. 
Boko commented ironically that his actions in speaking out 
against the Faure government have led to his isolation among 
many Africans and to limited job opportunities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Political Dialogue 
------------------ 
¶2.  (C)  At an August 16 meeting, former Interior Minister of 
Togo, Francois Boko, said he was following closely the 
political discussions between Togo's government and members 
of the opposition, taking place in Ouagadougou.  He said that 
the dialogue would likely result in superficial changes that 
would make the Faure government more acceptable to the 
international community and would facilitate the resumption 
of foreign aid, one of the regime's main priorities.  In 
Ouagadougou, Faure would not agree to reforms that would 
challenge his hold on power but might, for example, name an 
associate (NFI) of UFC opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio as 
Prime Minister, and place other opposition figures in 
position of ostensible authority. 
 
¶3.  (C)  After having spent the past 18 months consolidating 
its hold on power, the Faure regime was now in "Phase II," an 
effort to gain legitimacy, Boko observed.  He noted that 
Faure was succeeding to some degree in giving the impression 
that he would govern Togo in a more enlightened fashion than 
had his father, but Boko cautioned that this only reflected 
Faure's more sophisticated approach to crafting his image, 
using modern public relations tools, and following his 
counselors' advice. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Boko said he had been approached by the GOT, members 
of the opposition, and the French to join in the Ouagadougou 
talks, but had declined.  These approaches consisted of 
appeals to his patriotism and his experience, but Boko said 
he preferred for the moment to remain outside the process and 
to establish his family in France.  He believed that he could 
serve better as an "outside, constructive critic" than as a 
member of the GOT, should the GOT follow up on its suggestion 
that it would offer him a government job if he joined the 
political dialogue.  "If Faure gets everybody into the 
process, who would be left to serve as an independent 
critic?" he asked.  He said that his role would not be 
destructive.  "I want to hold them to whatever they decide in 
Ouagadougou.  If they decide to investigate the hundreds of 
killings at the time of the 2005 elections, and they don't do 
so, I'll be in a position to call this to public attention," 
he said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Boko said he did not want to give the impression 
that he was against the Ouagadougou talks or that he 
discounted their value.  The opposition, he said, had to take 
what it could and make the most of it.  "Even if opposition 
members in the government have only symbolic powers, they can 
still make a difference, and at the very least 'slow the 
damage,'" he said.  He nonetheless reiterated that the Faure 
regime intended to co-opt as much of the opposition as it 
could, and the opposition, "tired" after so many years in the 
wilderness, was probably more pliable than one would want. 
With a government integrating significant opposition members, 
Faure could credibly claim "reform," and international 
pressures against him could subside, Boko said.  This was 
what Faure hoped to achieve. 
 
Togo and France 
--------------- 
¶6.  (C)  Boko said that both the Faure regime and the French 
wanted rapid measures that would further entrench the Faure 
regime in power.  Progress in Ouagadougou would allow the 
French to receive Faure honorably during his planned 
September 2006 visit to Paris, and reconciliation with the 
opposition and the formation of a "national unity government" 
before the May 2007 French presidential election would do 
much to ensure a stable, more palatable Faure regime in place 
before Chirac's almost certain exit from the French political 
 
PARIS 00005544  002 OF 002 
 
 
scene.  Given France's long engagement with Togo and the 
Gnassingbes, and its desire not to "lose" another of its 
former colonies, France wanted a secure long-term 
relationship with Togo, Boko said.  From Togo's perspective, 
firming up Faure's status while Chirac was still in office 
was a high priority, as none of his probable successors would 
likely view the Faure regime, the Gnassingbe clan, and 
France-Togo relations as favorably as has Chirac. 
 
Still Being Hassled Over Cote d'Ivoire 
-------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C)  Boko commented briefly on the continuing 
repercussions of the bombing incident in Cote d'Ivoire on 
November 6, 2004, when, as Togo's Interior Minister, he 
ordered the arrest of the Belarusian personnel involved in 
the attack but then had them released, purportedly after the 
GOF's intervention, and later had to testify before a French 
judge investigating the matter.  (A recent series of new 
press reports again highlights Boko's role in this affair.) 
Stressing that "I was the good guy" in responding to the 
bombing, Boko said that he continued to receive thinly veiled 
threats from those associated with Faure, to the point where 
he had again requested GOF assistance and protection.  He 
indicated that the present threat level was lower than it had 
once been, but still worrisome, and he appeared comfortable 
with the GOF response.  He predicted that the GOF would never 
completely investigate the Cote d'Ivoire bombing and the 
French role in not pursuing the Belarusians -- "this touches 
on a matter of state, and the French won't permit an 
investigation that would embarrass France." 
 
Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't 
------------------------------------- 
¶8.  (C)  Without regretting the actions he took against the 
Faure regime, which led to his exile in France, Boko said 
that his anti-Gnassingbe stance continued to complicate his 
life.  He said that his several applications to work at 
international organizations had not, so far, led to any 
prospects.  He noted the irony -- African countries that have 
embraced the Faure regime do not want to support his 
applications because they view him as a troublesome dissident 
who did not remain loyal to Eyadema (with whom a number of 
African despots have much in common), while Western countries 
opposed to Eyadema and Faure view Boko as damaged goods 
because of his service as an Eyadema minister.  Boko confided 
that he was seeking to set up an independent law office in 
Paris, separate from the French law firm now employing him. 
His new office would be loosely affiliated with the French 
firm (with which he remains on excellent terms personally), 
but he and the French firm agreed that it was best that they 
end their official ties -- his presence there was hurting the 
firm's business, which depends on many clients from many 
sectors seeking opportunities across Africa. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
HOFMANN