VZCZCXRO0082
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1802/01 1980436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170436Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2763
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1502
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM HUMANR ETRD EINV ECON VM
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVES NEW GOVERNMENT, 
INDIRECTLY CRITICIZES PARTY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 
 
REF: A) HANOI 1580; B) HANOI 1090 
 
HANOI 00001802  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  During an unusually long summer 
session convened May 16-June 29 to approve the new government 
selected by the Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) 10th Party 
Congress, Vietnam's National Assembly (NA) also debated ten laws and 
approved three resolutions (debate on the laws reported septel).  In 
an unprecedented development, the CPV's nominees for the three top 
leadership positions (below Party Secretary) made brief 
presentations to the NA before their candidacies were voted on.  NA 
displeasure over the GVN's non-reaction to recent corruption 
scandals was clearly evident in low votes returned on several CPV 
candidates tainted by the scandals and in a rancorous question and 
answer session with Government ministers.  Several ranking Cabinet 
members cited Party policy as justification for the GVN's 
non-investigation of some figures, which provided an opening for 
some deputies to discuss the CPV's actual place in Vietnam's 
society, an issue that was raised indirectly in several other 
deputies' comments.  This session underscores that the Assembly has 
had some success in carving out space for itself as a real organ of 
government, at least in asserting its right to discuss even the most 
sensitive aspects of the country's political life.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
New Government Reaffirms GVN Policy to Continue Reform 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Foremost in the agenda of the latest session of the NA, an 
unusual summer session called immediately after the conclusion of 
the 10th Party Congress, was the "election" of the CPV's nominees 
for State President, Prime Minister and National Assembly Chairman, 
and approval of nine cabinet members, including two deputy prime 
ministers, six ministers and the General State Auditor (REF A).  As 
in past years, there was only one candidate for each office, despite 
vocal requests from many delegates for multiple candidates per 
position.  Despite the lack of competition, the two new deputy prime 
minister candidates were approved by unusually low majorities of 
only 58 per cent, Nguyen Sinh Hung, and 66 per cent, Trung Dinh 
Trong, respectively (REF A).  Nguyen Sy Dzung, a vice chairman in 
the Office of the National Assembly (ONA), commented that the low 
vote counts indicate that delegates have "become more difficult to 
deal with" when it comes to approving the CPV's vetted candidates. 
This can be seen as "a sign of improved democracy in terms of the 
National Assembly's activities," he said.  Nguyen Chi Dzung, a 
senior ONA staffer and former Editor-in-Chief of the ONA-affiliated 
Legislative Journal, said that the low vote counts, as well as the 
deputies' public request for more candidates to be considered for 
ranking State and GVN positions, manifestly reflect the NA deputies' 
distrust of some new cabinet members, and underscores their "quest 
for more democracy" in the system of nominating and approval of GVN 
ranking personnel. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A new feature in the "election process" during this 
post-Congress session were speeches made before the National 
Assembly by the three candidates for the offices of State President, 
Prime Minister and National Assembly Chairman prior to their actual 
election.  These addresses, though still far removed from campaign 
speeches, "aimed to provide delegates with more information about 
the candidates before the election took place," according to Vice 
Chairman Dzung.  He also revealed that the National Assembly 
Standing Committee (NASC), in effect the steering committee for the 
NA, initially wanted to require all 13 CPV candidates to present 
themselves to the Assembly before votes on their candidacy, but had 
to moderate this plan when the CPV Politburo decided that it did not 
want to set the precedent that Party-nominated candidates may be 
scrutinized by NA deputies.  Nevertheless, the CPV felt it necessary 
to make some allowance for the examination of candidates in the face 
of the deputies' continued insistence, thus the compromise of the 
three speeches.  One of our contacts noted with pleasure that this 
gesture placed the three top GVN leaders on a level with common NA 
deputies for the very first time, but admitted that the CPV Party 
Secretary (who is theoretically at the apex of power in Vietnam) is 
 
SIPDIS 
still above any NA or even GVN scrutiny. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In an interview with local newspapers, Vice Chairman Dzung 
affirmed that the three new leaders are all supportive of the 
renovation (Doi Moi) process.  He expressed hope that new State 
President Nguyen Minh Triet, a leader who spent many years leading 
provincial and municipal administrations, would be able to do more 
to speed up judicial reform for the sake of common people.  In the 
interview, he also noted that new Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung 
"meets the necessary criteria to deal with national economic 
issues."  He hinted, however, that Dzung might be different from 
former PM Phan Van Khai, noting that Dzung has "contributed much to 
the promotion of economic reform and yet is still loyal to 
Marxist-Leninism."  In an private conversation with Pol Assistant, 
Vice Chairman Dzung explained that PM Dzung tends to be more open to 
new ideas and concepts, because of his poor education. However, 
 
HANOI 00001802  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
owing to his "tolerant background," PM Dzung "is supposed to be not 
firm with his ideas, and thus overly subject to the influence of 
those around him", he commented.  For his part, Ngo Cuong, 
Editor-in-Chief of the Supreme People's Court Judicial Journal, 
informed Pol Assistant that PM Dzung's police background would 
likely make him focus more on security-related issues rather than 
economic ones. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to Assembly staffer Chi Dzung, although PM Dzung 
was the standing Deputy Prime Minister in the previous government, 
he has never been seen as a decisive leader.  Chi Dzung theorized 
that the low vote counts for some of the new Cabinet members 
reflected the level of trust in PM Dzung himself among deputies, 
which may account for the fact that almost half the NA Deputies did 
not vote with the PM on a vote tied to the PMU-18 scandal (REF B) on 
his first day in office.  Only 56.8 percent of delegates voted to 
approve a combined resolution to discharge eight cabinet members 
tainted by the scandal, but which let disgraced Transportation 
Minister Dao Dinh Binh retire without punishment despite his 
Ministry's central role in the affair.  During the debate, PM Dzung 
claimed that the GVN has developed a consensus approach to resolving 
the scandal, but deputies were incensed that he failed to confirm 
whether the GVN has actually conducted any formal meetings to 
investigate the case or to issue a formal conclusion, Chi Dzung 
asserted.  (Note: In early June, the Prime Minister issued a formal 
reprimand against Binh, blaming his "lack of responsibility" as the 
cause of the mismanagement of ODA projects.  End Note.) 
 
Grilled Cabinet Members Turn to Party for Help 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The PMU-18 corruption scandal, in addition to other 
significant corruption-related issues, was also high on the 
deputies' hit list during  the summer session's televised 
question-and-answer session, a traditional give-and-take between NA 
deputies and State ministers that has featured increasingly 
acrimonious and un-scripted exchanges in recent years.  In response 
to one question, Nguyen Hong Phuc, the Minister of Planning and 
Investment, who has been retained from the previous government, 
hinted that the scandal may continue to implicate other government 
figures as his Ministry is not the only agency responsible for ODA 
allocation, and that "we have no idea how much ODA has been 
(illegally) siphoned off and by whom."  Challenged on the same 
subject, Nguyen Sinh Hung, the former Minister of Finance who has 
been roundly criticized for his handling of the scandal, responded 
obtusely that "the situation might have been different if we had 
strictly dealt with the issue of public property usage." (Note: 
Hung was ultimately promoted to Deputy Prime Minister at the end of 
the NA session as planned by the CPV, but was the recipient of the 
58 percent majority noted above, the lowest affirmation vote in 
communist Vietnam's history.  End Note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) In another unusual development, Cabinet members who were 
grilled by delegates during the Q-and-A session over their failure 
to take action against subordinates with respect to misconduct or 
poor performance used the  CPV as justification, citing Party and 
GVN regulations.  Both Minister-Chairman of the Office of the 
Government (OOG) Doan Manh Giao and Politburo member-Minister of 
Public Security (MPS) Le Hong Anh quoted Party and GVN internal 
policies to rationalize their actions in the case of OOG Vice 
Chairman Nguyen Van Lam, who received more than USD 10,000 in 
kickbacks from various government offices in the south following a 
business trip there.  (Note:  The incident actually took place in 
2002, but was recently publicized by the Vietnamese press.  Despite 
public pressure that a formal investigation be conducted in this 
matter, Lam was only asked to forward part of the bribe money to a 
fund for the poor and to return the remainder to the originating 
offices.  End Note).  Anh said the MPS did not conduct further 
investigations against Lam because "the OOG did not request it" and 
cited a formal document issued by the Party's Control Commission 
regarding the case. "The MPS will not deal with the case unless the 
OOG has conducted their own investigation, determined that it is a 
corruption case and requested us to work on it," Anh told deputies. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Questioned about another well-publicized case, Anh defended 
MPS's decision not to prosecute ranking officials from PetroVietnam 
who were allegedly involved in corruption in a multi-billion dollar 
Russian investment deal.  He told delegates that "the investigative 
office has the right not to initiate formal investigations against 
them" despite laws to the contrary. But, according to Anh, "law 
provisions are not good enough regarding specific cases, so we need 
to exercise 'flexibility,' not to mention follow certain Party, 
State and Government regulations when  dealing with (ranking) 
officials." 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to both Sy Dzung and Chi Dzung, Anh's "frank 
responses" prompted noisy disagreement from NA deputies.  Delegate 
Nguyen Minh Nhi, a former Secretary of An Giang Province's Party 
 
HANOI 00001802  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Committee, argued that since most Cabinet members are also members 
to the Party's Central Committee, they should be able to propose any 
necessary changes to CPV or GVN regulations so as to ensure strict 
implementation of laws and regulations.  For his part, outgoing NA 
Chairman Nguyen Van An bluntly advised Anh not to mention "the 
Party's internal issues" in front of the National Assembly, noting 
that CPV policies should not be considered a higher source of 
authority than government laws as "the Party's 'guidelines' are 
enacted and ultimately the source of those laws."  An added that the 
conduct of investigative offices "should follow the law." 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) This latest NA session underscores that deputies have had 
some success in carving out space for the NA as a real organ of 
government, at least in asserting the deputies' right to discuss 
even the most sensitive aspects of the country's political life.  We 
should not expect, however that this new outspokenness will 
translate into real power for the NA any time soon.  Nonetheless, it 
is interesting to note that the question of the CPV's position in 
Vietnam's society and, by extension, questions about the monopoly of 
power by State ministries, seems to be the root of most of the 
political issues debated in this session.  This is a popular 
development that will likely continue despite inevitable CPV and GVN 
attempts to rein in the NA in the coming term of government. 
 
MARINE