VZCZCXRO2270
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHCI #0221/01 1420608
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220608Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0955
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0868
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0334
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0334
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0201
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0199
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0125
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0149
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0063
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0086
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0086
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1165

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM PTER IN
SUBJECT: CONGRESS LOSES ITS MAJORITY IN ASSAM STATE ASSEMBLY AND THE 
MUSLIM VOTE 
 
REF: A) CALCUTTA 0195   B) CALCUTTA 0145   C) CALCUTTA 0134   D) CALCUTTA 0071 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The May 11 state assembly election results 
returned a diminished Congress Party to power in Assam that must 
now rule in a coalition with the tribal Bodo People's 
Progressive Front - Hagrama (BPPF-H).  The recently established 
Muslim party Asom United Democratic Front (AUDF) split the 
formerly solid Congress Muslim vote and undermined the party's 
hold in 20 Muslim-dominated constituencies, causing Congress to 
loose its outright majority.  The AUDF had hoped to act as the 
"kingmaker," but Congress combined its 53 seats with those of 
the BPPF-H and Independents to form a government.  Chief 
Minister Tarun Gogoi appeared anxious to tie-up with the BPPF-H, 
as it was willing to let him retain his position in the new 
government.  Gogoi spurned the AUDF as its leaders had publicly 
opposed his remaining as CM.  Gogoi's willingness to rely on a 
party of former ethnic Bodo militants to retain his position 
could seriously damage the Congress' long-term prospects in 
Assam by alienating the Muslim vote and opening the door to 
greater ethnic violence and corruption.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) Assam's May 11 assembly election results left Congress 
without a clear majority, although it remained the state's 
largest party with 53 seats in the 126-seat assembly and easily 
beat its principal rival, the regional Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), 
which won just 24 seats.  Congress' weak showing was attributed 
to its losing control of the key Muslim vote in 20 
Muslim-majority assembly constituencies.  Businessman Badruddin 
Ajmal and other Muslim leaders formed the AUDF in late 2005 to 
tap into Muslim sentiment that Congress was not responsive to 
the community.  Congress, needing the "magic number" 64 to 
retain power, turned to the BPBF (H) with its 12 seats and to 
seven independents to form a coalition government.  Prior to the 
elections Congress, anticipating its loss of Muslim votes, made 
an unofficial arrangement with the tribal BPPF (H), and did not 
field candidates against it in Bodo-dominated areas. 
 
¶3.  (U) May 11 election results were: 
Congress: 53  (71 in 2001) 
Asom Gana Parishad (AGP): 24 (20 in 2001) 
Asom Gana Parishad - Progressive (AGP-P): 1 
Asom United Democratic Front (AUDF): 10 
Bodoland People's Progressive Front - H (BPPF-H): 12 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): 10 (8 in 2001) 
Communist Party of India (CPI): 1 
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM): 2 
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP): 1 
Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC): 1 
Others: 11 
 
¶4.  (U) Congress' difficulties with Muslim voters came to the 
fore in mid-2005, when the Supreme Court ruled that the Illegal 
Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act (IMDT) was 
unconstitutional.  The IMDT protected illegal Bangladeshi 
migrants from deportation and Congress' failure to appeal the 
ruling or to immediately offer alternative legislation was 
perceived by many in the Muslim community as a failure to 
protect its interests.  Congress finally responded in April 2006 
by amending the Foreigners Act of 1946 with the Foreigners 
Tribunals for Assam Order, effectively replicating the IMDT. 
However in late 2005, Muslim leaders, who traditionally 
supported Congress, had already formed the AUDF.  Given Assam's 
Muslim population of 28 percent, the AUDF hoped to do well in 
the election and play a key role in forming a new government. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Congress spokesperson B. Sharma (protect) told post 
that the party would have certainly won an absolute majority had 
it not been for the AUDF.  She maintained that indigenous 
Muslims voted for Congress, while  "Bengali speaking" Muslims 
most affected by the IMDT repeal voted for the AUDF.  Press 
contacts added that in lower Assam and the Barak Valley areas, 
where the Bangladeshi presence is higher, most voters preferred 
the AUDF.  However in upper Assam, indigenous Muslims voted 
mostly for Congress or even the AGP.  In as many as 20 
constituencies, the division of Muslim votes between Congress 
and the AUDF resulted in a Congress defeat.  The AUDF's 10 seats 
were clearly won at Congress' expense and the AUDF also came 
second in at least 12 other districts.  (Note:  At least 39 of 
Assam's 126 assembly segments have more than 40 per cent Muslim 
voters, while in 12 Muslim voters are between 30 and 40 per 
 
CALCUTTA 00000221  002 OF 002 
 
 
cent.)  According to Election Commission figures, Congress won 
only 28.33 per cent of the total votes and the BJP 10.88 
percent.  In effect, 60 per cent of votes cast were against 
national parties Congress and the BJP. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Even though the AUDF now represents the largest bloc 
of Muslim votes and many of its leaders and members were former 
Congress Party members, Gogoi refused to pursue an alliance. 
Gogoi was clearly motivated by self interest, as AUDF Leader 
Ajmal had said that he might support the Congress to form a 
government, but not with Gogoi as Chief Minister.  While Gogoi 
did not want a coalition with the AUDF, the Congress national 
leadership was reportedly interested in bringing the AUDF back 
into the fold.  An Assam Congress member noted to ConGen that 
the Congress national leadership had pressured Gogoi to work 
with the AUDF.  Congress leaders are apparently worried that the 
formation of the AUDF might encouraged Muslims in Uttar Pradesh 
to launch a similar party, and that Gogoi's rejection of the 
AUDF would send a negative signal to Muslims in other states. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) However, Gogoi apparently ignored pressure to work 
with the AUDF and instead put his fate and that of the Congress 
in the hands of Hagrama Mohilary and his Bodo faction, the 
Bodoland People's Progressive Front (BPPF-H) because the Bodos 
were willing let Gogoi remain as CM.  Mohilary was leader of the 
militant Bodo Liberation Tigers that disbanded in 2003 with the 
signing of a peace accord with the GOI.  Mohilary emerged as a 
key Bodo leader in the 2005 local Bodoland Territorial 
Autonomous Council elections.  During those elections, Mohilary 
received Congress support and fielded former BLT militants to 
contest against official BPPF candidates nominated by his rival 
faction leader Rabiran Nazary.  In the assembly elections, the 
Congress asked its supporters to vote for the BPPF (H) in Bodo 
dominated districts.  The BPPF(H) has proclaimed that solving 
the problem of illegal migration into Assam will be a priority 
for the party because it concerns "all the indigenous people of 
the state."  The BPPF (H) now seeks to portray itself as the 
champion of Assamese interests in partnership with the Congress, 
usurping the opposition AGP's role as protector of the Assamese 
against foreign (Bangladeshi) influence. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Gogoi's short-term calculus for personal gain in 
aligning with the BPPF-H could have serious negative long-term 
repercussions.  The BPPF-H has already been accused of 
corruption in its governance of the Bodoland Council and 
Congress' support of the BPPF-H against the BPPF-R, in a classic 
tactic of divide and rule, has exacerbated factional tensions 
and has led to violence.  In a series of incidents involving the 
two Bodo factions this April, a youth was lynched, a teacher 
hacked to death, several homes set on fire, and faction members 
shot. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  Congress loss of its majority in the Assam 
state assembly was a setback.  Through judicious negotiation 
with the AUDF, the Party could have minimized its losses and 
potentially won back the Muslim vote.  Instead, CM Gogoi's chose 
to save his own political skin at the expense of the Congress 
Party.  Gogoi's alignment with the BPPF reinforced the break 
with the AUDF and its former Congress members, making any 
reconciliation with errant Muslims less likely.  This has ruined 
Congress' prospects of uniting the Muslim community behind it. 
In addition, Gogoi's actions sends a negative signal to other 
Muslim communities in states like UP that Congress leaders will 
sacrifice the Muslim vote when politically expedient.  Gogoi's 
favoring of the BPPF-H against the BPPF-R is also fueling 
factional violence within the Bodo community and further 
inflaming Assam's simmering ethnic tensions.  In saving himself, 
Gogoi appears to have damned his party. 
JARDINE