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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 004900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT AND SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC PGOV ELNT IN PK
SUBJECT: GOI DECISION-MAKING, POST-MUMBAI BLASTS: WHAT TO 
WATCH FOR 
 
REF: A. MUMBAI 1293 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 4667 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 3857 
     ¶D. 05 NEW DELHI 8508 
 
Classified By: Charge Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In the aftermath of October's Diwali 
bombings in Delhi (Ref D), NSA Narayanan put us on notice 
that although that attack did not surpass the GOI's threshold 
for absorbing terrorism, he could not say definitively how 
close it came to crossing the line.  His more recent warnings 
of growing cross-border infiltration (Ref C), echoed by our 
J&K Police contacts (Septel), suggest that additional 
spectacular attacks (or attempts) may follow.  PM Singh and 
the UPA government will weigh many factors in deciding if, 
how, and when to respond to the July 11 series of bomb blasts 
in Mumbai (Ref A).  The GOI's initially restrained response 
reflects, among other things, Prime Minister Singh's 
continued strong personal commitment to the process of 
rapprochement with Pakistan.  Embassy New Delhi outlines 
below signposts to watch in gauging GOI response and some 
possible avenues Delhi may pursue if the government concludes 
a response is warranted.  Government stability -- closely 
linked to the mood of the people -- is the most critical 
factor, although the signposts include some important 
sub-factors that will contribute to the stability calculus. 
The close timing between the Srinagar and Mumbai attacks 
suggests they were coordinated, but they may have been the 
work of two cooperating groups and not necessarily of one 
organization.  End Summary. 
 
Signposts to Watch For 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Embassy New Delhi has identified the following 
signposts that we will monitor over the coming weeks, to help 
gauge the GOI's likely reaction to the July 11 terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai: 
 
-- Clear evidence of any involvement by Islamabad in the 
Mumbai blasts will drive a confrontational approach.  The GOI 
will be cautious, however, and not act on speculative 
reporting. 
 
-- Communal violence stoked by right-wing Hindu groups (RSS, 
Shiv Sena, etc.) could force the GOI to adopt a harder line 
on Pakistan to appease the crowds, and may lead to either 
mass casualties from mob violence (if the security services 
stay in their duty stations) or civilian deaths from 
panic-firing (if the security services come out in force 
without adequate protection and direction).  (NOTE: Heavy 
monsoon rains and flooding in some cities may help deter 
communal violence.  End Note.) 
 
-- Partisan back-biting, in the form of the BJP accusing the 
UPA of having "compromised" India's security, could also push 
the UPA to authorize a visible response either against 
Pakistan or local groups, the control over which could 
quickly slip through the hands of the political leadership. 
The UPA can opt to fling muck back at the BJP, however; its 
most likely response will be to highlight the Vajpayee 
government's decision to release three jihadi terrorists and 
fly them to Afghanistan in December 1999 to ransom the 
 
NEW DELHI 00004900  002 OF 004 
 
 
hijacked flight IC-814. 
 
-- Additional spectacular terrorist attacks will increase the 
likelihood of a hard GOI response. 
 
-- An Indian perception that Pakistan is responding 
inappropriately will also raise the GOI's ire.  In this, we 
believe President Musharraf's and Prime Minister Aziz's early 
condemnation of the Mumbai attacks will at least buy the UPA 
some breathing room. 
 
UPA Stability the Key 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In the wake of a two-month-long series of grenade 
attacks in Srinagar (Septel) and two headline-grabbing spy 
scandals, the UPA government is on the defensive regarding 
security issues.  The BJP is smelling opportunity, and will 
undoubtedly try to bloody the government's nose in the 
Parliament session that begins July 24.  PM Singh and 
Congress President Sonia Gandhi's conclusion that the 
coalition is under political siege would be the most likely 
scenario that would lead to New Delhi retaliating, although 
we cannot yet say what option the GOI may employ.  Both the 
government and the Embassy will closely watch the nation's 
mood over the next few days to try to gauge what the people 
want the GOI to do.  At this point, communal calm prevails, 
but extremist ideologues and/or follow-on attacks could 
change the political landscape in a matter of hours. 
 
Options Before the Government 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) If the GOI concludes it must act visibly against 
Pakistan, it has a variety of options: 
 
-- At a minimum the Indo-Pak Foreign Secretaries'/Foreign 
Ministers' meetings slated for later in July could be 
postponed or cancelled, and the PM's possible visit to 
Pakistan would continue to be held in abeyance. 
 
-- The GOI could suspend or withdraw participation in 
Indo-Pak CBMs like the cross-LoC buses and relaxed visa 
requirements for certain categories of Pakistani visitors. 
 
-- Delhi could recall its High Commissioner to Islamabad; 
also, intelligence operations against the Pakistan High 
Commission, and the PNGing of diplomats, are other possible 
but unlikely responses. 
 
-- As in the 1990s, tit-for-tat terrorist attacks cannot be 
ruled out, but are highly unlikely at this juncture. 
 
-- Military and intel escalation are also possibilities; the 
Army's "Cold Start" doctrine  was conceived after the 
military escalation that followed the December 2001 
Parliament attack, bearing in mind that a rapid attack 
against select terrorist targets in Pakistan or Pakistani 
Kashmir, avoiding Pakistani civilian and military centers, 
may be required.  We believe the PM would not employ this 
option absent additional attacks or very clear (and public) 
evidence that Islamabad ordered these blasts. 
 
Likely Suspects: A Short List 
 
NEW DELHI 00004900  003 OF 004 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) A reported LeT spokesman called New Delhi Television 
(NDTV) to deny that group's involvement in the Mumbai blasts; 
however, LeT often denies any role in attacks on non-military 
targets for PR purposes, and we lack data to confirm how 
often their denials are accurate.  We are also looking at 
these attacks in light of information we have received from 
both NSA Narayanan and J&K police that infiltration has as 
much as tripled in 2006 to date over the same period in 2005, 
but without an increase in the tempo of day-to-day terrorism. 
 (NOTE: We do not know the GOI methodology behind this 
estimate.  End Note.) 
 
¶6.  (C) We expect knee-jerk reactions from both police and 
press, to include arrests of suspected jihadis and bombastic 
reportage of same, so caution shoul be exercised not to rely 
exclusively on information provided by the Indian media (Ref 
B).  Of the jihadi and Islamist groups active in India, only 
the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) contends with 
LeT as a possible suspect as far as capacity and the ability 
to strike outside Northern India.  SIMI, however, has never 
been accused of possessing the sort of sophisticated command 
and control necessary to detonate seven bombs within 15 
minutes.  Other possible suspects are far less likely. 
Hizbul Mujahedeen would receive no political value from 
launching anonymous attacks in Mumbai; the city's criminal 
organizations may have been contracted to execute the blasts, 
but the question would remain as to who hired them; and the 
targeting and methodology are inconsistent with what we know 
about Naxalites and North-East ethno-national groups. 
 
¶7.  (C) A collaboration of like-minded groups is also 
possible.  There are no clear links between the two sets of 
blasts in Srinagar and Mumbai but two series of multiple, 
nearly-simultaneous explosions occurring independently on the 
same day, absent an obvious trigger (such as Indian 
Independence Day or the anniversary of some other terrorist 
attack), is highly improbable. 
 
The BJP Fishes on the Bottom 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Despite the tragic nature of the Mumbai bombing 
attack, shortsighted BJP leaders attempted to use the event 
to score cheap political points against the UPA.  Party 
President Rajnath Singh claimed that the bombings "underlined 
yet again the total failure of the UPA Government to gain an 
upper hand on terrorism," and accused the UPA of creating "an 
environment in which jihadi terrorists can act with 
impunity."  Singh maintained that the UPA's repeal of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) "emboldened the 
terrorists," stating "this government has robbed the 
country's population of all sense of security."  LK Advani 
was equally negative, emphasizing that "the internal security 
situation deteriorated after the UPA came to power" and 
blaming the UPA's "failure to ensure internal security" for 
the attack.  BJP Spokesman Prakash Javdekar insisted to us 
that the BJP is not content with mere criticism of the UPA, 
but will press for strong anti-terrorism measures in the next 
session of Parliament, which is slated to begin on July 24. 
 
¶9.  (C) Our RSS/VHP contacts were even more virulent.  Shyam 
Parande, the RSS International Affairs Secretary, did not 
 
NEW DELHI 00004900  004 OF 004 
 
 
hesitate to lay the blame for the Mumbai attacks on 
Pakistan's doorstep, telling us that "India should not be 
talking peace with Pakistan at the cost of lax internal 
security."  He further claimed that this attack was 
"masterminded by groups based in Pakistan and by people who 
might be linked to the Pakistani establishment."  Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad President Acharya Giriraj Kishore stated to us 
that Pakistan should be "served with a warning much stronger 
than mere words, or such acts of terrorism would continue." 
 
¶10.  (C) With the country mourning the loss of innocent life, 
the BJP's unhelpful sniping and attempt to somehow smear the 
UPA with blame is likely to backfire.  Few Indians outside of 
the most hard-line BJP supporters are in the mood for such 
name calling.  This is another indication that the BJP 
continues to descend into a negative politics that can only 
contribute towards its further decline.  While the BJP has 
gone after the UPA, it has so far refrained from brazen 
Muslim-baiting.  In their private statements to us, RSS/VHP 
leaders have indicated that the BJP is contemplating turning 
the attacks into an anti-Muslim, anti-Pakistan issue.  In the 
current emotional atmosphere, these are thresholds that the 
BJP leadership must contemplate long and hard before crossing. 
 
Comment: GOI Redlines Unclear, Calm Required 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) More than Narayanan's redlines, those held (closely) 
by the PM and Sonia Gandhi will be key to developments in the 
coming days (although Narayanan will undoubtedly be of great 
impact on the PM's calculations); Narayanan himself has told 
us in the past he has not calculated the GOI's redlines, 
except that they lie somewhere between the Diwali blasts and 
the 2001 attack on Parliament.  Assuming the GOI's 
infiltration data are correct, this influx of fighters may 
have been destined for the Mumbai blasts and possible future 
attacks throughout India, which can severely test Delhi's 
capacity for self-restraint.  The redlines will be as much 
political as security-oriented, and largely a reaction to the 
public mood, which makes an authoritative prediction 
hazardous at this stage.  The PM is known for both his own 
calm demeanor and for instilling calmness in others, but his 
abilities will be tested as he and his Cabinet try to keep 
the situation under their control, and not spin into a repeat 
of the 2001-02 "war scare," or worse. 
 
¶12.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
PYATT