VZCZCXRO0569
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNY #0406/01 0931428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031428Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3726
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 2046
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 7780
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3878
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0671
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 2813

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL ENRG SENV EFIS RS NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY-RUSSIA:  KEEPING UP APPEARANCES 
 
REF: OSLO 213 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.  (C) Russian Prime Minister Fradkov's March 28 and 29 
visit to Oslo generated extensive press play and further 
heightened expectations about Norway's role in developing 
Russia's Shtokman gas field, but achieved little movement on 
substantive issues like Barents border delineation, the 
Russian ban on Norwegian fresh fish, and disputes over 
fisheries rights in the Svalbard archipelago.  The visit 
reflects the current status of the Russian Norwegian 
relationship -- lots of public fanfare, some movement where 
Russian and Norwegian interests clearly coincide, but little 
progress on the hard issues. 
 
PM FRADKOV VISIT: ATMOSPHERICS 10, SUBSTANCE 0 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The first stop for the Russia PM on his visit was a 
red carpet tour of NorskHydro's Ormen Lange gas project near 
Molde, on the west-central coast.  Gazprom is scheduled to 
announce its partners for the Shtokman natural gas project on 
April 15, and the Norwegians used the tour as a final 
opportunity to pitch their world-class offshore petroleum 
technology.  While Hydro CEO Eivind Reiten called Norway and 
Russia "natural partners," Fradkov was less forthcoming, 
telling the press that "the possibility for an important role 
for Norway in the project is not diminished." 
 
¶3.  (C) While the growing Norway-Russia energy dialogue 
continues to move full throttle, the MFA told us there was 
little progress on substantive issues during the visit, with 
discussions largely a re-hash of well known positions.   On 
the Barents border delineation issue, Fradkov reiterated 
Russia's suggestion to explore the disputed zone for 
petroleum resources while negotiations continue.  The 
Norwegians insist that the border be clearly determined 
before any exploration is undertaken.  On fisheries rights in 
Svalbard, the Russians maintained their position that flag 
states should be responsible for punishing rogue fishing 
vessels.  The Norwegians claimed the right to regulate 
fishing practices and enforce compliance in the Svalbard 
archipelago.  On Russia's ongoing salmon ban, PM Stoltenberg 
told Fradkov that the ban should be lifted and reportedly 
served the Russian PM Norwegian salmon.  Fradkov said after 
meeting Stoltenberg that "there was a willingness to find 
compromises on disputes," but neither side offered any real 
evidence of progress. 
 
¶4.  (C) The high-level visit was remarkable for its lack of 
any substantive agreements.  The Norwegian media gave the 
visit a positive spin and focused on the countries, good 
relations and gas development opportunities, but the most 
substantive article on the visit we could find appeared on 
the website "FishUpdate.com," which focused on a Memorandum 
of Understanding on an information and monitoring system for 
Barents maritime traffic.  The MFA told us that a mutual 
cooperation agreement with the Russian Ministry of Justice 
was also signed during the visit, but there was virtually no 
public mention of it. 
 
NORWEGIANS TREAD CAREFULLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) In a briefing to resident Ambassadors on April 3, PM 
Stoltenberg's National Security Adviser Ingvard Havnen said 
they had raised human rights with Fradkov, specifically the 
situation in Belarus.  Havnen said Fradkov completely 
dismissed the West's claim that the election was a fraud, 
rejected calls for sanctions, and instead asserted that it 
had been a democratic election.  When several Ambassadors 
asked if Stoltenberg had raised human rights concerns in 
Chechnya, or within Russia, Havnen timidly said no. 
 
NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS OUTWARDLY OPTIMISTIC, PRIVATELY LESS SO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) The positive spin given the visit reflects the 
center-left government's public line on relations with 
Russia.   We repeatedly hear that bilateral relations have 
never been better and that the Moscow is treating Oslo as a 
genuine partner.  True, there is evidence that Norway's 
engagement is paying some dividends.  Bilateral trade 
turnover increased by 66 percent in 2005 (with trade in 
seafood alone worth $533 million), Russian students are 
increasing enrollment at Norwegian Universities, and at least 
 
OSLO 00000406  002 OF 002 
 
 
one Norwegian energy company will likely take a stake in the 
Shtokman project. 
 
¶7.  (C) However, there are clear difficulties with the 
partnership.  Despite some hoopla and hope several weeks ago 
that Fradkov might give a signal of real progress on the 
border talks, his comments suggest Moscow has not moved off 
its old positions.  Privately, MFA officials have told us 
that there is little chance that Russia will agree to 
Norway's median line approach and that Oslo will (eventually) 
have to cut the best deal it can get.  There was also no real 
movement on Russia's seafood ban, which has now dragged on 
for three months with no end in sight.  While Russian 
scientists are in Norway this week visiting aquaculture 
sites, Norwegian firms are scrambling to find substitute 
seafood products, like frozen fish, to maintain their 
half-billion dollar share of Russia's growing import market. 
Finally, as the Elektron fishing trawler incident and 
subsequent protests over Norway's continued fishing vessel 
inspections show, the Russians have not budged in opposing 
the Norwegian position on Svalbard. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) The Russians seem to be in no hurry to resolve some 
fundamental old differences with Norway, like the maritime 
border issue.  Nor do the Russians hesitate to create new 
difficulties, like the fresh seafood ban, when it suits their 
interests.  The Russians will no doubt continue to engage 
with Norway on these and other leading issues, but the 
relationship is clearly imbalanced.  The Norwegians need 
movement on the Russian side to resolve some issues that are 
central to their interests, e.g. fully developing High North 
energy, maintaining seafood exports, protecting the Arctic 
environment, while Moscow appears to view these issues as 
more peripheral. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The center-left coalition keeps casting the most 
positive light possible on the relationship, noting the 
unprecedented number of high-level visits by ministers of 
each country over the past several months.  And, indeed 
bilateral relations and interaction have improved 
substantially in recent years, but the government eventually 
will have to demonstrate real substantive progress to 
maintain the public line.  An editorial in Norway's newspaper 
of record, Aftenposten, has already called into question what 
Norway is really getting out of the relationship, suggesting 
that the media is not fully buying the government's spin. 
The difficulty is that Oslo has little real leverage over 
Moscow to compel progress on the central issues.  The 
Russians can continue to sit back, engaging when it suits 
them (like on developing Shtokman, where they have a genuine 
need for Norwegian offshore petroleum technology), and 
letting other difficult issues fester.  The imbalance poses a 
special risk for Norway's High North agenda, every aspect of 
which (energy, economic development, the environment, and 
security) is tied to its relationship with Russia.  For 
Norway to pursue this agenda effectively, it must maintain 
good relations with the Russian bear. 
 
¶10.  (C)  For better or worse, Russia is a necessary partner, 
albeit a difficult one, for Norway in the High North.  This 
partially explains Norway's eagerness to engage us and 
European powers on the High North, as we can supply the only 
real effective counterbalance to Russian power in the region 
on the most contentious issues.  The underlying reality, not 
publicly voiced, is that Norwegian officialdom is quite 
anxious about Russia's future direction.  While they all hope 
for the best, Norwegians remain unsettled by what could 
happen if things turn for the worst.  In fact, those within 
the Norwegian establishment that most support NATO and strong 
relations with us do so in part out of lingering fear that 
Norway could end up with an unstable and potentially 
threatening neighbor once again. 
 
 
Visit Oslo's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m 
 
WHITNEY