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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0618/01 1211752
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADCA0B29 MSI5063 SIGNATURE 538)
P 011752Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3652
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1350
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1739
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0695
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0728

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAN WATCHERS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SIGNATURE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU
SUBJECT: SLM EXCLUDED FROM ABUJA WARN OF CIVIL WAR 
IF SIGNING OCCURS 
 
 
Classified by: POL SMCRAMPTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As peace negotiations enter an 
extra 48-hour inning in Abuja, three Chad-based 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) representatives 
told the Ambassador during a May 1 meeting that 
their delegation had been effectively excluded 
from the Darfur peace talks in Abuja by the AU, 
which instructed them to join one of the two SLM 
factions holding a seat at the negotiating table. 
Senior SLM members Dr. Sharif Harir, Adan Shogar 
and Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador that the 
proposed peace agreement is "debatable" but needs 
to be amended in some important ways, and they 
will not be bound by any outcome unless they are 
allowed to participate independently (as a third 
SLM faction) in the negotiations. They warned that 
if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is signed 
by the three parties negotiating with the GOS, it 
could lead to civil war among the parties involved 
as the SLM representatives in Abuja no longer 
represent the field commanders in Darfur.  They 
have asked the African Union to set a new round of 
negotiations after the movements have had an 
opportunity to organize themselves and pick a new 
leader. The SLM representatives claimed not to be 
aware of SLM forces fighting alongside the Chadian 
army against Chadian rebels or of the SLM's 
recruitment in refugee camps, despite reports to 
the contrary.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Third SLM Faction at our Doorstep? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Three SLM Chad-based representatives, 
Dr. Sharif Harir, Spokesman Adam Shogar, and 
"Acting Chairman" (formerly Vice-Chairman) 
Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador in a May 1 
meeting that their 17-member delegation 
remains in Abuja, but had been excluded from 
the Darfur peace talks by the AU, which cited 
guidelines outlined by the AU Peace and 
Security Commission (PSC) obligating them to 
join one of the two SLM factions holding a 
seat at the negotiating table (that of Abdul 
Wahid Mohamed Nour or Minni Arkou Minawi). 
They informed the AU that as long as they are 
excluded from participating independently in 
the negotiations, they will not be bound by 
any outcome that might be reached. They warned 
that if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is 
signed by the movements' representatives 
involved in negotiations, many of SLA fighters 
in the field would reject it, which could 
trigger a civil war. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Dr. Harrir asserted that although "the 
world would be disappointed in us," it would be 
better to have no agreement signed. Abdul Wahid 
Mohamed Nour had established back channels with 
Khartoum without the consent of the SLM coalition 
and was intending to sign an agreement with 
Khartoum that would be unacceptable to them. They 
said Abdul Wahid had consequently been placed 
under an "executive freeze" for going beyond his 
mandate, essentially preventing him from 
committing the SLM to any peace agreement. Khamis 
Abdullah is now the acting Chairman of the SLM. 
As the highest ranking SLM member after Abdul 
Wahid and Minawi, Khamis is known as a unifier 
among the SLM political factions, they asserted, 
and is well respected by  SLA commanders in the 
field.  They noted, however, that some commanders 
only recognize Jamoah Haggar (phonetic). While 
acknowledging good relations with the JEM, they 
ruled out the idea of falling in line behind JEM 
leader Khalil Ibrahim.  Khamis will continue as 
acting Chairman until the next congress can be 
held to name a new Chairman. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Why the Agreement Cannot Be Signed 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Dr. Harrir said Abdul Wahid and Minawi were 
too willing to appease the Arab government and 
 
that their negotiation efforts were primarily 
motivated by their desire to secure "good jobs" 
for themselves in Khartoum. The proposed peace 
agreement is "debatable" and "discussable" but 
should not be passed in its current form, Dr. 
Harrir said. The three men said the proposed 
agreement does not adequately address some of the 
root problems of the Darfur conflict, including 
how to deal with refugees. Some of the major 
points of contention for the three men are the 
provision allowing President al-Bashir to select 
or appoint members of the movements to fill 
certain government positions and the allocation of 
too much power (including veto power over anyone 
in the movements) to Abdul Wahid, Khalil, and 
Minawi, the latter of whom Dr. Harrir said is 
"becoming another Bashir." The three men 
underlined the need for the movements to have 
their own standing force (a la CPA, in the event 
the government went back on its word) and deemed 
unacceptable the provision that would integrate 
the movements' forces into the Sudan Armed Forces 
("the worst army in the world") and other security 
services (NOTE: Dr. Harrir said Minawi is under 
significant pressure to reject the agreement 
because of this provision alone. END NOTE). 
 
¶5.  (C) Reminding the Ambassador that Khartoum 
has thus far refused to disarm the janjaweed 
armed militia, Dr. Harrir also emphasized that 
the provision entrusting the Arab government to 
"neutralize" the janjaweed is problematic to say 
the least. By "asking for a job" as a Senior 
Assistant to the President (essentially a VP in 
all but name, as outlined by the proposed 
agreement), the movements weakened their 
negotiating position, Dr. Harrir added: the 
ideal would have been to discuss fundamental 
"principles" rather than a specific position. 
They noted that the President still had the 
authority to appoint Governors of the three 
Darfur regions, and therefore a "Senior 
Assistant" to the President would have no real 
power.  According to Dr. Harrir, Khalil recently 
said the proposed agreement needed "major 
overhauling" and would not sign it. He added 
that Abdul Wahid was "scared now" and lacked 
confidence in his ability to make good 
decisions, and that Minawi is under pressure 
from and having problems with his followers, who 
are reminding him constantly that he will be 
responsible for whatever he might decide to 
sign.  What is needed, they said, is for the AU 
to program a new round of talks after the 
movements have had an opportunity to hold a 
Congress and pick new leadership. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
The AU's Misteps: The Doctor Has Become More 
Important than the Patient 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (C) On the current situation in Darfur, Dr. 
Harrir lamented the weak mandate held by the 
AMIS force of approximately 7,000 men, which 
does not provide for the protection of 
civilians, and said the transition to a UN force 
of 14,000 would be a very positive development. 
Nevertheless, he said he was very disappointed 
in the work of the AU and its chie mediator 
Salim Ahmend Salim, who had unwisely wrked to 
produce what was essentially an agreemen 
between the AU and the GOS--one that had 
negleted totake into account the key demands 
of the movements. Evidence of the AU's 
inexperience and lack of wisdom in the 
negotiations was the fact that the 17 delegates 
representing the three men were essentially 
excluded from the talks but still allowed to 
remain in Abuja, spending per diem and running 
up hotel bills on the AU's tab; "Only in 
Africa!" he exclaimed. The exclusion of their 
faction and the misguided actions of mediators 
such as the Nigerian president was a clear "case 
of where the doctor has become more important 
than the patient." Calling the movements and the 
people of Darfur "guinea pigs" in an AU 
experiment, Dr. Harrir underlined the need for 
more direct involvement from the USG and other 
members of the international community to ensure 
an adequate level of competency in the ongoing 
mediation. It is taken for granted that the AU 
mediators have an adequate understanding of 
human rights and democracy, said Dr. Harrir, but 
largely undemocratic and have poor human rights 
records. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SLA: Deby's Ally in time of Need? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On the anti-Deby rebellion and the 
upcoming elections in Chad, Dr. Harrir predicted 
that the rebels would "try again." Although they 
might not make it to N'Djamena, they would 
attack other towns in Chad. Underlining the 
differing agendas of the FUC and SCUD rebel 
groups, he called their alliance temporary. 
Nour's FUC is a "front for Arabs," he said, and 
if the group were able to topple President 
Idriss Deby Itno, it would show a completely 
different face after the victory, one that 
closely resembled the Khartoum regime. Dr. 
Harrir said he was not aware of SLA efforts or 
plans to fight alongside Chadian armed forces 
against the Chadian rebels and did not think the 
SLA fought alongside the Chadian armed forces in 
Adre on April 13. However, he said the janjaweed 
had attacked SLA positions in Darfur a week ago 
and said it was possible that SLA forces might 
be forced to fight Chadian rebels if similar 
incidents occurred. 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador, Shogar said 
after meeting with and keeping in close contact 
with the UNHCR, he did not think SLA forces were 
recruiting combatants from refugee camps. If the 
UNHCR confirmed that recruitment activities were 
being conducted by the SLA in refugee camps, he 
said he would visit the Adre area and that the SLM 
was prepared to halt its activities if such 
recruitment was occurring. Asked if they were 
aware of Chadian recruitment in the refugee camps, 
they responded that this was not happening as far 
as they knew. 
 
¶9. (C) Dr. Harrir mused that after 15 years, Deby 
had finally "discovered that al-Bashir was a 
dictator." Although the SLM had not met Deby in "a 
while," the SLM now enjoyed much freer freedom of 
movement in Chad, Dr. Harrir said, noting that even 
members of JEM were now allowed to come to Chad 
(whereas in the past they were sometimes 
imprisoned). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Signing Not the End of the Crisis 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Apologizing for his broken English, 
Khamis Abdullah spoke only briefly through a 
translator. He thanked the Ambassador and the 
USG for being the first government to recognize 
that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur. 
After assuring the Ambassador that the SLM's 
interests were in Sudan, not in Chad, he 
acknowledged the need to establish greater 
cohesiveness within the SLM and committed 
himself to seek unity, peace, and democracy. In 
closing, the three men lamented that any signing 
of the proposed peace agreement would not bring 
an end to the crisis but said they were 
committed to establishing peace in Darfur. 
WALL