VZCZCXRO5739
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1158/01 1360757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160757Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2833
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM MOPS PTER PEL SU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE 
LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY, CONFLICT IN JONGLEI STATE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1116 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) The following is an action request - see para 3. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary:  CG met with Government of Southern Sudan 
(GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Minster for 
Parliamentary Affairs Gabriel Changson on May 12 to discuss 
the security climate in Southern Sudan.  Machar spoke at 
length on his contacts with Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
leaders and justified his actions as being in the 
self-interest of the GoSS (reftel).  Because of these talks, 
Machar confirmed that Sudan will not renew the mandate of the 
Ugandan Popular Defense Force (UPDF) to operate on Sudanese 
territory.  The discussion also covered ongoing clashes 
between the Lou Nuer and the Sudan People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA) in Jonglei State.  Machar explaine why the SPLA had 
resorted to force, but said that he hoped to return to 
negotiations with the White Army militia (septel).  Other 
sources indicate that the SPLA units involved have been 
ordered to remain in their current positions.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) ACTION REQUEST:  AF/SPG is requested to advise on the 
background and legal ramifications of contacts with the LRA 
that we can share with senior GoSS officials. 
 
---------------------------- 
Cutting Deals with the Devil 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Machar was very forthcoming in providing details 
regarding his talks with the LRA.  Following GoSS President 
Kiir's January 9 speech in which he offered the LRA three 
options -- GoSS mediation between the LRA and Government of 
Uganda (GOU), voluntary LRA withdrawal from Sudan, or an 
offensive against the LRA by the SPLA - a Dutch NGO named Pax 
Christi contacted the GoSS Presidency and offered to set up a 
meeting between GoSS representatives and the LRA.  Dr. Simon, 
Dr. Leonard Anab, and Professor Safa, an American of 
Ethiopian descent, spearheaded this initiative.  Machar said 
that the trio had been involved in earlier attempts to 
negotiate with the LRA. 
 
¶5. (C) Machar said that he used the hubbub surrounding the 
February visit of Sudanese President Bashir to spirit LRA 
representatives through Juba airport.  They offered to 
arrange a meeting between Machar and LRA Deputy Commander 
Vincent Otti, and on March 11 Machar traveled to Western 
Equatoria State for the meeting.  This led to a second 
meeting on May 3 that included GoSS Security Minister Daniel 
Awet, an SPLA general, Otti, LRA leader Joseph Kony, and LRA 
General Odiambo. 
 
¶6.  (C) Machar said that Kony, who was dressed in the uniform 
of a general, was articulate and to the point.  To Machar's 
surprise, several LRA advisors who also attended the meeting 
were "well learned" Ugandans who had studied in Europe. 
Machar repeated Kiir's offer to mediate or allow the LRA to 
withdraw peacefully from Sudan, but he warned that continued 
attacks on the Sudanese population would provoke a strong 
military reaction from the SPLA, and they would employ 
whatever force necessary to evict the LRA.  He also told Kony 
that the LRA should desist from further attacks on UNMIS 
forces. 
 
¶7. (C) Kony responded that he was interested in peaceful 
negotiation with Uganda, but said that he believed Museveni's 
goal was to kill him, rather than talk.  He agreed to cease 
all offensive operations on Sudanese soil and told Machar 
that there was not a single LRA soldier remaining in Sudan 
east of the Nile. 
 
¶8. (C) Machar pointed out that there had been no LRA attacks 
since May 1, although he deflected questions from the CG on 
what the GoSS offered in return for these assurances -- there 
are rumors the GoSS provided food aid to the LRA.  Machar 
said that he had briefed Kiir on the meeting before Kiir's 
May 4 departure for Khartoum, with scheduled onward travel to 
Kampala for Museveni's May 12 inauguration.  Machar said that 
Kiir would return with Museveni's response, which would be 
delivered to Kony. 
 
¶9. (C) Machar said that he had heard, through various 
channels, including the Ugandan CG in Juba, that Kampala 
might not be adverse to a peaceful settlement of the LRA 
problem.  Machar continued that under the present 
circumstances, Sudan had decided not to renew the protocol 
with Uganda that permitted Kampala to station UPDF forces on 
Sudanese territory.  UPDF forces currently in Sudan would 
withdraw and deploy along the Ugandan border with Sudan. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001158  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶10. (C) Machar said that the GoSS had taken these steps not 
out of any fondness for the LRA, but rather out of 
self-interest.  The LRA was a Ugandan problem that had 
migrated to Sudan as a facet of the North/South conflict in 
Sudan, and now that the war was over, the GoSS wanted the 
Ugandan problem to return home.  Machar observed that Kony's 
willingness to deal may have been influenced by the 
withdrawal of SAF forces to the north.  When the SAF 
abandoned its blocking positions on the roads between Juba 
and Torit, and between Juba and Nimule, LRA activities in 
those areas ceased. 
 
¶11. (C) CG replied that he understood why the GoSS wanted the 
LRA to go away, but cautioned that dealing with a group on 
the U.S. list of designated terrorist organizations, or with 
individuals under International Criminal Court indictment in 
The Hague, could bear a political and possible legal price. 
Machar asked exactly what the latter might entail; CG 
responded that he would seek more precise information and 
report back. 
 
----------------------- 
The White Army vs. SPLA 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Machar said that he had spent 22 days traveling in 
Western Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile States since 
fighting broke out between the Lou Nuer militia, the White 
Army, and the SPLA in January (septel).  He said that in late 
February he had invited representatives of all of the 
pastoralist (and cattle raiding) tribes, to Pibor to discuss 
disarmament and reconciliation.  Nuer (including Lou Nuer), 
Dinka, Murle, Taposa, Jie, Anuak, and Mundari representatives 
all participated.  In separate discussions, he had gotten 
commitments from the White Army to disarm before beginning 
its annual end-of-dry-season migration toward the Toich to 
the west, through territories peopled by the Gawar Nuer and 
Dinka groups. 
 
¶13. (U) The agreement was never honored, and a group of Lou 
Nuer began almost immediately an armed march toward the 
Toich, raising the specter of clashes with the neighboring 
groups.  The White Army shot two senior Lou chiefs who 
protested the forced migration and subsequently clashed with 
SPLA units that had been dispatched to protect the March and 
prevent inter-tribal conflict.  Machar said that the GoSS 
could not simply stand by while large armed units marched 
about the countryside at will - the SPLA was obliged to 
intervene.  He confirmed that there had been fighting since 
early May, but said that this had died down and that he hoped 
to be able to return to negotiations soon. 
 
¶14. (U) He stressed, however, that ultimately disarmament 
must take place.  Machar did not think buying back arms or 
other soft methods would be effective, since the White Army 
was so well-armed that many of its members owned several 
guns.  Machar said that negotiations would not be easy 
because the White Army consisted mostly of young men who had 
created a military structure and selected their own leaders. 
They no longer respected the authority of traditional 
leaders.  Machar said that for now the SPLA had ceased 
operations against the White Army, which had retreated back 
toward its traditional Lou Nuer homeland.  CG applauded this 
course of action, noting that attempts to pursue and disarm 
the retreating militia would only aggravate the situation. 
 
¶15. (C) Following the Machar meeting, CG tracked down Waat 
Constituency MP Gatkouth Kuich.  Kuich said that SPLA Chief 
of Staff Oyai Deng had indicated that he was the one who 
ordered the SPLA to desist from further pursuit of the 
retreating White Army.  Kuich estimated that there had been 
50,000 Lou Nuer in the migrating cattle camps, with as many 
as 20,000 of these armed.  He said that the most recent 
number of Nuer "civilians" killed had reached 210, but 
admitted that many of these were armed youths.  He did not 
know SPLA casualty figures.  In addition, the Nuer had lost 
some 7,000 head of cattle.  Kuich said that Paulino Matiep 
stood ready to join him in a visit to northern Jonglei State 
to attempt to calm passions as soon as a halt to the 
hostilities was confirmed. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) Machar's comments on the LRA confirmed much of what 
we have heard from other sources, including the Governor of 
Eastern Equatoria's recent claim to CG that LRA forces had 
abandoned positions east of the Nile concurrently with the 
pull-out of SAF forces there.  The GoSS desire for the LRA 
problem to go back where it came from is understandable and 
sympathetic, but the GoSS may not be able to continue to buy 
 
KHARTOUM 00001158  003 OF 003 
 
 
off Kony's depredations, especially if Museveni indicates 
that he is unwilling to negotiate. 
HUME