This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER) 
STATE FOR ISN/NESS (DELABARRE) 
DEPT OF ENERGY FOR DOE/NNSA/NA-242 (GOOREVICH) 
UNVIE FOR LISA HILLIARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 
TAGS: PREL MNUC PINS PINR PGOV KNNP PARM IR IS UNSC UN GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: NSG TROIKA CONDUCTS OUTREACH WITH ISRAELI 
INTER-MINISTERIAL TEAM 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 1722 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen.  Reasons:  1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) troika representatives 
held discussions April 27 with an inter-ministerial team led 
by the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) as part of the 
NSG's outreach to Israel.  Current NSG Chairman Ambassador 
Naess (Norway) updated the Israeli side on changes made to 
the NSG's guidelines since the June 2005 NSG plenary in Oslo. 
 Naess and NSG Consultative Group Chairman Richard Goorevich 
(DOE/NNSA) noted that the NSG is currently discussing several 
issues, including criteria for the supply of sensor 
technology to third countries, the definition of "restraint," 
and how to control stable isotope separation technology. 
Naess said the NSG is constantly assessing whether an 
extraordinary plenary should be convened in advance of the 
June 2006 NSG plenary in Rio de Janeiro, in light of the Iran 
nuclear crisis.  Naess noted that while future NSG Chairman 
Ambassador Jose Medeiros (Brazil) was unable to accompany the 
other troika members to Israel, he looks forward to meeting 
the Israeli ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna. 
 
¶2. (C) The Israeli side expressed gratitude for the NSG's 
outreach to Israel, and pledged Israel's steadfast commitment 
to the NSG's nonproliferation agenda.  IAEC Director General 
Gideon Frank pressed the NSG troika for a formal answer to 
Israel's request to the NSG in 2005 to be accorded NSG 
"adherent status."  The Israeli side expressed its serious 
concerns about the threat a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to 
Israel, and asked questions to ascertain what the NSG could 
do to stave off that threat.  The Israeli side also made 
presentations on how Israel views current trends in 
nonproliferation, and how Israel is strengthening its export 
control system.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NSG "ADHERENT" STATUS FOR ISRAEL 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Director 
General Gideon Frank stressed the importance Israel places on 
its dialogue with the NSG, and the "utmost importance" the 
GOI places on implementing export control legislation.  Frank 
noted Israel's desire to receive a response to its letter to 
the NSG requesting formal recognition of Israel's adherence 
to the NSG guidelines.  Frank noted his expectation that 
formalizing Israel's status with the NSG would "yield 
tangible benefits," but did not elaborate on what those 
benefits would be. 
 
¶4. (C) Frank said that he believes Israel can positively 
influence the development of international nonproliferation 
norms, and assured the troika that Israel would continue to 
"synchronize its activities with those of the NSG."  He 
listed as examples of Israel's activity in the area of 
nonproliferation: (A) Israel's submission of a report to the 
UN on its fulfillment of UNSCR 1540 obligations, and its 
support for the Security Council Committee's efforts on UNSCR 
1540 implementation; (B) Israel's active work on the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
and its support for the convention's adoption; (C) Israel's 
work on the Nuclear Terrorism Committee, and its support for 
the committee's work; (D) Israel's membership in the DOE's 
Megaports Initiative; (E) Israel's favorable consideration of 
the U.S. Container Security Initiative; (F) Israel's intent 
to join the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and to 
participate in the U.S. reactor fuel conversion program; and 
(G) Israel's support for MANPADS initiatives in the 
Conference on Disarmament.  Frank added that Israel is active 
in the IAEA Experts Group on Enhancing Safeguards, and that 
Israel is the deputy chair of the UN Disarmament Committee. 
 
¶5. (C) NSG Chairman Ambassador Roald Naess (Norway) explained 
that the NSG's delay in responding to Israel's formal request 
for designation as an "adherent" was due to the NSG's need to 
achieve consensus in drawing up a response.  He noted that, 
since the Oslo plenary, the NSG had taken up discussion on 
its relations with non-adhering countries and possible 
association.  He said that incoming NSG Chairman Ambassador 
Medeiros (Brazil) intends to obtain a consensus decision on 
"adherent" or "associate" status at the June NSG Plenary in 
Rio de Janeiro.  Naess conveyed Medeiros's apologies for his 
absence, and noted the Brazilian ambassador's hope to meet 
Isaeli Ambassador Michaeli in Vienna in the near future. 
 
------------------------------------- 
UPDATE ON PROGRESS SINCE OSLO PLENARY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Naess updated the Israeli side on changes made to the 
NSG guidelines based on decisions from the last NSG plenary 
in Oslo:  (A) new text was added that concerns the transport 
of trigger list items; (B) there is a new section D in 
paragraph 9 of document I concerning controls and 
re-transfer, that says suppliers should consider restraint; 
(C) there is a new paragraph 15 that has been introduced in 
accordance with UNSCR 1540; and (D) there is a new paragraph 
16 with new language on consultative mechanisms. 
 
¶7. (C) Goorevich updated the Israelis on the last 
Consultative Group meeting, noting that members agreed to 
recommend the addition of UF-6-resistant bellows sealed 
valves to the trigger list to prevent Iran and others from 
purchasing them.  He said the Consultative Group is also 
developing language for review at the Rio Plenary that would 
control technologies associated with stable isotope 
separation.  Goorevich cautioned that the stable isotope 
separation issue could prove problematic because there is 
increasingly a legitimate need for such technology in 
non-nuclear industry (e.g., in semiconductor manufacturing). 
The challenge is to control the technology in a way that does 
not unduly affect industry.  Goorevich noted that discussion 
of this issue follows on the heels of discussions with the 
South Koreans on their use of lasers for isotope separation 
involving uranium. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ISRAEL HOPES THE NSG WILL TAKE ACTION ON IRAN 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to Frank's question about how the NSG could 
address Iran, Naess said that an NSG determination of IAEA 
safeguards noncompliance raises the question of suspending 
cooperation with the noncompliant country.  He noted that 
most NSG members have already suspended supply to Iran, even 
while the NSG as a body has taken no decision to suspend 
supply to Iran.  The natural follow-up to suspension would be 
for NSG members to terminate some contracts with Iran.  Naess 
cautioned, however, that this would require a decision 
"elsewhere in the system."  He added, "If the UN Security 
Council decides on sanctions against Iran, then we will have 
a new situation." 
 
¶9. (C) Naess noted that the NSG invoked its noncompliance 
mechanism in October 2005, following the IAEA resolution on 
Iran in September.  Subsequently, NSG member states in the 
IAEA issued statements signaling their agreement with Naess's 
statement and support for EU-3 and IAEA activities on Iran. 
Naess said that the NSG is constantly assessing whether an 
extraordinary plenary is needed, and is now considering the 
matter in light of IAEA DG ElBaradei's report on Iran to the 
UNSC.  Based on the report, the NSG will determine if another 
extraordinary plenary is necessary, or if the NSG can wait 
for the regular plenary scheduled for June.  He stressed that 
the NSG would only want an extraordinary plenary, however, if 
it would yield decisions. 
 
¶10. (C) Gil Reich from the IAEC asked whether the troika 
could confirm rumors he had heard that there would be an 
extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) in 
the near future.  Goorevich replied that an extraordinary BOG 
meeting would depend on whether suppliers see an Article 12 
violation leading to an extraordinary NSG meeting.  If the 
IAEA, after consultations, rules that there has been an 
Article 12 violation, then this would lead to another round 
of consultations that could yield a decision to terminate 
supply.  Goorevich clarified that while decisions to suspend 
or terminate supply apply only to the NSG's trigger list, it 
would be hard to see NSG members sending dual-use times to 
Iran in the wake of such decisions. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Naess said that the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
initiative caused much discussion in the NSG, and noted that 
many NSG members are waiting for answers from India, 
especially about its separation plan and how it intends to 
implement IAEA-mandated safeguards.  Naess said that the U.S. 
and India want the NSG to make a decision on the initiative 
that will allow for U.S.-Indian coordination.  Naess 
characterized this call as premature, saying that in the 
NSG's view, the "ball is now in India's court," and that many 
NSG members prefer to wait for reactions from the U.S. 
Congress and India's parliament before ruling on the 
initiative. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
PRESENTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION TRENDS, EXPORT CONTROLS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶12. (C) IAEC Nonproliferation Department Director Gil Reich 
then made a presentation on how Israel views trends in the 
nonproliferation arena.  In his briefing, Reich emphasized 
that Israel's formal recognition as an adherent would help 
bring non-participating states into the NSG; and that Israel 
will never challenge the NPT or the principles on which it 
stands.  MFA Arms Control Division Director Alon Bar stressed 
the need to continue work on nonproliferation.  He said he 
hopes steps will be taken to ensure that U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation will not increase proliferation risks. 
 
¶13. (SBU) MFA Export Control Department Director Haim Waxman 
updated the NSG troika on the steps Israel is taking to 
strengthen and transform its export control system.  In his 
presentation, he (A) stressed the key role that export 
controls play in combating proliferation; (B) noted that 
Israel has catch-all provisions in its export control 
legislation; and (C) pointed out that Israel will be adhering 
to all the major nonproliferation regimes after the Knesset 
passes the draft Defense Export Control Act and a control 
order on dual-use export controls later this year. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor (MOITAL) 
Chemical Administration Deputy Director Zeev Berel updated 
the NSG troika on the steps MOITAL is taking to educate 
Israeli industry on new, dual-use export control reporting 
obligations.  Berel noted a recent success story in which an 
Israeli company contacted MOITAL about an export license for 
tantalum -- a metal that has dual-use applications.  Reich 
added that the IAEC plays a key role in educating Customs 
officers on sensitive nuclear and dual-use technology, and 
said that the IAEC still has work to do in this area. 
 
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PARTICIPANTS 
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¶15. (U) The participants on the Israeli side were: 
-- IAEC Director General Gideon Frank 
-- IAEC Director for Nonproliferation Gil Reich 
-- IAEC Director for Arms Control Merav Zafary 
-- IAEC Assistant Director for External Relations Ronen Shaul 
-- Israeli Ambassador to the IAEA Israel Michaeli 
-- MFA Arms Control Division Director Alon Bar 
-- Keren Shahar Ben-Ami from the MFA's Office of the Legal 
Adviser 
-- MFA Export Controls Department Director Haim Waxman 
-- MOITAL Deputy Director for Chemical Administration Zeev 
Berel 
 
¶16. (U) The participants on the NSG troika side were: 
-- Current NSG Chairman Ambassador Roald Naess (Norway) 
-- Past NSG Chairman Ambassador Richard Ekwall (Sweden) 
-- NSG Consultative Group Chairman Richard Goorevich (U.S.) 
-- U.S. Embassy notetaker 
 
¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared by U.S. Consultative 
Group Chairman Richard Goorevich. 
 
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