VZCZCXRO7297
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0521/01 1281616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081616Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0248
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0022
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0013
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0243
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0189
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0084
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
PARAMARIBO FOR DCM MARY BETH LEONARD 
LIBREVILLE FOR GLENN FEDZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV EINV ASEC ML
SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM QADHAFI'S VISIT CONTINUES AS TUAREGS 
DEBATE AUTONOMY FOR KIDAL 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 00443 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 00208 
 
BAMAKO 00000521  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, U.S. Embassy 
Bamako, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The fallout from Qadhafi's tumultuous 
mid-April visit to Timbuktu (ref A) continued to spread as 
members of the National Assembly expressed concern over 
Libya's intentions and some Tuareg leaders requested autonomy 
for Kidal.  On April 19 a group of National Assembly Deputies 
suggested calling Prime Minister Issoufi Maiga before the 
Assembly to answer questions regarding Libya's role in 
northern Mali.  Meanwhile, Qadhafi's Cabinet Director, Becher 
Salah, arrived in Kidal to meet with former National Guard 
deserter Hassan Fagaga.  During the meeting, Fagaga and a 
handful of northern leaders demanded autonomy for the Kidal 
region - an old idea that seems to have resurfaced concurrent 
with Qadhafi's sometimes bizarre interventions in the north. 
End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Deputies Question Qadhafi's Motives 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On April 19 a group of National Assembly Deputies from 
the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) suggested calling 
Prime Minister Issoufi Maiga before the Assembly to respond 
to questions regarding Mali's relationship with Libya.  This 
coincided with an official request by the Assembly for 
testimony from the Ministers of Justice and Investment on 
matters unrelated to the north.  According to reports, the 
Deputies hoped to ask the Prime Minister to explain the 
reasoning behind Libya's newly opened consulate in Kidal 
given the absence of any Libyan citizens in the region. 
Reports indicated the Deputies were also eager for details of 
Qadhafi's secretive meeting in Timbuktu with former National 
Guard deserter Hassan Fagaga. 
 
¶3. (C) An Embassy contact within the National Assembly 
subsequently stated that the Assembly had no intentions of 
formally calling the Prime Minister to testify.  After what 
appears to have been a quick intervention by the Presidency, 
the Assembly's requests for testimony from the Justice and 
Investment Ministers were also tabled. 
 
---------------- 
No Hidden Agenda 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) During an unusually candid press conference on April 
30, however, Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane responded to 
questions regarding Libya's role in the north.  The 
responsibilities of a consulate, Ouane told the national 
press, go beyond serving the needs of citizen nationals. 
According to Ouane, the Libyan consulate in Kidal serves as 
an extension of the Libyan Embassy in Bamako by increasing 
the reach of Libyan diplomacy and strengthening bilateral 
cooperation.  Ouane noted that during the consulate's opening 
ceremony he met with his Libyan counterpart, the Libyan 
Consul and the Governor of Kidal to ensure that the consulate 
played by the "rules".  Ouane did not specify what the 
"rules" entailed.  Ouane concluded by saying that there was 
"no hidden agenda" behind the opening of the consulate in 
Kidal. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment.  Ouane's remarks are interesting given his 
initial opposition to Libya's request to open a consulate in 
Kidal (see ref B).  During his brief exchange with the press, 
Ouane compared the Libyan consulate in Kidal to the Algerian 
consulate in Gao and observed that while it was true no 
Libyan citizens lived in Kidal, no Algerians lived in Gao 
either.  This is not altogether correct, however, since there 
are a number of Algerian citizens in northern Mali and the 
largely nomadic populations of northern Mali and southern 
Algeria are closely linked.  Unlike the Libyan Consul in 
Kidal, moreover, the Algerian Consul in Gao administers no 
development programs.  End comment. 
 
 
BAMAKO 00000521  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
A Second Libyan Visit and Demands for Autonomy in Kidal 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (C) Qadhafi's Cabinet Director, Bechir Salah, arrived in 
Kidal on April 21 to celebrate the end of Lieutenant Colonel 
Hassan Fagaga's "rebellion" and pursue "peace talks" 
initiated during the private meeting between Fagaga and 
Qadhafi held in Timbuktu one week earlier.  Assuming the role 
of facilitator, Salah presided over a meeting between Fagaga 
and Kidal representatives, the Minister of Territorial 
Administration Kafougouna Kone, the Governor of Gao, and the 
Director of the Malian Office for Northern Development. 
 
¶7. (C) Minister Kone - a former Minister of Defense and 
active military General - was President Amadou Toumani 
Toure's (ATT) commanding officer in 1991 when ATT led the 
uprising that unseated former dictator Moussa Traore.  Kone 
is regarded as a close ATT confident and military advisor. 
Dispatched from Bamako, Kone apparently intended to meet 
Salah's plane in Gao but the Libyan delegation decided at the 
last moment to fly directly to Kidal instead, enabling Salah 
to precede the arrival of his Malian host just as Qadhafi 
preceded the arrival of ATT in Timbuktu. 
 
¶8. (C) During the meeting Fagaga and his followers 
articulated a demand for greater autonomy for the Kidal 
region.  Kone rejected this idea, stating that such a move 
would signal a step toward succession and the partition of 
Mali.  The Minister also rejected a request for financial 
compensation for former rebels to ease their reintegration 
into the Malian armed forces.  In response, Salah offered 
Libyan funding for rebel reintegration.  Kone opposed this as 
well and noted that, even if Libya were to provide 
reintegration support, the funds would be given to the Malian 
Office of Northern Development for distribution throughout 
the northern regions. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Northerners Divided on Question of Autonomy 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Following the call for northern autonomy, a National 
Assembly Deputy from the region of Menaka, Bajan Ag Hamatou, 
stated publicly that he was "not in agreement with the people 
of Kidal" regarding the question of autonomy and would "never 
be associated with any project geared toward the partition of 
Malian territory."  Three days later, on April 28, Hamatou 
retracted this statement and affirmed that he was, in fact, 
in favor of autonomy if it would lead to improved development 
for the north.  On May 2 an influential former rebel leader, 
Ilias Ag Ayouba of the Idaksahak group from the region of 
Gao, issued a statement opposing greater autonomy for the 
north.  Ayouba then asked the Libyan Consul to intervene to 
unite Tuareg communities behind the Malian republic and ATT. 
On May 3 several former rebel leaders and northern 
representatives met with northern National Assembly Deputies 
in the office of the Assembly's 2nd vice-president, Assarid 
Ag Imbarcawane.  The northerners warned that the up to now 
silent GOM needed to make an official statement vis-a-vis 
Kidal autonomy or risk being overtaken by events. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Malian press initially reported that Bechir Salah 
would arrive in Kidal with a shipment of weapons to be 
incinerated in a symbolic bonfire akin to the 1996 "Flame of 
Peace" in Timbuktu that marked the end of the last Tuareg 
rebellion.  Although the arms and bonfire never materialized, 
Qadhafi's foray into the politics of northern Mali has 
re-ignited a somewhat familiar national debate.  Periodic 
demands for northern autonomy are not new.  The concept's 
sudden re-emergence, however, in conjunction with intensified 
Libyan interest and increased oil speculation in the north, 
provides a new and rather uncertain dynamic.  Indeed, some 
national commentators have suggested that current rumblings 
over northern autonomy "smell of oil".  Whether this is 
 
BAMAKO 00000521  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
actually the case, the renewed calls for autonomy, Libya's 
role as a suspected supporter of past Tuareg revolts, 
Qadhafi's recent references to a "Greater Sahara", and 
promises of large-scale Libyan funded development projects 
have sparked a genuine sense of concern within the GOM. 
McCulley