VZCZCXRO0058
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0777/01 1110335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210335Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5585
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7816
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1906
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2431
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2332
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1416
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/AAE (PRAHAR AND HOOKER) AND SCA/CEN 
DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (LEHMAN) 
ALMATY FOR SCOTT WALDO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF TI UZ
SUBJECT: INL COORDINATOR/DCM TRIP REPORT: TERMEZ AND 
SARIOSIYA 
 
REF: TASHKENT 262 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (U)  Summary:  Visiting INL Coordinator and DCM visited 
the Surkhandarya Province for inspection and observation of 
border post facilities and procedures.  Emboffs assessed the 
use of equipment and training provided to Uzbek Customs and 
Border Guard officials by USG-funded programs through the 
United Nations Office for Drug Control (UNODC) at Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan border crossings.  Emboffs also observed 
established operations for pedestrians, small vehicles and 
trucks attempting to enter or exit Uzbekistan. End Summary. 
 
HAIRATON/FRIENDSHIP BRIDGE (UZBEKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  April 3 Site overview: UNODC is in the final process 
of completing the Friendship Bridge project. The bridge and 
land checkpoints are open and the law enforcement agents 
assigned to the post function in a professional manner.  The 
crossing itself is similar to a typical site at the 
U.S.-Mexico border and perhaps surpasses many of our own 
border checkpoints in terms of technology.  The bridge is 
open only during daylight hours and has 45 Customs officers 
and slightly fewer Border Guard personnel assigned to it. 
Personnel rotate every two to three years, and junior 
officers are trained by senior officers upon arrival.  Uzbek 
personnel speak Uzbek and Russian while a few speak Dari and 
Pashto to communicate with Afghan counterparts. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Construction of the railway platform near the bridge 
was completed in October 2005.  The site is in need of a 
crane to unload containers from freight cars, since currently 
all suspicious containers that are detected must be sent back 
to the Termez station for unloading and inspection.  One long 
cargo train crossed into Afghanistan during our visit.  We 
saw more than 60 train wagons, including 25 gasoline rail 
cars, waiting to enter Afghanistan.  Uzbek personnel told us 
that three to four cargo trains cross to Afghanistan daily; 
no passengers are allowed on these trains; and all staff 
employed on the trains are Uzbek. 
 
¶4.  (U)  We were not given access to the river port; however, 
the UNODC project manager met with port representatives the 
day before the visit and was told that it is in need of a 
large x-ray machine to scan freight.  He was told that most 
narcotics trafficking at the crossing is now done by boat. 
The Border Guard and Customs representatives denied us access 
to the river port since it was not listed in the diplomatic 
note requesting permission to visit, but we intend to visit 
the site in the near future.  Interestingly, the river port 
falls under direct control of the regional Border Guard and 
Customs offices in Termez, not the Airatom Border Guard and 
Customs units. 
 
¶5.  (U)  All equipment provided by INL has been delivered and 
installed, including the video surveillance equipment, 
weighbridges, and forklifts for unloading cargo from trucks. 
DTRA WMD portal monitors are also installed at the entry 
gates on both sides of the Uzbek bridge checkpoint and appear 
operational . 
 
¶6.  (U)  Observations: The INL-funded video surveillance 
equipment includes 57 cameras, six of which rotate 360 
degrees and have zoom capability.  The surveillance room is 
staffed by a duty officer and contains seven monitors that at 
the time of the visit were displaying the pedestrian check, 
vehicle check, and the front gate.  The information is 
recorded digitally and is kept for one month before the 
cameras re-record.   We saw a long cargo train crossing the 
bridge to Afghanistan on the video during the visit. 
 
¶7.  (U)  All pedestrians and vehicle passengers who cross the 
border enter a screening area that contains two x-ray 
machines for luggage.  Post representatives reported that 
anywhere from 50 to 100 people enter or exit Uzbekistan on a 
typical day.  Uzbek, Afghan, EU, the occasional AMCIT, and 
international organization staff typically cross, with the 
majority of individuals being Afghan citizens. 
 
 
TASHKENT 00000777  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶8.  (U)  Border Guard representatives told us that the 
checkpoint has been effective and few individuals currently 
attempt to cross with narcotics.  The agents recently found 
several grams of hashish that someone discarded in the middle 
of the bridge outside of the surveillance area before 
arriving to the checkpoint. 
 
¶9.  (U)  A poster is displayed in the screening area that 
lists hashish seizure statistics at the bridge: 1993 ) 1 
ton; 1996 ) 4 tons; from 1998 to present, only small amounts 
of hashish have been detected.   Other posters showed amounts 
of humanitarian shipments by country of origin through 
Airatom for 2002 and 2003, but no statistics were available 
for 2004 and 2005. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Post personnel reported that cargo going to 
Afghanistan typically consists of humanitarian assistance, 
construction material, food, and oil and is shipped primarily 
on the railroad.  Cargo from Afghanistan is typically fruit 
and vegetables ) some of it transshipped from Pakistan - and 
is shipped primarily by truck or boat.  The railroad cars 
typically return empty to Uzbekistan. 
 
¶11.  (U)  The vehicle checkpoint contains trenches for 
searching underneath trucks.  We observed the full search 
procedures of a truck, which entailed a canine narcotics 
sniffer, partial unloading of the vehicle, and an underneath 
search.  The vehicle inspection area is equipped with four 
sets of CT-30 kits and narcotics test equipment (two sets of 
each at entry and two at exit).  The buster and fiberscope 
that we inspected have clearly been used and had dust and 
other residue.  Post representatives said that their 
personnel had been trained to use the equipment through 
search and detection courses. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Analysis: The Friendship Bridge is an impressive 
project, both in terms of infrastructure and technology.  The 
observed search techniques and canine utilization were 
thorough and professional.  Now that the bridge and land 
checkpoint projects are complete, we should consider focusing 
our efforts in Termez on the river port.  An Embassy Tashkent 
representative should attend the  ceremony planned by UNODC 
in April (Note: Now postponed.  End Note.) to mark the 
substantial completion of this multi-donor project and 
request to tour the river port prior to arrival.  Based on 
his/her assessment, INL and the Embassy will consider 
allocating a portion of CN pipeline project funding to UNODC 
for the purchase of an x-ray machine and other necessary 
detection equipment and training for the port. 
 
SARIOSIYA CHECKPOINT (UZBEKISTAN-TAJIKISTAN) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U)  April 4 Site overview: The Sariosiya-Tursunzada 
crossing is the most direct way to travel by road from 
Tashkent to Dushanbe throughout the year, although this is 
still at least a ten hour drive from Tashkent via Termez to 
the border.   According to Uzbek personnel, approximately 
300-400 people cross each day (pedestrians and passengers). 
An estimated 10 to 15 trucks transit the post in an average 
day.  Government bus services crossing the border stopped in 
1995 and private bus services in 1998, according to Uzbek 
personnel.  The railroad crossing is approximately 20 km from 
the land crossing and approximately 5-6 cargo trains pass 
through in an average day and 2-3 passenger trains each week. 
 We did not visit the railroad checkpoint.   Uzbek personnel 
speak Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Observations: Sariosiya (Uzbek side) contains a 
metal detector that all individuals pass through before going 
through passport control.  Passport control includes one 
booth for entering records into the database.  Another window 
is used for examining export control documents.  The passport 
database is updated weekly with the current &black list.8 
The database does not store individuals, information, but 
rather records the number of people transiting.  Information 
is saved to CDs when the hard drive is full, but no data is 
transferred back to Tashkent. 
 
¶15.  (U)  While not as impressive as Termez, the Sariosiya 
checkpoint has all the necessary elements of a professional 
 
TASHKENT 00000777  003 OF 003 
 
 
checkpoint: trenches for underneath truck searches, CT-30 
kits containing busters, fiberscopes, and mirrors, four 
canines at the land crossing (seven at the railroad) that 
were trained in Tashkent.  The post has an x-ray machine, but 
personnel reported that it is broken.  They also reported 
that electricity is sporadic and that they are in need of a 
more powerful generator.  There is no DTRA WMD portal monitor. 
 
¶16.  (U)  Most of the people crossing to Uzbekistan are 
Tajiks not requiring visas under the Uzbekistan/Tajikistan 
bilateral agreement permitting citizens of each other's 
country residing in border districts to visit the opposite 
border district for short periods without a visa.  Uzbek 
personnel estimated only 8 to 10 percent of the Tajiks 
crossing the border had Uzbek visas.  Unlike the 
Airatom/Friendship Bridge checkpoint, Sariosiya is open 24/7. 
 It is particularly busy during national holidays, such as 
Navruz, when many families cross to visit relatives on the 
other side. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Analysis: The post is professional and generally 
well-equipped, but it is in need of an x-ray machine, 
generator, and a forklift for unloading trucks.  The Tajik 
post is located a short distance away, so communication 
generally entails simply walking to speak with their 
counterparts on the other side.  The Uzbek personnel did not 
feel that a communications system with the Tajik side (either 
telephone or radios) is necessary since they prefer to walk 
the short distance to speak with their counterparts.  An 
Embassy rep should also visit the railroad crossing to see 
checking procedures, as it appears that a substantial number 
of passengers and freight also cross via trains, a 
traditional means of smuggling narcotics in Central Asia. 
PURNELL