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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE: 
ISTANBUL VIEWPOINTS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 7215 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 6543 
 
Classified by Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions with Istanbul 
intellectuals interested in the political and social aspects 
of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) reflect a 
vigorous ongoing debate regarding the ideology of the AKP and 
how it could shape Turkey in coming decades. These observers 
were eager to share their views of the AKP's agenda, and the 
potential implications for Turkish society.  Predictions 
ranged from the alarmist -- fears of an Iran-style religious 
state or a domineering executive a la Russia's Putin -- to 
the fulfillment of middle class desires for democracy, as 
well as aspirations for an American-style state with freedom 
for all kinds of expression. These diverse opinions suggest 
that the Istanbul elite remain suspicious of a party with 
central Anatolian and Islamist roots and what appears to them 
to be an ambiguous agenda.  This ambiguity can also be seen 
as a result of the 'big-tent' politics the AKP espouses to 
juggle competing internal factions. End Summary. 
 
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The Context of the AKP Agenda: Big-Tent Politics 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (C) Unlike most Turkish political parties which tend to be 
ideologically homogeneous, the AKP is an umbrella party that 
encompasses different ideological views and personalities 
(refs A and B). Within this coalition are a pious group, a 
nationalist group, and a pragmatic group, all of whose 
interests AKP leadership has to keep in balance.  In 
addition, its roots are Anatolian and generally more pious 
than those parties with which the Istanbul elites 
traditionally have been more comfortable.  To a certain 
extent, the AKP agenda is deliberately ambiguous to maintain 
a balance among the AKP's internal factions and to prevent 
ideological and personality fault-lines from creating a major 
split in the party. In this context, the ambiguity of the AKP 
agenda as described by the following discussions with 
Istanbul-based outsiders may reflect both this balancing act 
and a continuing level of discomfort with an AKP party 
structure and ideology that remains largely foreign to them - 
and which AKP has failed adequately to explain. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Islam Lite: Religious Modernization and the American System 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Mustafa Akyol, a journalist at the widely-read, 
mainstream secularist Hurriyet newspaper, told us recently 
that many within the newspaper would not agree with his 
views, but that he felt there had been a change within the 
Islamic camp which now viewed democratic governance as 
compatible with Islam as long as it allowed the latter to be 
practiced freely. The change had not occurred due to pressure 
from the secular establishment, he noted. 
 
¶5. (C) Akyol agreed with the characterization of this 
phenomenon by a professor at Ankara University as "Islam 
Lite." He noted that when he drives home next to a 
fashionably-dressed headscarved girl talking on her Nokia 
cellphone in her car, he sees that Turks do not want a 
Sharia-based legal system. As he put it, he feels that people 
want the government to "defend the headscarf as much as it 
defends the mini-skirt" and to protect the right to freedom 
of expression for all. "As long as it is not forced, how can 
one deny the right to wear a headscarf?" Akyol rhetorically 
asked. Akyol went on to criticize "secular fundamentalists" 
who are pre-emptively intolerant of expressions of Islam and 
who see the subject of Islam in Turkey as a zero-sum game. 
"If there is an Islamic, pro-Sharia party, please bring in 
the army," Akyol said, "but the army and secularists 
intervene before Turkey even has a chance to explore these 
issues." Akyol declared that the AKP is part of this Islamic 
modernization process and that despite difficulties, it won't 
move backwards to the Islam of "narrow-minded people." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
It's All About The Middle Class and Democracy 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) We accompanied a Washington-based analyst to a 
wide-ranging discussion with Can Paker, chairman of the 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation think-tank 
(TESEV) and chairman of the Open Society Institute-Turkey. 
Presenting a different perspective, Paker explained that 
Turkish politics were based on a civil/military bureaucracy 
that instituted top-down change upon a homogeneous society. 
However, with the rise of a middle class, demand for greater 
democracy, individualism, and better conditions for private 
enterprise emerged. This, coupled with EU and US demands for 
greater political openness, meant that Turkey was on a fast 
track to democratization, according to Paker. Paker argued 
that democratization has not yet been fully realized in 
Turkey and the current political struggle is an attempt to 
diminish the power of the civil/military bureaucracy and its 
ability to "dictate to" political parties. The rise of the 
AKP in 2002, according to Paker, was fueled by a desire for 
greater democracy and an end to civil/military domination of 
the political scene. 
 
¶7. (C) With this political framework in mind, Paker declared 
that the AKP's political future rests on continued 
democratization and that the party knows it must be 
progressive. He claimed that only a minority of the party 
desires traditional Islamic ways and that the party therefore 
cannot be an Islamic party. The party "must be secular," he 
declared. "There is no second agenda," religious or 
otherwise. Paker believes that the AKP desires democracy and 
is a reflection of the aspirations of the middle class, which 
in Paker's analysis, doesn't vote for religion or 
nationalism, but rather for the party that helps advance its 
interests. 
 
¶8. (C) Paker went on to assert a position he's made 
previously to the Ambassador -- that the headscarf is not a 
religious expression, but rather a middle-class expression of 
the desire of women to enter the public sphere and carve out 
an active role in society. For him, women being active is a 
sociological sign of the middle-class in society (versus at 
home). When asked how to explain comments by an AKP MP who 
told us that the AKP,s self-identification as a 
"conservative democratic party" was merely code for "Islamist 
party," Paker's response was that the AKP member was 
"mistaken" and that "he will never be able to have an Islamic 
government because of the civil/military bureaucracy." Paker 
did say that Erdogan "probably started out as an Islamist, 
but saw the realities and changed." 
 
------------------------------------ 
Iran in Turkey or the Russian Model? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Of all our interlocutors, Kemal Koprulu and his 
colleagues at the Ari Movement (a center-right NGOQocusing 
on developing civil society with its roots in the 
center-right Motherland party - ANAP) were most critical of 
the AKP and the most suspicious of its agenda. Aside from 
criticizing Prime Minister Erdogan for being "self-centered, 
angry, and lacking accountability," the Ari Movement clearly 
views the AKP as having a threatening ideological agenda. 
Koprulu asserted that Erdogan's plan to establish 15 new 
universities with rectors selected by the ruling party, 
rather than the (arch-secularist, military controlled) Higher 
Education Board (known by its Turkish acronym "YOK"), would 
have led to ideological fights between pro-AKP rectors and 
the rest of the university system. The plan ultimately 
failed. (Note: It was vetoed and then declared 
unconstitutional. End Note.) In Koprulu's view, this was part 
of a broader AKP initiative to erode specific "subsystems" 
and rebuild them with their "own people," ultimately leading 
toward radical change overall. Another Ari Movement member 
suggested that a successful AKP agenda could mean the 
creation of an Iran-style Islamic government in Turkey. 
Koprulu told us that he did not necessarily share that 
opinion, but believes the AKP may indeed have a religious 
agenda. 
 
¶10. (C) Koprulu's greatest concern was that the AKP may be 
seeking to mimic "the Russian Model" with a strong, 
dominating executive leader along the lines of Vladimir 
Putin. Noting that Erdogan "admires Putin", Koprulu said that 
perhaps the AKP wants to change Turkey into a presidential 
system so that it can hold power "from 2002 to 2032." Koprulu 
concluded his comments by proclaiming that no matter the 
AKP's true agenda, in 20-30 years "a secular republic like 
the one established by Ataturk will not exist." (Comment: We 
have heard similar arguments from other elites, who cite 
instead the French presidential model while ascribing similar 
motives. End Comment.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Ari Movement concerns notwithstanding, a recent 
survey suggests that fewer than 10% of Turks want a 
Sharia-based government, making the likelihood of a 
successful imposition of a religious state highly unlikely. 
Kemal Koprulu's "Russian Model," in which the AKP and PM 
Erdogan seek to create a dominating executive power a la 
Putin or as in France, remains widely discussed but clearly 
speculative. Moreover, Koprulu's views and the opinions of 
other members of the wealthy, secular elites must be tempered 
with the understanding that AKP politicians and voters are 
quite different from the Istanbul elite. The Anatolian and 
pro-Islam nature of the AKP must be unsettling for thesQ 
elites, and coupled with a deliberately ambiguous agenda, can 
easily be seen as threatening. Ambiguity in the AKP's agenda 
may very well not point to a sinister hidden ideology, but 
rather the difficulties inherent in holding together a 
big-tent political party with competing internal 
constituencies. 
 
¶12. (C) The AKP's balancing act may take a turn for the 
worse, as Koprulu expects, or may succeed in the way Paker 
and Akyol view the party. In order to hold together and 
retain power, it must continue to perform its tricky juggling 
act to keep its internal factions from splitting the party up. 
SSOUDKIRK