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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2602
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0467
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1927

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
USPACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MARR PHUM TT CU CH
SUBJECT: EMBOFFS INTERVIEW NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSIONER IN HIDING 
 
DILI 00000279  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Vice Interior Minister Alcino Barris, Police 
Commissioner Paulo Martins and dozens of police officers from 
all branches have reassembled the national police (PNTL) 
hierarchy at an orphanage in the hills overlooking Dili. The 
group has been disarmed by the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) 
and is operating under the direction of the President. Martins, 
who has not been seen publicly for several weeks, said he fled 
Dili after being warned of a plot on his life by Interior 
Minister Rogerio Lobato. He expects the police to be reinstated 
soon by the Australian Defense Forces (ADF), reports that 
military (FDTL) patrols in Dili were more extensive than had 
been admitted by the government, and like many Timorese views 
the current crisis in part through the prism of ethnic and 
regional rivalries. He reports that Minister Lobato is deeply 
suspicious of the United States and believes East Timor's 
security forces should rely on the governments of China and Cuba 
for training. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Emboffs met with Police Commissioner Paulo Martins at a 
remote site in the hills overlooking Dili on May 29. Martins' 
headquarters is at an orphanage near the President's house in 
Balibar, in the hills above Dili.  Martins wore shorts, 
flip-flops, and a customized police shirt adorned with someone 
else's name. Approximately 50 police officers appeared to be 
staying at the site. While en route, Emboffs also met briefly 
with Vice Interior Minister Alcino Barris and Deputy Police 
Commissioner Ismael Babo. 
 
¶3. (C) Martins, who has not been seen publicly since April 22, 
said that despite his absence from the public eye, he is still 
the PNTL Commissioner and answers to the President through Vice 
Minister of the Interior Alcino Barris.  Most PNTL District 
Commanders remain loyal to him and the President, he said, 
particularly those in the western districts. In addition, 
several hundred police officers were standing by in Dili waiting 
for his return so they can resume their duties.  Martins 
believes that his men will play an important role in assisting 
ADF with its operations, but he did not yet know precisely what 
that role would be. 
 
¶4. (C) Martins told Emboffs the situation in the country had 
deteriorated to the point that many Timorese felt that they 
could only trust members of their own ethnic group. Although he 
claimed to be critical of this view, he frequently implied that 
senior military officials and some formerly respected members of 
the police force could not be trusted because they were 
Lorosa'e, or easterners. 
 
Why he Fled Dili 
 
¶5. (C) The Police Commissioner said he fled to the hills after 
receiving warnings via SMS (cell phone text messages) that 
Lobato planned to have him killed. These fears were confirmed, 
he said, when he received an SMS (which he showed to emboffs) 
from Lobato asking him to meet to discuss a surprise trip to 
Portugal, followed quickly by another SMS warning him that the 
plan to kill him would be carried out at the proposed meeting. 
Martins, who had been actively avoiding Lobato for nearly a 
week, decided that the situation was too dangerous for him in 
Dili and chose to flee to the orphanage and put himself under 
the protection of the President. He believes his life is still 
in danger and will not travel to Dili without an armed escort. 
 
¶6. (C) Martins' distaste for the Minister of the Interior is 
well known. During the meeting he described Lobato as a "stupid" 
man with the "brain of a terrorist". He said Lobato wanted to 
have him killed for many reasons, including his persistent 
efforts to block the politicization of the police and for 
documenting and, in some cases, circumventing Lobato's improper 
 
DILI 00000279  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
attempts to arm civilians. Lobato, he said, was particularly 
incensed that Martins changed unit assignments immediately prior 
to the Fretilin congress, dulling Lobato's efforts to use 
members of the police to keep dissident Fretilin members in 
line. 
 
¶7. (C) Martins said Lobato improperly provided police weapons 
and uniforms to Fretilin supporters throughout the country, but 
especially in Dili and in the Western districts.  Some of the 
weapons were requisitioned directly from the armory but in other 
cases Lobato improperly took them from active police units.  In 
once case, he said, Lobato ordered Border Patrol Commander 
Antonio de Cruz to give him 17 assault rifles and in another he 
took rifles from the Baucau Police Task Force and Rapid 
Intervention Unit (UIR).  Martins documented the improper 
weapons transfers, gave the information to Foreign Minister Jose 
Ramos Horta, and also reported the matter to Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri. Several persons who received the uniforms and weapons 
have turned themselves in to the President and will be revealed 
publicly "at the appropriate time". 
 
Martins on the Petitioners 
 
¶8. (C) Martins presented a new spin on the deployment of the 
military to put down the riot in Tasitolu on April 28 and 29. 
According to Martins, General Taur Matan Ruak (TMR) expelled the 
"petitioners" from FDTL without following the correct procedures 
or preparing an official notice of dismissal. TMR knew that 
President would not support his decision, so he and his men, 
Col. Lere in particular, told the Prime Minister repeatedly that 
the petitioners were planning a coup and that he must meet the 
threat with military action. Alkatiri, whom Martins described as 
always prepared to believe people were after him, was easily 
convinced and, after the petitioner-led demonstration in front 
of his office turned violent, was determined to crush the 
petitioners. When the order came for the FDTL to intervene, 
Martins said, the military knew it was coming and was already 
prepared. 
 
Statements on the Dissident Military 
 
¶9. (C) Martins denies rumors that he supported the dissident 
military groups such as the one led by Maj. Alfredo Reinado. On 
the contrary, he said, he had specifically refused a request 
from Maj. Marcos Tilman to deploy a detachment from the Police 
Reserve Unit (URP) to protect him in Gleno.  Martins claims to 
have interviewed several of Maj. Reinado's men who were present 
when the first shots were fired in Fatuahi on May 23, and he 
believes Reinado ordered his men to fire first. 
 
Military Patrols in Dili 
 
¶10. (C) On the evening of May 23, Martins said, he attended a 
meeting that included Prime Minister Alkatiri, Minister of 
Defense Rodrigues, Minister of the Interior Lobato, and General 
Taur Matan Ruak. At the meeting it was decided that the Police 
and the Military should divide the responsibility for patrolling 
Dili between them. The military had already commenced operations 
in Dili, he said, but there had been several near misses between 
the police and FDTL. The organizations formally divided the city 
into military and police sectors. This was contrary to 
assurances by Alkatiri and other Government leaders that FDTL 
patrols in Dili consisted only of the participation of military 
police officers (MPs) in joint patrols with PNTL officers. 
 
On Lobato, China, and Cuba 
 
¶11. (C) According to Martins, Rogerio Lobato accuses the U.S. of 
conspiring with the petitioners and the Catholic Church. He 
believes that Timor should rely more heavily on the governments 
of China and Cuba for military training.  He quoted Lobato as 
having said that the Cubans are most willing to provide as many 
military advisors as required and, if necessary, to have them 
pose as doctors so as not to arouse suspicion. Martins remains 
deeply angry with the Cubans because two of the doctors in Gleno 
 
DILI 00000279  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
allegedly refused to provide medical care to a police officer 
who had been wounded by the military. 
REES