VZCZCXRO2864
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0859/01 1511126
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311126Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3992
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 000859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KPKO KDEM MARR CG UG
SUBJECT: FARDC IN EASTERN DRC OFTEN UNDERMINING SECURITY 
 
REF: KINSHASA 818 
 
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) 
constitute one of the more problematic elements of the 
overall security situation in eastern DRC. Underpaid, 
underequipped, poorly disciplined, and poorly led, elements 
of the FARDC continue to harass, extort and menace local 
populations, thereby contributing to the overall sense of 
insecurity rather than reducing it. Most problems with 
Congolese forces largely come from those brigades that have 
yet to be integrated, although problems exist with some of 
the FARDC's integrated brigades as well. While some progress 
has been made in professionalizing the DRC's military, the 
force as a whole remains incapable of defending the country 
from internal or external threats, and cannot act independent 
of substantial support from MONUC peacekeepers. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) PolOff and EconOff visited North Kivu province's Grand 
Nord region and the DRC's northeastern Ituri District May 
4-10 to assess the overall security situation as well as the 
FARDC's role as it relates to the resolution of those 
problems. In speaking with various local politicians, MONUC 
officials, Church leaders, and FARDC officers, EmbOffs 
confirmed the Congolese military in this part of the DRC 
faces the same logistical challenges as in other areas of the 
country: irregular (or nonexistent) salaries, a lack of 
ammunition and transport, and deplorable living conditions. 
Consequently, certain elements of the FARDC -- particularly 
among the non-integrated forces -- prey upon local 
populations, demanding exactions, stealing food, or 
committing other violations. In return, Congolese citizens in 
the East tend to consider the FARDC to be a menace equal to 
(if not greater than) militias or foreign armed groups. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
FARDC IN THE GRAND NORD: LOYAL TO WHOM? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The 88th and 89th FARDC brigades are currently 
stationed in North Kivu's Grand Nord region (located along 
the Beni-Butembo axis). These two brigades, comprising 
several thousand soldiers, have not gone through the 
integration process. The commander of MONUC peacekeepers in 
Beni, Colonel V.S. Rathore, said most of the soldiers in the 
88th and 89th brigades are former members of the Congolese 
People's Army (APC), the former military wing of the Rally 
for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement 
(RCD-K/ML), led by current Minister of Regional Cooperation 
(and presidential candidate) Mbusa Nyamwisi. 
 
¶4. (C) Because of the history and origins of these particular 
troops, many in the Grand Nord question where their loyalties 
lie. Colonel Rathore, as well as the acting head of office 
for MONUC-Beni, Alfred John, said these troops were believed 
to be loyal to Nyamwisi rather than the GDRC, especially 
since most of them fought under Nyamwisi when the APC was 
operational. Beni civil society representative Elie Danga 
said he and many others feared that if Nyamwisi and his party 
lose in the upcoming elections, he would call upon these 
ex-APC troops to somehow seize control of the local 
government. Butembo's assistant bishop, Monsignor Emmanuel, 
said these forces need to be sent through the integration 
process and replaced with troops who are not from this 
region, and therefore not as easily susceptible to political 
manipulation. The overall sense among those in Beni and 
Butembo is that the FARDC in these areas cannot be trusted to 
respect election results. 
 
------------------------- 
EXACTIONS CREATE TENSIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The FARDC in the Grand Nord also suffers from problems 
of its own making. The region is a major import and export 
center for goods moving to and from Uganda, both legally and 
illegally. Customs and border officials interviewed by 
EconOff admitted that some FARDC troops profit from illegal 
trade in wood, coffee, gold and other items. In addition, 
these officials said certain elements of the FARDC demand 
bribes at border crossings to "facilitate" the transport of 
goods (reftel). While the level of FARDC involvement in these 
activities is impossible to quantify, local officials 
throughout the Grand Nord said they were certain the military 
is involved to some extent. MONUC officials in Butembo 
reported that some members of the 89th FARDC brigade, in 
 
KINSHASA 00000859  002 OF 005 
 
 
addition to other military personnel, were known to be 
collecting illegal taxes in the area. The mayors of Beni and 
Butembo, however, downplayed the role of the FARDC in illegal 
trade and taxation, saying their involvement was minimal and 
had, in fact, been decreasing recently. 
 
¶6. (C) In addition to this form of economic harassment, some 
FARDC soldiers have engaged in episodes of theft and looting. 
MONUC officials said some troops have stolen voter 
registration cards from civilians after military operations 
in certain areas, claiming the holders of such cards 
possessed them "illegally." Monsignor Emmanuel of Butembo 
said he has also received reports from his parishioners of 
FARDC soldiers establishing roadblocks, demanding exactions 
and stealing food from villages outside the main towns. 
Emmanuel explained, though, that such actions resulted 
primarily because the FARDC is neither paid regularly nor 
given sufficient supplies. As a result, he said, the military 
tends to take (sometimes forcefully) what it needs from the 
local population. Overall, though, the conduct of the FARDC 
in the Grand Nord has tended to be less problematic than in 
areas further south in the province. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FARDC IN ITURI: PICKING UP WHERE MILITIAS LEFT OFF 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (C) In northeastern DRC's Ituri District, FARDC forces 
face similar problems, but are perhaps a bigger source of 
insecurity than their counterparts in the Grand Nord. Ituri's 
local militia presence -- numbering in the thousands -- has 
necessitated the deployment of three integrated brigades and 
several other FARDC units (totaling nearly 10,000 troops by 
one estimate, though definite numbers are difficult to find). 
Currently stationed in the district are the 1st (near 
Mahagi), 4th (near Mongbwalu) and 6th (near Lake Albert) 
Integrated Brigades, plus the 2nd battalion of the 8th 
Integrated Brigade (sent from North Kivu to provide security 
in and around Bunia) and the 811th battalion (also dispatched 
from North Kivu), which is engaged in anti-militia operations 
in Djugu and Irumu territories. Not all integrated brigades 
are created equal, however. The 1st, which was trained by the 
Belgian military, generally has the best performance record 
in battle and is the most professional of all the units in 
Ituri, and perhaps of the FARDC itself. The 4th, by contrast, 
is less well-trained and -disciplined, its ranks having been 
depleted by a cholera outbreak and mass desertion when the 
brigade first arrived in Ituri in 2005. This brigade has also 
been the subject of the majority of accusations by local 
populations of harassment and other violations. MONUC 
officials in Bunia said the 6th is also generally ineffective 
and is viewed as having questionable loyalty, as the 
brigade's deputy commander is reported to be a relative of 
militia leader Cobra Matata. The elements of the 8th brigade, 
as well as the 811th battalion, have only been stationed in 
Ituri for a few months, but according to MONUC and other 
officials, have performed well. 
 
¶8. (C) Much as in the Grand Nord, there is widespread belief 
that some members of the FARDC engage in illegal trade, 
particularly in the gold mining regions of Mahagi and Djugu 
territories. The assistant bishop of Mahagi, Monsignor 
Leonard, said the militias in these areas used to control 
illegal cross-border routes, exporting gold, wood and other 
commodities. The Monsignor added, though, that the FARDC 
later took over these routes after eliminating or removing 
the militias. The MONUC head of office in Mahagi, Sandra 
Reis, said some members of the FARDC were also demanding 
illegal taxes at trading points along Lake Albert. The Bishop 
of Bunia, Monsignor Dieudonne Uringi, said many FARDC 
soldiers have set up illegal roadblocks around Bunia and 
other parts of Ituri to tax merchants and other travelers. 
 
¶9. (C) Some FARDC soldiers, though, have been involved in 
more serious incidents against the population. MONUC-Bunia 
reported in late April that elements of the 811th battalion 
forced civilians to carry their equipment and physically 
assaulted those who refused to cooperate. Humanitarian 
workers in Bunia told PolOff that some FARDC troops rob and 
beat ex-combatants, stealing their identity cards and the 
stipends they receive from demobilization programs. MONUC 
officials in Bunia also reported that some members of the 
FARDC have been accused of numerous cases of rape, torture 
and looting, particularly after conducting anti-militia 
operations. Bishop Uringi said some Congolese troops burned 
down the homes of civilians after engaging militias near 
Nioka and Fataki. Uringi added that as a result of these 
 
KINSHASA 00000859  003 OF 005 
 
 
violations, local populations will flee in advance of 
military operations more out of fear of the arrival of the 
FARDC than of the militias or the fighting itself. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
FARDC COMMANDERS CLAIM VIOLATIONS ARE "ISOLATED" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (C) The commander of FARDC troops in Aru, Major Esongolo, 
claimed he and his troops respect human rights, and that he 
and his sub-commanders are investigating allegations of 
smuggling and arms trafficking across the border with Uganda. 
(Perhaps to emphasize his point, Major Esongolo also brought 
to his meeting with PolOff the regional military court 
official, who carried with him a copy of the DRC's military 
code of justice.) 
 
¶11. (C) The (now-departed) FARDC-Ituri commander General Bob 
Ngoie said cases of rape, looting, harassment and other 
violations were "isolated." General Ngoie argued that such 
stories were part of a "plot" by certain (unnamed) NGOs and 
political parties to "discredit" the FARDC before elections. 
General Ngoie also claimed the allegations of rape or 
harassment brought forward by most women were not credible, 
since the women bringing such charges often could not provide 
evidence, and were therefore "lying." General Ngoie admitted 
there had been some problems with some FARDC soldiers, but 
asserted those who had committed violations were held 
accountable and brought before military justice. Ngoie and 
others on his command staff argued that it was in any case 
nearly impossible to monitor the activities of all FARDC 
troops in the field, especially since many of them are 
deployed without well-trained commanding officers. General 
Ngoie himself has been implicated by others in Bunia and 
elsewhere in Ituri for his involvement in and sanctioning of 
violations by the FARDC. Ituri District Commissioner 
Petronille Vaweka has said Ngoie, a nephew of FARDC Chief of 
Staff General Kisempia, has also been involved in illegal 
trade for some time. MONUC officials have also expressed 
their frustration with Ngoie's behavior and lack of 
commitment to end impunity. The week after PolOff met with 
him, Ngoie was reassigned to a position in Kisangani after 
considerable pressure was brought upon FARDC commanders to 
remove him from Ituri. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
POOR CONDITIONS FOR THE AVERAGE SOLDIER 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) FARDC troops in the field, however, are largely 
unsupported by their commanders in Kinshasa. As has been 
reported, soldiers often receive their salaries late, if at 
all, and essentials such as food, ammunition, uniforms and 
housing are in inadequate supply. When PolOff visited Ituri, 
troops were being paid for the first time in three months. 
What they are paid, however, cannot meet the needs of the 
average soldier, who often must support a wife and many 
children (who tend to live with the soldiers in military 
camps). A FARDC major with the 8th Integrated Brigade who was 
in charge of security at the military camp outside Bunia told 
PolOff he receives only USD 25 a month. (Those of lower rank 
receive as little as USD 10 per month.) As a result, he 
claimed his wife (who did not live in the camp) has had to 
turn to prostitution in order to provide food for their 
family. (Note: FARDC troops are supposed to receive USD 50 
per month, but this payment rarely makes its way to troops in 
the field. End note.) 
 
¶13. (C) The living conditions of the FARDC soldiers at Camp 
Opas outside Bunia illustrate the hardships they endure. The 
camp includes approximately 700 troops from the 8th 
Integrated Brigade, plus their wives and children, totaling 
nearly 2,000 people. The majority of soldiers and their 
families live in crudely constructed huts made of bamboo and 
mud, covered with a thatched roof. PolOff saw several dozen 
of these structures along the main road through the camp. 
Others at Camp Opas live in a former slaughterhouse, which 
has no electricity or running water. During a tour of this 
building, PolOff saw dozens of families crammed into the 
space, with bare mattresses strewn along a floor covered in 
mud and fetid pools of water. PolOff estimated, based on the 
number of beds, that nearly 200 people lived inside the 
building. Nonetheless, FARDC soldiers PolOff spoke to at the 
camp claimed their morale was high, although they did 
complain about their salaries, living conditions and the lack 
of equipment. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000859  004 OF 005 
 
 
¶14. (C) In some areas, however, the FARDC and the local 
population have developed a better working relationship in an 
effort to improve conditions for the military. In Aru, MONUC 
officials said a local NGO had recently given the FARDC there 
an undisclosed amount of money to buy tools for planting 
crops. (Note: Local NGOs in Ituri tend to be local political 
interests dressed up in NGO clothing. Many are reportedly 
controlled by local politicians or leaders. End note.) The 
idea, officials said, was to make the FARDC more 
self-sufficient and provide them with their own food source 
so they would not harass and steal from civilians. In 
addition, PolOff visited the FARDC camp outside Aru and saw 
several civilians building semi-permanent shelters for the 
FARDC troops. Aru Administrator Sindani Anyama said he and 
local FARDC commanders had reached an agreement in April to 
provide labor for the construction of these barracks. Major 
Esongolo said his troops had previously been living in tents 
which would often flood or be blown over during storms. 
Esongolo added that the soldiers under his command 
(approximately 750) were also living with private families 
and among the population in Aru. (Comment: Illicit trade 
between Aru and Uganda is extensive, and FARDC soldiers 
likely profit from it as well. The construction of these new 
barracks may be nothing more than a marriage of convenience 
between illegal traders, who want to continue their 
cross-border commerce with little interference from (or even 
the assistance of) the military, and the local FARDC, which 
wants a cut of the action. The cooperation seen in Aru, while 
encouraging on the surface, should be taken with a degree of 
skepticism. End comment.) 
 
--------------------------- 
UNABLE TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) In terms of actual combat performance and dealing 
with security threats, the FARDC in Ituri has a mixed record. 
While the 1st Integrated Brigade has exhibited a degree of 
professionalism and tactical ability in fighting militias, 
most other units have not. Elements of the FARDC in many 
operations have fled the scene of battle after running out of 
ammunition or facing tougher-than-expected opposition. In all 
cases, however, the FARDC must receive substantial logistical 
support from MONUC peacekeepers. Without such assistance, the 
FARDC -- in Ituri and elsewhere in the DRC -- would be unable 
to plan and execute independently any size military 
operation. Thus, the FARDC is largely incapable of providing 
security on its own. 
 
¶16. (C) In addition, the FARDC's counterparts in MONUC have 
said they do not trust FARDC commanders with the details of 
pending operations. Former MONUC-Bunia head of office Sharouh 
Sharif said he believes many joint MONUC-FARDC operations 
have been ineffective because FARDC troops leaked information 
to militias beforehand. MONUC commanders have now taken to 
deliberately withholding information from the FARDC, 
including the location of imminent operations. For example, 
when visiting FARDC officials in Bunia May 6, PolOff saw six 
transport trucks filled with FARDC soldiers outside the 
regional military headquarters. When asked where these troops 
were headed, General Ngoie said they were going "north," but 
he did not know exactly where. Later that evening, MONUC 
Ituri Brigade Commander General Mahboob Haider Khan said he 
purposely did not tell Ngoie or any other FARDC personnel 
where the troops were being deployed, so as to maintain 
operational security. General Mahboob said he simply did not 
trust the FARDC with such details. (Note: The soldiers seen 
leaving Bunia May 6 ultimately took part in Operation Ituri 
Ember, which seized control of several towns along Lake 
Albert. End note.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
COMMENT: AN URGENT NEED FOR REFORM 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The behavior of the FARDC in eastern DRC is not 
unique to that part of the country, as there are numerous 
reports of violations, harassment and exactions on the part 
of the military throughout the DRC. Neither are the 
difficulties the FARDC faces in terms of salaries and 
materiel solely a problem in the East; all FARDC units lack 
basic necessities like uniforms and ammunition. What makes 
the problems of the FARDC in the East more pressing, though, 
is the presence of militias and foreign armed groups which 
attempt to destabilize the region. Thus, the FARDC in eastern 
DRC by necessity should play a much more visible role in 
providing security than their counterparts in other sectors 
 
KINSHASA 00000859  005 OF 005 
 
 
of the country. And as such, the FARDC's presence -- and the 
related disciplinary problems -- are much more pronounced. 
All these factors point to the urgent need by the government 
to accelerate reform of the security sector, to institute the 
proposals of the European Security Commission to manage the 
salary system, and to complete the process of integration. 
Until such time as the FARDC can stand up a professional army 
-- adequately paid, well-equipped, well-trained, capable of 
independently carrying out its own missions -- the DRC will 
require the assistance of MONUC and others to defend itself. 
Moreover, without these urgent reforms, those elements of the 
FARDC that exploit the culture of impunity will only prolong 
the country's instability. End comment. 
MEECE