VZCZCXRO7341
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0978/01 1731314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221314Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4167
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO KDEM CG UG
SUBJECT: ITURI'S MILITIAS: WHY THEY CONTINUE TO FIGHT 
 
 
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ituri District's security has long been 
threatened by the presence of local armed militias backed by 
Congolese and Ugandan elements seeking to profit from the 
region's abundant natural resources, instability, and lack of 
central government authority. Over the past three years, a 
series of joint MONUC-FARDC military operations, along with 
significant demobilization efforts and the arrest of several 
militia leaders, has slowly reduced the overall threat these 
militias pose. The current Ituri militias -- an estimated 
2,000 fighters -- are however the hard-core remnants of the 
former groups. Consequently, the Ituri militias have become 
more difficult to eliminate, requiring more comprehensive 
economic, political, and security solutions. End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
ORIGINS OF ITURI MILITIAS 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The DRC's northeastern Ituri District faces security 
challenges resulting from its geographic location, ethnic 
composition, and wealth of natural resources. The instability 
in this region has often been separate and apart from the 
larger threats and waves of violence which have swept through 
the eastern part of the country. At the base of the original 
conflicts were tensions between indigenous Hema and Lendu 
ethnic groups, which fought one another for control of land 
for agricultural or pastoral use. Subsequent clashes between 
Hema and Lendu continued throughout the wars which engulfed 
the rest of the DRC beginning in the late 1990s. However, as 
Ituri shares a 200-mile land border with Uganda -- in 
addition to 90 miles of shoreline along Lake Albert -- 
outside interest in the District and neglect by Kinshasa left 
it vulnerable to manipulation by its neighbors. 
 
¶3. (C) In late 2002 and early 2003, Ituri saw the creation of 
a host of militia groups backed by individuals in Uganda and 
Rwanda. These militias -- including the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC), the Front for National Integration (FNI), the 
Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), and the 
People's Armed Forces of Congo (FAPC), among others -- were 
founded predominantly along existing ethnic lines. As central 
government authority in Ituri was almost non-existent during 
this period, these militias effectively controlled the region 
politically, economically and military. One of their goals 
was to gain control of the region's abundant natural 
resources, including gold and wood. The militias fought to 
control land, particularly the gold mining region of central 
Ituri, and to prevent rival ethnic groups from achieving 
economic dominance. Militia groups engaged in extensive 
illegal cross-border trade in exchange for money, or more 
often, weapons. The lack of central government controls in 
Ituri provided an ideal environment for the groups to operate 
and thrive. 
 
------------------------ 
SLOWLY REGAINING CONTROL 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) At its peak, the conflict involved some 25,000 militia 
throughout Ituri, which descended by mid-2003 into a complete 
state of lawlessness. The French-led Operation Artemis that 
year ultimately established a tenuous beachhead in Bunia that 
allowed MONUC to resume operations there. As MONUC deployed 
several thousand peacekeepers to the region, and the Armed 
Forces of the DRC (FARDC) dispatched tens of thousands of its 
own troops, joint operations slowly eroded the militias' 
overall control of Ituri. While neither MONUC nor FARDC 
officials can quantify how many militia members have been 
killed, the estimated number of those remaining in Ituri in 
mid-2006 is approximately 2,000. MONUC officials and others 
in Ituri report that those militias still operating -- 
primarily the FNI and FRPI -- are concentrated in specific 
areas; namely, the Nioka-Fataki axis north of Bunia, and the 
Tchei-Semiliki axis south of Bunia. 
 
¶5. (C) Three other factors, aside from military operations, 
have contributed to the decrease in militia numbers. First, 
approximately 9,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized and 
reintegrated back into their communities. While the 
demobilization programs in Ituri have faced significant 
financial and logistical problems, they have nonetheless 
provided an opportunity for thousands to turn in their arms. 
In addition, government authorities have captured several 
high-ranking militia leaders over the years, including Thomas 
Lubanga of the UPC and Chief Kahwa Mandro of PUSIC. While 
 
KINSHASA 00000978  002 OF 003 
 
 
removing these militia commanders from the field has not 
resulted in the dissolution or disappearance of the militias 
themselves, the arrests have had a chilling effect. Members 
of Mahagi's civil society told PolOff on a recent visit that 
the handing over of Lubanga to the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague was viewed with alarm among militia 
supporters -- an indication that militia leaders may no 
longer be able to evade justice. 
 
¶6. (C) A third important factor in addressing the militia 
threat in Ituri was the creation of an interim administration 
by the GDRC to govern the District as a semi-autonomous 
region. Led by District Commissioner Petronille Vaweka, the 
interim administration has been able to establish some 
measure of control and provide limited services to the 
population. Vaweka herself became a central force in 
successful efforts to demobilize and disarm militias by 
virtue of the authority of her office, as well as her own 
tireless efforts to negotiate peace settlements. But lacking 
full support and virtually any funding from Kinshasa, Vaweka 
and the administration did not -- and still do not -- have 
the resources to impose governmental control and to build 
economic infrastructure. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
REDUCED NUMBERS, BUT PERHAPS MORE DANGEROUS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Despite their reduced numbers, militias in Ituri still 
pose a significant threat to security and stability. The May 
28 capture of seven MONUC peacekeepers from Nepal illustrates 
the capability these groups possess and the resulting danger 
they can cause, even to forces that are better-equipped. 
During a May 6-10 visit to Ituri District, PolOff spoke with 
a variety of local politicians, civic leaders and MONUC 
officials, all of whom said the militias are still a constant 
concern. Former MONUC Head of Office Sharouh Sharif reported 
that captured or killed militia members have regularly been 
found with significant weapons caches, including grenade 
launchers, mortars and other light arms. The administrator of 
Mahagi territory, Jean-Paul Likambo, said the area around 
Nioka is effectively ungovernable because of the presence of 
the FNI militia led by Peter Karim. Likambo said the militia 
there often sets up road blocks and levies illegal taxes from 
local merchants and traders. In Djugu and Irumu territories, 
MONUC humanitarian officials report that thousands have been 
forced to flee their homes due to the threat from militias. 
(Note: The IDP problem in Ituri is made worse because local 
populations will often leave an area in advance of expected 
military operations against the militias. End note.) 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) officials in Bunia and 
Mahagi said their operations were often hampered because they 
are not able to access areas controlled by the militias, and 
therefore are unable to deliver voting equipment or conduct 
civic education campaigns. 
 
---------------------------------- 
WHY THEY FIGHT: THE ECONOMIC ANGLE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Militias continue their fight in Ituri largely to 
retain control of Ituri's resource wealth. Any remaining 
pretense that Ituri's militias had been engaged in an ethnic 
conflict dissolved in 2005 with the creation of the umbrella 
organization called the Congolese Revolutionary Movement 
(MRC), which sought to bring together Ituri's various 
militias. The focus of militia activities has shifted towards 
a common enemy, as militias now battle MONUC and the FARDC 
rather than each other in order to protect their economic 
interests. Ituri District Commissioner Vaweka said militias 
only fight now to control resources and to secure illegal 
trade routes to Uganda. Vaweka added that because the GDRC 
cannot provide jobs or money to the population, joining the 
militias becomes an attractive option. Bunia's Bishop 
Monsignor Dieudonne Uringi agreed, saying the militias are 
further supported by local businessmen with known economic 
ties in Uganda. These local merchants, Uringi said, often 
facilitate the illegal transfer of goods across the border 
and use the proceeds to purchase and smuggle weapons to the 
militias. 
 
¶9. (C) By extension, Ituri's militias have become the 
facilitators for illegal trade across the border. Since the 
GDRC is unable to provide basic needs or regular employment, 
militia members see their only chances of economic survival 
coming from illicit commerce. District Commissioner Vaweka 
said demobilized ex-combatants are often lured back into 
 
KINSHASA 00000978  003 OF 003 
 
 
militia ranks by the promise and security of regular pay and 
food, things they cannot secure for themselves in civilian 
life because of the dismal state of the economy. MONUC 
officials in Ituri said this explains why militias have been 
successful in recruiting members in recent months, 
particularly from the ranks of ex-combatants. 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE WAY FORWARD: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Resolving Ituri's militia problem requires an 
approach that addresses the intertwined economic and security 
dynamics of the DRC and Uganda. Attempts by MONUC, the 
international community and local officials to convince 
militias to surrender their arms and re-enter the community 
have produced limited results, and are hampered by 
ineffective management and funding of the DRC's 
demobilization program. The military solution to neutralize 
militias, in the form of joint MONUC-FARDC operations, has 
also proven to be less than fully effective in establishing 
security, particularly as the FARDC itself often contributes 
to the region's instability. Aside from more focused efforts 
in these areas, though, there is a need for greater 
governmental presence and authority in Ituri, along with a 
robust economic development program. With increased 
government control and oversight in the border region, the 
illegal trade that now exists can be monitored, regulated, 
taxed, and legitimized, thereby improving economic conditions 
on both sides of the border, and reducing the incentive for 
militias to continue their fight. 
 
¶11. (C) The region's economic infrastructure must be rebuilt. 
This should include the creation of substantive job-training 
and job-creation programs, including for ex-combatants. Also 
important is economic integration with Uganda. The aim should 
be to benefit both countries through legitimizing and 
regulating regional economic trade, with the implementation 
of border and customs controls and the collection of 
legitimate revenue. 
 
¶12. (C) In terms of security, steps can be taken in several 
areas to reduce the militia threat, apart from direct 
military confrontation. First and foremost, the central 
government needs to establish authority in Ituri after years 
of neglect. The GDRC will need to work directly and 
cooperatively with the newly-elected governor and local 
representatives to ensure economic development and 
reconstruction programs are implemented, and the central 
government needs to share revenues with Ituri District. 
Border security remains a pressing issue for military, police 
and customs officials to resolve, as large portions of the 
DRC-Uganda border are not monitored. Finally widespread 
illegal arms trafficking needs to be brought under control. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: FIXING THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The solution to the Ituri militia threat is no longer 
just a matter of neutralizing or disarming combatants. 
Instead, it requires the creation of legitimate and capable 
local government authorities that can address the region's 
underlying economic, political, and security problems and 
thereby eliminate the incentives for militias to continue 
their fight. End comment. 
MEECE