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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR ER
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHEBREMESKEL DISCUSSES U.S.- 
ERITREAN RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: CDA Jennifer McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U)  Cable includes an action request for AF/E.  See para 
¶11. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary:  Charg d,Affaires met with the Director in 
the Office of the President Yemane Ghebremeskel on August 28, 
at his request, to discuss the status of the proposed phone 
call from Secretary Rice and to reiterate a proposal for a 
high-level Eritrean delegation to meet with the Secretary. 
Charg used the opportunity to raise concerns about the 
negative trends in our bilateral relations, discuss 
Eritrea,s role regionally and to urge the Eritreans to adopt 
a less provocative stance towards the U.S.  Post requests AF 
guidance on responding to Ghebremeskel,s request for high 
level meetings in Washington.  End Summary. 
 
Call from the Secretary and Proposal for Meeting 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) Ghebremeskel inquired about the status of the proposed 
call from Secretary Rice to President Isaias.  Ghebremeskel 
noted that the President would be heavily engaged in meetings 
and staying in Massawa through part of the week but indicated 
that the President would be available for the call.  Charg 
said that she believed that the call was still forthcoming. 
She would check with Washington and get back with him. 
 
¶4. (C) Ghebremeskel stated that a high level visit with the 
Secretary in Washington would prove more useful and asked 
 
SIPDIS 
whether this would be possible. When asked who would 
represent the Eritreans and what would be the proposed topics 
for discussions if such a visit were to occur, Ghebremeskel 
replied that Yemane Ghebreab, Head of Political Affairs for 
the People,s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) would 
likely lead the delegation and topics would include the 
border, bilateral relations and regional issues such as Sudan 
and Somalia. 
 
State of Bilateral Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Charg stated her belief that under the present 
circumstances, a direct meeting with the Secretary was 
unlikely without concrete indications that the Eritreans 
wished to improve bilateral relations.  In almost all areas, 
the U.S.-Eritrean relationship has become unproductive and 
communication with the GSE severely circumscribed. For 
example, the Ambassador has not had access to the President 
in over a year.  Unhelpful actions run the gamut from the 
GSE,s closing of USAID last fall, the removal of Western 
UNMEE monitors, cessation of military programs and exchanges, 
lack of access of Embassy personnel to government officials, 
as well as administrative obstacles placed on getting visas 
for official travelers and gaining permission to travel 
in-country. 
 
¶6. (C) As recent examples of gratuitously provocative 
actions, Charg referred to an anti-American video clip which 
had been airing repeatedly on Eri-TV throughout the previous 
week, and a full page editorial in the Saturday edition of 
the Eritrea profile with the headline, &U.S. Policy 
Threatens War in Horn of Africa8. (Note: The TV clip was 
e-mailed to AF/E and AF/PD on August 25 and consists of a 
one-minute segment of President Bush speaking about democracy 
and tolerance juxtaposed against a series of images edited to 
illustrate U.S. military human rights abuses in Iraq. The 
newspaper editorial is one of several recently published 
blaming the unrest in Somalia on U.S. meddling.  End note.) 
Ghebremeskel professed no knowledge of the TV clip and 
dismissed the newspaper editorial as an opinion piece. 
Charg noted that since the Eritrean Profile is the official 
news organ of the government, inclusion and prominence of 
such editorials are clearly with the government,s approval. 
She also pointed to President Isaias, anti-American remarks 
during his Martyr,s Day Speech in May and his recent speech 
 
in Nakfa on August 24 blaming the U.S. administration for 
lack of progress on the border issue. (Reported previously in 
septels.) 
 
¶7. (C) Ghebremeskel noted that even several years ago, when 
Eritrea was cooperating on a range of bilateral programs with 
the U.S., the U.S. had taken a number of negative actions. 
For example, Eritrea had not been included with five other 
countries as a recipient for regional U.S. counter-terrorism 
assistance. (Comment: Post assumes he is referring to the 
EACTI program announced in June 2003. End Comment.)  He also 
cited the 2004 sanctions levied under the International 
Religious Freedom Act and the exclusion of Eritrea from 
participating in AGOA.  The sanctions, he noted, were unfair 
because the U.S. Government does not apply such sanctions 
consistently across all nations.  Charg responded that these 
sanctions and programs should be viewed in the bilateral 
context and not in comparison with other countries.  U.S. 
relations with each country are unique and reflect an 
aggregate of interests across the full bilateral 
relationship, as well as domestic considerations. 
Ghebremeskel also commented that the U.S. had historically 
favored Ethiopia, including identifying Ethiopia as an 
&anchor8 state despite its own human rights problems and 
had portrayed both the Eritrean government and President 
Isaias in a negative light, most recently in A/S Frazer,s 
July 11 testimony to Congress. 
 
Discussion of Border Issues 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ghebremeskel noted that border demarcation remains of 
paramount importance to the Eritreans.  He reiterated the 
complaint that the U.S. position favors Ethiopia, averring 
that the U.S. has done little to address the issue in the 
past three years.  He referred to the sum of previous UN 
envoy Axworthy,s efforts as &delaying tactics8 in favor of 
the Ethiopians and noted that General Fulford was on record 
as discussing changing the border lines with the EEBC.  He 
added that the Eritrean government had sent a letter to 
President Bush and &others8 in the U.S. government 
following Ethiopia,s refusal of the demarcation decision and 
had never received a response.  In a familiar refrain, he 
noted that the U.S. could make the Ethiopians comply with the 
boundary decision, if it chose to do so. 
 
¶8. (C) Charg stated that the U.S. has always expressed 
backing for the EEBC decision and strongly supports a final 
demarcation.  U.S. interest clearly lies in a peaceful, 
stable Horn of Africa with good bilateral relations with all 
countries and between those countries. U.S. relations with 
Ethiopia and Eritrea should not be viewed as a zero sum game, 
a point to which Ghebremeskel agreed. Logically then, the 
U.S. and Eritrea share a mutual interest in not only 
demarcation but the eventual reestablishment of cordial 
relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which will 
necessitate engagement between the two countries at some 
juncture in the future.  The Charg added that the Eritreans 
need to bear in mind that the U.S. is supporting a UN, not a 
U.S., effort. The contesting parties, i.e. Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, have to be willing to remain engaged for a solution 
to work.  In terms of the current U.S.-Eritrean bilateral 
relationship, though, the GSE,s single-minded focus on the 
border demarcation and reticence in engaging the U.S. in 
other areas is unhelpful, and is fueling perceptions that the 
GSE does not want a cooperative relationship. 
 
Somalia and Regional Concerns 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Charg noted that the lack of open communication with 
the GSE is also fueling concerns about Eritrea,s intentions 
in the region, especially Somalia but also vis-a-vis Darfur. 
She referred to recent press reports alleging Eritrean 
material and troop support to the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC) in contravention of the arms embargo and inquired why 
 
Eritrea does not support an IGAD peace-keeping force. 
Ghebremeskel noted that the Eritrean position on Somalia was 
misunderstood by the U.S.  First, Eritrea,s perspective 
differs from the U.S.; Eritrea does not see Somalia as the 
next Afghanistan.  Secondly, he said there is no evidence to 
show that Eritrea is supporting the UIC and countered that he 
had read press reports in the spring alleging U.S. support to 
Somali warlords. (Comment: Touch. End Comment.) Regarding 
IGAD, Ghebremeskel added that not only Eritrea, but few of 
the IGAD countries agree on whether to send in a 
peace-keeping force. The Eritreans have concerns about an 
IGAD force,s capabilities to conduct such a mission and 
about its purpose, which in their view, is only for the 
protection of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
&And, what is the TFG really?,8 he asked. The Courts are at 
least bringing a semblance of order to the country. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Charg responded that the U.S. does not see Somalia 
as a replica of Afghanistan, but certainly has serious 
concerns about extremist elements in the UIC, including known 
terrorists with ties to Al-Qaeda. She noted that the U.S. 
supports talks between the UIC and the TFG, and established 
the Somalia Contact Group to this purpose. Eritrea should be 
cognizant of the legitimate concerns of the U.S. regarding 
the role of extremist elements like Sheikh Hasan Aweys within 
the UIC. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment: While Ghebremeskel covered familiar ground 
in the substance of discussions, the mere fact that the 
Eritreans initiated the meeting represents one of the few 
positive actions by the GSE in months.  Charg encouraged 
Ghebremeskel to look first at expanding dialogue on these 
topics through our respective Embassies and for the Eritreans 
to use UNGA as an opportunity to discuss a proposal for 
higher level engagement with AF bureau officials. Certainly 
any consideration for higher level meetings in Washington 
should be predicated first on the tenor of the conversation 
between the Secretary and President Isaias and a clear 
willingness by the Eritreans to discuss not only the border 
but also the broader bilateral relationship. Post would 
appreciate guidance from AF on responding to the request for 
high-level meetings in Washington.  End Comment. 
MCINTYRE