This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: COLAR PREDICTS ESCALATION BEFORE NEGOTIATION 
 
Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) Commanders of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O), the 
Colombian military's elite force at the core of the Plan 
Patriota campaign, see the conflict with the FARC entering a 
phase of more direct confrontation.  They contend the FARC 
has determined it cannot withstand four more years under 
re-elected President Uribe, and hence it will try to gain a 
position of strength from which to enter peace negotiations. 
Commanders believe the FARC wants to pressure Bogota, by 
regaining territory lost in the first phase of Plan Patriota. 
 An escalating campaign would pose tough challenges to 
COLMIL's stretched resources, especially in helicopter 
mobility, as well as to its internal coordination and 
underemphasized civil affairs work.  End Summary. 
 
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Renewed FARC Assertiveness 
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¶2. (S)  On June 8 US MILGROUP Commander visited the command 
of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O), which prosecutes Plan 
Patriota in FARC heartlands, to discuss ongoing operations 
and near-term outlook.  JTF-O commanders anticipate that a 
new and more direct phase of the conflict is approaching. 
Instead of the COLMIL's active pursuit of the FARC in 
defensive retreat, the pattern will shift to one in which the 
FARC will move to the strategic offensive, trying to regain 
territory in the JTF-O area of operation (AO) and provoking 
head-on confrontation.  Current intelligence already 
indicates movement of some 500 guerrillas into JTF-O's AO on 
the Sumapaz plateau in Cundinamarca Department, a strategic 
gateway to Bogota. 
 
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FARC Sights on Bogota 
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¶3. (S)  Seizure of Bogota remains the FARC's principal 
objective, according to JTF-O commanders.  They believe the 
struggle now occurring west of La Macarena around La Uribe is 
aimed at the establishment of an intermediate rear-guard in 
sufficient strength to project and support an effort directed 
against Bogota.  The FARC's principal rear-guard remains in 
its historic safe haven further south, but in the early days 
of Plan Patriota, the FARC learned from hard experience that 
lines of communication from the despeje were too long to 
protect its operations in Cundinamarca. 
 
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Maneuvering for Talks 
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¶4. (S)  The FARC's new assertiveness is ironically born of 
weakness.  Plan Patriota deprived the FARC of its safe haven 
(despeje) and dispersed its forces.  Under sustained COLMIL 
operations the FARC has suffered higher casualties, forced 
mobility, and inability to aggregate.  Its supply and 
communication lines are interdicted.  These factors have 
taken a heavy toll on FARC morale and discipline, as well as 
hindering recruitment and boosting desertion.  In JTF-O 
commanders' view, the about-face from a FARC defensive to an 
offensive posture is triggered by President Uribe's 
re-election and by the FARC's strategic determination that it 
cannot withstand another four years of this military 
pressure.  The FARC's drive to regain territory, according to 
the commanders, is motivated by a desire to enter peace talks 
-- in a position of greater military strength and hence 
greater negotiating leverage. 
 
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COLMIL Challenges 
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¶5. (S)  The commanders said the GOC shares the same goal of 
entering talks in a dominant position, and it will fight to 
sustain pressure on the FARC.  The next phase of the conflict 
will be about stamina and staying power, which poses tough 
challenges for the COLMIL: 
 
- Helicopters: this is a long-standing issue. Already 
stretched, Omega's helicopter assets have been drawn off to 
support other areas, including high value target (HVT) 
missions. 
- U.S. support: this concern applies most to the logistical 
area.  Although U.S. support meets only about 24 per cent of 
COLMIL requirements, this assistance enables movement of 
supplies as well as troop evacuations and rotations, which 
are vital to morale and discipline. 
 
- Organizational hurdles: commanders retain the mind set of 
war fighters within their respective armed services rather 
than providers to a collaborative joint force.  The COLAR 
cares little, the commanders said, for the Mobile Brigades 
that fight in the Omega area.  Continued duplication by units 
pursuing the same HVT targets is evidence of this phenomenon: 
whichever service develops target information is the one to 
pursue it on any given occasion.  Sister services are often 
unaware of one anothers' activities. 
 
- Civil affairs: JTF-O commanders stressed that social and 
economic development work by the GOC's USAID-equivalent 
Accion Integral was the key to defeating the FARC.  Omega 
officers lamented the lack of GOC development programs in 
their AO.  The COLMIL, they said, can improve the security 
situation but cannot sustain that progress without 
significant GOC local presence. 
 
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An Alternate View 
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¶6.  (S) There are observers who believe the FARC, having 
waited over 40 years, may wait four more years in the hope 
that Uribe's successor will be someone of the left who would 
be easier to deal with.  Meanwhile, the drug trade is so 
lucrative they can afford to wait.  These observers usually 
point out the FARC "do not think like us," and therefore it 
is difficult to predict their actions. 
 
DRUCKER