VZCZCXRO8656
RR RUEHMR
DE RUEHTO #0573/01 1371241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADXCF88E7 MSI9434 640A)
R 171241Z MAY 06 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5392
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (CORRECTED TEXT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR HTREGER 
NSC FOR CCOURVILLE 
MCC FOR SGAULL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016 
TAGS: KCOR KCRIM PGOV PREL MZ
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE: FIGHTING CORRUPTION OR SHADOW BOXING? 
 
REF: A. 05 MAPUTO 1653 
     ¶B. 05 MAPUTO 559 
 
MAPUTO 00000573  001.5 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Apart from continued strong rhetoric and some 
mid-level action by the Guebuza government, the GRM has not 
moved very far in tackling corruption in the past year. 
In August 2005 the government released the results of a 
nationwide survey, which revealed deep concern by the 
populace over corruption.  And this April it announced its 
long-anticipated National Anti-Corruption Strategy. 
But so far concrete action has been disappointing, 
leading donors to complain that the government has made 
little headway. End Summary. 
 
Perception is Reality 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Mozambique's score on Transparency International's 
2005 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) remained 2.8, the same 
as its 2004 measure (ref B).  Other nations that scored on 
par with Mozambique include Algeria, Argentina, Madagascar, 
Malawi, and Serbia and Montenegro.  Mozambique ranks among 
the lowest of its southern African neighbors, with Namibia, 
South Africa, and Botswana all ranking well above Mozambique, 
scoring 4.3, 4.5 and 5.9 respectively. 
 
¶3. (C) On August 3, 2005, the GRM finally released its 
National Survey on Governance and Corruption, though it was 
much delayed and only in part made public.  (Comment: Many 
observers believe the GRM delayed its release to hide lack of 
progress in fighting corruption.  They assert that timely and 
full disclosure of the survey results, initially slated for 
September 2004, could have severely damaged FRELIMO's image 
in advance of the December 2004 general elections and might 
have hobbled the incoming Guebuza administration.  End 
Comment).  The document, resulting from a survey of families, 
civil servants, and businesses, concluded that corruption is 
perceived as a pernicious reality across almost all of the 
country's public institutions.  The report listed the most 
affected services as customs, justice, licensing, 
procurement, revenue collection, inspection, and budget 
administration.  Police in general, and traffic police in 
particular, were listed as particularly corrupt public 
institutions.  Media and religious congregations were 
described as the most honest.  The report also highlighted as 
a weakness the lack of an effective mechanism to detect and 
punish corrupt practices, as well as serious deficiencies in 
institutions that defend the law and rights of citizens. 
 
Some forward movement in the past year... 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) President Guebuza continues to make fighting 
corruption a key component of his GRM's plan to reduce 
absolute poverty, and corruption remains a central theme in 
all his public addresses.  To a limited extent, some of his 
ministers have acted.  Minister of Public Works Felicio 
Zacarias, Minister of Education Aires Aly, and Minister of 
Interior Jose Pacheco all have taken steps to weed out 
corruption, publicly admonishing and dismissing some 
officials (though few in number) within their respective 
ministries suspected of corrupt activities.  Apart from these 
mid-level dismissals, there were two other notable sackings 
last fall -- the dismissal of the head of the National 
Institute for Social Security, Elina Gomes, and the firing of 
Labor Ministry representative in South Africa, Pedro Taimo. 
 
¶5. (U) In December 2005 Interior Minister Pacheco announced 
the results of an internal audit of Ministry of Interior 
accounts, revealing that approximately USD 8.8 million in 
funds gone missing under his predecessor, Almerino Manhenje 
(ref B).  The audit also uncovered 55 "ghost workers" on the 
Ministry's books, all of whom were receiving monthly wages. 
Press reports indicated criminal proceedings would be 
initiated against officials involved; however no further 
details on the audit findings or proceedings have yet been 
made public. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Earlier, in September 2005, Attorney General 
Francisco Madeira announced the creation of the Central 
Office for the Combat of Corruption (GCCC), born from a 
 
MAPUTO 00000573  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
restructuring of the Attorney General's Anti-Corruption Unit 
(UAC), previously Mozambique's primary corruption fighting 
office.  Unlike the UAC, the GCCC now functions as an 
autonomous unit under the Attorney General's Office, with its 
own line item in the State Budget and authority to hire 
additional permanent full-time prosecutors and investigators. 
 Some progress into investigating corruption cases appears to 
have been made since the restructuring.  An FSN employee 
reported that the GCCC recently followed up with her on a 
corruption case involving traffic police that she reported to 
the unit (then the UAC) more than a year ago.  Higher level 
cases have also seen movement.  In September 2005, former 
Education Minister Alcido Nguenha was summoned to the 
Attorney General's Office to answer questions on charges of 
corruption and theft of property.  And this March the GCCC 
detained seven individuals accused of diverting over USD 
400,000 in public funds. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In another positive development, in April Attorney 
General Madeira agreed to placing, for six months initially, 
a U.S. legal advisor in the GCCC, to help prosecutors and 
investigators in the GCCC develop their techniques and 
skills.  He indicated that such an advisor would be able to 
join the GCCC in the fall of 2006. 
 
Including a National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) This April the Council of Ministers approved the 
much-anticipated National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), 
which is part of a larger public sector reform initiative 
aimed at improving public administration and delivery of 
services (ref A).  Critics note, however, that although the 
NACS presents a well-thouQ out commentary on the issue of 
corruption in Mozambique and outlines broad objectives on how 
the GRM can address the situation over the next five years 
(2006-2010), it lacks a detailed implementation plan.  And 
they add that it also does not go far enough in addressing 
key issues including measures on conflict of interest, asset 
disclosure, implementation resources, and salary reform. 
With the publication of the NACS, necessary next steps 
include establishing a Technical Committee and National 
Anti-Corruption Forum responsible for designing and 
implementing an action plan, as well as the design of 
corruption strategies for each sector to be implemented by 
respective ministries.  (Comment:  Some observers fear that 
the GRM will treat the NACS as a "check-box" exercise and 
stall tactic, resting on the good will created by its 
approval and exhibiting little intent to actively promote its 
implementation.  End Comment.)  However, just weeks after the 
release of the NACS, the Mozambican National Assembly 
unanimously ratified the anti-corruption conventions of the 
African Union and the United Nations. 
 
Civil Society 
------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Civil society and the media continue to play an 
important role in fighting corruption.  Mozambican 
journalists frequently report on corruption cases, and often 
serve as the principle source of information on such issues 
for the general public.  Scandals involving two former 
ministers (Education and Interior) received significant 
attention in the press over the past year, as did the 
dismissal of various mid-level public officials suspected of 
corrupt acts.  Civil society, though still quite weak and 
somewhat ineffective, has gained ground with the 
establishment of a new corruption "watchdog" organization, 
the Center for Public Integrity (CIP).  The group is headed 
by investigative journalist Marcelo Mosse, who is considered 
a leading researcher on corruption in Mozambique.  Over the 
last six months, CIP has organized seminars on "Corruption in 
Mozambique's Education Sector" and to discuss the draft 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy.  Comment: Further USG 
support aimed at strengthening civil society and the media to 
expose corruption would be beneficial, and Post's FY2008 
Mission Performance Plans includes tactics to support such 
efforts.  End Comment 
 
 
But Donors Concerned about Lack of Progress 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) In April, in the conclusion of the "Joint Review," an 
annual exercise in which the G-18 donors contributing to the 
 
MAPUTO 00000573  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
state budget together with the government conduct an 
assessment on progress toward agreed upon targets, the donors 
singled out good governance as an area where progress "has 
not been satisfactory." Noting in an Aide Memoire to the 
Review that some anti-corruption targets were "partially 
met," they stressed that the anti-corruption effort must be 
accompanied by "specific action-oriented plans."  In 
particular, they cited the infrequency of inspections and 
audits as one of the government's failings.  External 
auditors carried out 68 audits in 2005.  The authors called 
for making the audit results public, but, according to press 
reports, the GRM has yet to do so.  The delay in the 
roll-out of the general accounting mechanism for the budget, 
known as SISTAFE (ref B), is another of their complaints -- 
SISTAFE is unlikely to be fully functional until 2007, at the 
earliest. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In late 2005 USAID sponsored an in depth study of 
Mozambique's corruption challenge and possible 
anti-corruption measures.  The resulting report was delivered 
to President Guebuza and his advisors in February for 
consideration.  To date, we have not heard back from the GRM 
on the report. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) For the past 12 months the GRM has taken only small steps 
to match its anti-corruption rhetoric.  We, along with other donors, 
intend to increase pressure on the GRM for more concrete 
action.  One important benchmark will be follow through on 
the GRM's National Anti-Corruption Strategy.  Another will be 
the performance of the GCCC, particularly once the US advisor 
in on board.  An informal corruption donor working group 
(with representation from the G18 and US Mission) has been 
established, and we intend to share the USAID-funded report 
with our counterparts in our efforts to coordinate the 
activities and objectives of donors involved in 
anti-corruption efforts. 
La Lime