This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP EIND EINV FR IT ETRA
SUBJECT:   COMMERCIAL ADVOCACY SUCCESS STORY -- GENERAL 
ELECTRIC SALE OF NAVAL FRIGATE PROPULSION SYSTEMS TO 
FRENCH/ITALIAN CONSORTIUM 
 
SUMMARY 
--------------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) After two and a half years of advocacy by Embassy 
Paris, and considerable efforts on the part of Embassy Rome, 
General Electric (GE) has finally signed a contract to 
supply propulsion systems to the Franco-Italian Multi- 
Mission Frigate (FREMM) program.  Letters from President 
Bush, Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and Secretary Rice 
helped seal the USD 200 million transaction.  The contract 
is expected to produce up to another one billion dollars in 
GE sales through a worldwide partnership created under the 
agreement.  Close interagency coordination in Paris, Rome 
and Washington made this commercial advocacy success 
possible.  The deal is also tangible evidence of the value 
of our American Presence Post (APP) concept.   END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) GE first approached Embassy Paris in June 2003 
about assistance in competing for this contract, which is 
pursuant to a joint naval shipbuilding program that will 
supply 17 frigates to France and 10 to Italy.  The primary 
constructor of the French vessels is the Directorate of 
Naval Construction of France (DCN).  GE's competitor for the 
supply of the propulsion systems was Rolls Royce (RR) of the 
UK.  GE, in order to add a European dimension that was 
necessary to gain credibility in the process, partnered with 
Avio of Italy so that Rolls Royce could not overplay the 
European nature of its bid and to give the Italians reason 
to support GE.   At one point in the fall of 2003, GE had 
virtually thrown in the towel, perceiving that RR simply had 
too much political clout in its favor and that the 
consortium would choose the all-European option.  At that 
point, the Embassy began its efforts to stop the march 
toward a selection of RR. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The impetus initially came from a State Department 
Foreign Service National (FSN) employee in the American 
Presence Post in Rennes, in which district lies the 
headquarters of DCN.  The FSN had developed close contacts 
in DCN as they attempted to find American suppliers in their 
efforts to become a truly competitive shipyard after they 
were hived off from the French Ministry of Defense into a 
separate corporation looking to supply parties outside of 
France.  Former Amb. Leach visited DCN in February 2004 at 
APP Rennes' suggestion, and pressed GE's case with DCN 
officials. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Commercial Service of the Dept. of Commerce 
(FCS), the Embassy Economic Section and the Office of 
Defense Cooperation (ODC) then began a program of visits to 
French military authorities.  They also coordinated efforts 
of GE France, GE U.S., the Dept. of Commerce's Bureau of 
Industrial Security, and the U.S. Dept. of Defense to build 
an advocacy strategy.   Embassy Paris assisted GE throughout 
the campaign, directly lobbying the Defense Minister and 
other high Ministry and government officials at critical 
junctures when RR mounted a counterattack.  The UK 
government involvement went to the very highest levels, with 
Prime Minister Blair intervening personally on several 
occasions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) GE's propulsion units were significantly cheaper 
(by half) than RR's, partly because virtually all of their 
R&D costs had been recovered through sales of hundreds of 
units of earlier versions of the veteran turbine they 
offered to FREMM, while RR was building in the cost of its 
R&D for a brand new, unproven engine.  RR relied on its 
"European" stamp, claimed a superior industrial 
participation (offset) program, and raised the specter of 
U.S. export controls.  FCS and ODC intervened regularly to 
coordinate responses to these tactics, in close 
collaboration with GE. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) When the Embassy discovered that British Prime 
Minister Blair was personally sending letters to French 
President Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, 
Embassy Paris and Embassy Rome worked with U.S. agencies to 
obtain letters of support from Secretary Rice and Secretary 
Gutierrez.  Finally, the persistent intervention of Prime 
Minister Blair led to the request for a presidential letter 
of support, which was signed by President Bush in August 
¶2005. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  COMMENT.  The GE case highlights what can be 
achieved when agencies collaborate closely, and points out 
the value of judicious use of Presidential involvement. 
Careful interagency coordination between three different 
agencies at Embassy Paris, and close cooperation with 
colleagues at Embassy Rome and in the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, State and USTR made this a success.  The 
President's personal involvement in writing to French 
President Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi was 
critical.  Finally, none of this would have occurred with 
the strong on-the-ground ties forged by APP Rennes with 
officials of the French primary constructor, DCN. 
 
STAPLETON