VZCZCXRO9730
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0063/01 1211318
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011318Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0318
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0337

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/1/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH POLICE - A WORK IN PROGRESS 
 
REF: (A)05  BASRAH 0049; (B) 05 BASRAH 0056; (C) 05 BASRAH 105; (D) 05 BASRAH 112;  (E) 05 BASRAH 120;  (F) BASRAH 0017; (G) BASRAH 0019; (H)BASRAH 0054 
 
BASRAH 00000063  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The Basrah police force is a barometer to 
gauge the ability of the local government to govern in the 
south, and a viable police force is essential to curb internal 
security threats.  The police force has received large amounts 
of assistance from the Coalition and has made some progress. 
However, corruption and the large number of police officers with 
links to militia groups prevent the police from being viewed by 
the average citizen as anything more than an extra-legal entity 
that serves its own interests.  The dysfunctionality of the 
Provincial Council adds to the problem (Reftels C, E), allowing 
political groups to commandeer parts of the force for its own 
interests.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Basrah police force is a natural choice for the 
Coalition to use to build law enforcement capability.  However, 
the police traditionally had little institutional experience in 
performing law enforcement duties.  During the Saddam regime the 
force numbered less than 10,000 and was mandated by the Ministry 
of Interior to enforce laws.  It was not an investigative arm 
and served only as a way to exert control over the local 
population.  The police suffered from institutional neglect 
except during periods of trouble when it received support from 
the Iraqi Army. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Until recently the Basrah provincial police was 
organized into 5 districts that were divided into 37 
neighborhood police stations.  In early March 2006 the Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) instituted a change in the structure 
of the Iraqi police.  The reorganization puts the 14 stations in 
Basrah city under the City District and the remaining stations 
under the Rural District.  The MOI determined that Basrah 
province requires a police force of 15,000 to establish an 
acceptable per capita police to population ratio.  The reasons 
for the reorganization were to streamline the authority within 
the MOI to assert better control over the subordinate sector 
headquarters. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Though the Ministry of Interior had theoretical 
control of a national police force during the former regime, 
leaders in Basrah province were left to their own devices to 
manage a largely ineffective police force.  Professional 
development and leadership suffered as a result.  The task of 
training a national police force after the fall of Saddam was 
given to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 
(MNSTC-I) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team 
(CPATT).  CPATT officials stationed at the Regional Embassy 
Office in Basrah who participated in the effort revealed that 
the majority of police currently in service in Basrah worked for 
the former regime, and  MNSTC-I decided to retrain existing 
members instead of recruiting an entirely new force.  The police 
force has recruited the numbers needed to increase its size, 
though experienced personnel to increase the talent pool of its 
force have not been hired. The Joint Training Academy located at 
the Shaibah Logistics Base has produced a basically qualified 
graduate, but one that remains unskilled in forensics, 
investigation, or special tactics. 
 
¶5.  (C)  In discussions with CPATT officials and British police 
trainers, one of the biggest hurdles they face in creating an 
effective force is corruption.   In an area where elected 
officials primarily seek self-enrichment, the police are 
expected to turn a blind eye.  For their own safety many police 
officers participate in smuggling or at least authorize the safe 
passage of goods to their intended destination.   Corrupt police 
officers are an institutionalization of corruption based on 
certain police units' links to militia groups that are stronger 
than their loyalty to the police force.  Police links to militia 
groups are especially noticeable in the smaller, specialized 
units. 
 
¶6. (C)  Specialized units are an important part of the Basrah 
police force due to the unwieldy size and the low skill level of 
most police officers.  The MOI established smaller units to 
develop specialized skills and increase accountability and 
provided these units with a level of autonomy uncommon in the 
police force.  This resulted in a reporting chain that often 
excludes the Chief of Police.   These small units have been 
implicated in extrajudicial killings that have plagued the 
province.  The most notorious example was the Department of 
Internal Affairs (DIA). 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  Created in March 2004, the DIA was given the task to 
increase accountability and deter abuse of authority, but did 
 
BASRAH 00000063  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
little to achieve its stated goals.  The DIA was accused of 
committing torture, kidnapping, and murder for the benefit of 
the political parties, especially Fadillah and the governor.  On 
September 18, 2005, members of the DIA were implicated in the 
incident involving the detention of two British soldiers at the 
Al Jameat police station.  (Reftel D.)  DIA personnel attempted 
to transfer the detained soldiers to militia members.  The 
Governor, Muhammad Musbih Al-Wahili of the Fadillah Party, 
obstructed an MOI order to disband the DIA by claiming it was 
British interference in local affairs.  The Governor stalled 
until pressure from the central government forced the closure of 
the DIA in November 2005. 
 
¶8.  (C)  While the closure of the DIA has stopped activity of 
officers assigned to DIA, police involvement in criminal 
activity continues, and the British response to it has led to 
recent political turmoil.  Many of the personnel from the DIA 
were transferred to the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU), and 
the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU).  A string of IED attacks in 
January 2006 led to an arrest operation on January 23 that 
targeted 14 policemen associated with the CIU and the SCU. 
Chief among them was Major Jassim Hassan, from CIU and Captain 
Abbas Munis Abdulaal.  The political response was immediate. 
Sheikh Abu Salam al SA'EDY, provincial council member from the 
Fadillah Party, organized protests and was successful in 
persuading the Provincial Council to adopt a boycott against 
MND-SE that continues to the present.   (Reftel G) 
 
¶9.  (C)  After the January arrests, the murder rate increased 
substantially in Basrah.   The victims have been police, Sunni 
religious leaders, teachers, and other civilians.   The term 
"debathification" has been used to describe the current murder 
campaign due to a purported list of names associated with the 
former regime and its use in targeting victims.   A common 
thread of many of the incidents in February and March is the 
reported sighting of Iraqi police vehicles at the scene of the 
kidnapping of individuals later found murdered.   (A recent 
intensified murder campaign against Sunni citizens is discussed 
in Reftel H.) 
 
¶10.  (C)  Though the smaller police groups might be the most 
notorious examples of malfeasance, the civilian population views 
the entire Basrah police force with mistrust.   Despite this 
stigma the Basrah police presided over several elections within 
the province without incident.   The individual often singled 
out for praise for this performance is the Chief of Police, 
General Hasan Sewadi al-Saad.  (See Reftels A, B, and E for more 
on General Hasan.)  A frequent visitor to the REO, the Chief of 
Police had a meeting with the Regional Coordinator on March 23 
to discuss the current state of affairs within the Basrah 
Police.  General Hasan reiterated his often repeated statement 
that he is not in control of the police force.  He said that 
"the parties" were in control of large portions of his force and 
the Provincial Council interfered in law enforcement matters 
because they had their own agenda.   When questioned about how 
to rectify the problem he quickly answered, "Arrest them!" 
 
¶11.  (C)  In addition to political interference, he said that 
another reason for his lack of control, and presumably poor 
police performance, was the administrative and personnel system 
of the MOI.  General Hasan said that he had no use for the 
15,000 officers in his force and would prefer 7,000 
well-qualified policemen instead.  He also stated that he is 
unable to fire poor performers because of the administrative 
process centrally controlled at the MOI.  He revealed that he 
trusts several units, chiefly the Tactical Support Unit (TSU), 
and the City Reaction Force (CRF).  He said that in the recent 
restructuring these units have been put under a common district 
commander.  (Comment:  TSU is the most used force in the Basrah 
police for critical missions. For the most part TSU has been 
considered a trusted force by MND SE.  However, the commander of 
TSU, Lt Colonel Shakir, accompanied the Governor to a REO 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting  and members of the TSU reportedly have been involved in 
serious crimes.  Although he often speaks of desiring more power 
to gain control of the police, Gen Hasan has done little to 
confront the interference in police matters by the Governor. 
The Chief of Police has amazed many outside observers by 
retaining his job for as long as he has.  He blames Basrah's 
problems on the Provincial Council who, in turn, blame the 
British.  His future relevance relies on cooperation with both. 
If the Provincial Council ever becomes functional the Chief of 
Police would have to deliver on his promises of effective law 
enforcement.  End Comment. 
 
¶12.  (C)  MNF-I has created a police force with only basic 
training.  Baswaris do not trust the police.  Recent attacks on 
Sunni leaders have been ignored by the police due to 
indifference, involvement, or fear.  Comment:  A possible reason 
for this is that the large scale infiltration of the police has 
resulted in groupings that are fairly balanced.  That is, no 
 
BASRAH 00000063  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
militia wishes to interfere with another's business for fear of 
reprisal.  Therefore when incidents are reported that hint of 
militia participation the police is slow to react.  End Comment. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Comment:  MNF-I is training the Basrah police force to 
become a large, minimally qualified law enforcement unit. 
Political parties established themselves as centers of power 
through the use of militias financed by criminal activities such 
as smuggling.   There is an increasing need for funds by local 
parties in the run-up to provincial elections later this year 
and therefore a presumed need for increased smuggling and 
criminal police involvement.  Links between the Shia militias 
and the police, especially small specialized units such as SCU 
and CIU, are very strong and any attempt to act against them 
will have political repercussions as evidenced by the latest 
boycott by the Provincial Council against the British. 
Ironically the best solution for conferring authority within the 
police and winning the respect of Baswaris lies in the 
establishment of a functional Provincial Council that does not 
rely on militia support and concomitant police corruption. 
GROSS