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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA863, THE GLOVES ARE OFF -- MONTEALEGRE TO RUN ON OWN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA863 2006-04-19 22:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0020
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0863/01 1092219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192219Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6025
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0626
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL EAID KCOR PHUM
SUBJECT: THE GLOVES ARE OFF -- MONTEALEGRE TO RUN ON OWN 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0854 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Now that it is clear that the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) will neither participate in 
multi-party primaries nor sideline Arnoldo Aleman (reftel), 
Eduardo Montealegre and his National Liberal 
Alliance-Conservative Party (ALN-PC) are determined to run on 
their own.  In Ambassador's April 18 meeting with Montealegre 
and his senior leadership, and in comments to the media 
following the event, the Ambassador noted that the ALN-PC is 
the only party that fully supports multi-party primaries and 
reiterated that the U.S. cannot maintain positive relations 
with a PLC under Aleman's control.  Montealegre dispelled PLC 
assertions that he has designated himself as his alliance's 
candidate, noting that over 150,000 affiliates and alliance 
party members have formally endorsed him.  While he has 
developed political machinery and performs well in the polls, 
Montealegre will need a concerted, generously financed 
campaign to effectively convey his message to Nicaraguans and 
turn his popular support into votes on Election Day.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
EDUARDO GOES IT ALONE 
- - - - - - - - - -- 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador and Emboffs met on April 18 with ALN-PC 
presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre and his senior 
leadership as part of Embassy's effort to encourage 
multi-party primaries.  Among Montealegre's 22 supporters 
were Mario Rappaciolli and Alejandro Bolanos (PC); Salvador 
Talavera (Partido Resistencia Nicaraguense, or PRN); Eliseo 
Nunez (Movimiento Salvacion Liberal, or MSL); Roberto Urroz 
(Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense, or MDN); Indalecio 
Rodriguez and Oscar Sobalvarro, otherwise known as Comandante 
Ruben (PLI); Jose Esteban Gonzalez (Partido Social Cristiano, 
or PSC); and Assembly Deputies Maria Eugenia Sequeira, 
Yamileth Bonilla. 
 
3.  (C) Appreciative of the Ambassador's visit and our offer 
to support multi-party primaries, Montealegre welcomed the 
Ambassador to his new, freshly painted headquarters. 
Montealegre repeated his willingness to compete against Rizo 
if Aleman were to step aside, noting that an alliance with 
the PLC under Aleman's control is untenable, as it would 
damage the ALN-PC and Nicaragua.  At this juncture, a 
four-way race is inevitable and the best option to win the 
November election, he said.  Although the task ahead is 
difficult, "a war of nerves," Montealegre was confident he is 
up to the challenge so long as he focuses on the main 
objective - the needs and aspirations of the Nicaraguan 
people. 
 
FOUR-WAY RACE GOOD FOR DEMOCRACY, ROUGH ON THE NERVES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C) Ambassador concurred that a four-way race is in the 
cards, jesting that, while tough on the nerves, such a 
competition is probably healthier for Nicaragua's democracy. 
He added that this election poses a double challenge, the 
struggle between democracy and the FSLN and the competition 
between anti-Pact and pro-Pact parties.  Referring to the 
Department's statement on Nicaragua, the Ambassador assured 
Montealegre that the U.S. stands firm vis a vis its position 
on Aleman and the PLC.  (Note: Press coverage of the 
Department's statement was ample, generating several 
questions for the press availability following the 
Ambassador's meeting.  The statement was reprinted in full by 
national dailies and gossip magazines and read on several 
nation-wide radio and television stations.  While some 
outlets heralded the statement as another sign the USG will 
not support the PLC, others termed it another sign of U.S. 
interventionism.) 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador also reiterated the U.S. commitment to 
helping Nicaragua hold clean, fair, transparent, and 
inclusive elections, informing the group  that the 
international community is well underway in its preparations 
for observation.  He shared that the OAS observation team 
will arrive next week and will remain in Nicaragua until 
January.  He explained that the USG is contributing USD 2.5 
million to the OAS efforts and millions more to assist 
domestic observation and voter education, and to provide 
technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). 
 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR FRIENDS 
- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - 
 
6.  (C) Endorsing his party's support for Montealegre, PC 
leader Mario Rappaciolli recounted that the Conservatives had 
erred by running on their own in the 1996 and 2001 national 
elections.  They had fared miserably and now realize that 
they must unite with other parties for the sake of economic 
and democratic stability.  To Rappaciolli, the PLC is no 
longer an option, as it is a party held hostage by one 
family.  Nicaraguans have reached a fork in the road and must 
now choose to move forward or to continue along the current 
ineffective path.  Lauding the Department's April 18 
statement on Nicaragua, which reiterates the Ambassador's 
call on the PLC to distance itself from Aleman and to compete 
in open multi-party primaries, Rappaciolli asserted that U.S. 
opinion counts in Nicaragua and our help can bolster 
Montealegre's chances to win in November. 
 
7.  (C) Rappaciolli offered that high voter turnout will work 
in Montealegre's favor, asserting that at least 60 percent of 
"independent" voters will choose Montealegre if they are 
ultimately motivated to vote.  He added that the parties 
supporting Montealegre combined garnered 19% of the 2004 
municipal election votes, a significant number.  (Note: 
Rappaciolli's estimate includes votes for APRE, an alliance 
that the PC belonged to until 2005.  The rest of APRE is 
currently divided between supporting the PLC and ALN-PC, 
though APRE's official leadership has clearly tilted towards 
the PLC.  End Note.)  Fellow Conservative Alejandro Bolanos 
(President Bolanos' nephew) emphasized the need to change 
Nicaragua's culture of fear.  Many Nicaraguans customarily 
vote against the Sandinistas and Daniel Ortega rather than 
voting for a better future, he explained, asserting that 
Nicaragua's culture of fear has actually strengthened the 
FSLN.  The moment has arrived for Nicaraguans to transform 
this fear into a vote for c 
hange, Montealegre, concluded Bolanos. 
 
RESISTANCE: PLEASE DON'T ABANDON US MID-STREAM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - -  - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C)  Salvador Talavera (PRN) emphasized his goal to 
consolidate Nicaragua's numerous Resistance groups to rally 
around Montealegre.  He echoed Rappaciolli's call for U.S. 
support, noting that some of the many Resistance groups 
hesitate to endorse Montealegre because they fear the U.S. 
will flinch and support the PLC as the November nears.  The 
State Department's statement and the Ambassador's visit to 
ALN headquarters have assuaged some of this fear, he said, 
adding that two more Resistance groups may join Montealegre 
next week.  According to Talavera, the PRN is the main 
Resistance party and contains two factions, one under 
Comandante Ruben, and the other under Popo Chamorro.  A 
number of sub-groups are affiliated with these factions. 
 
9.  (C)  According to PLI/Resistance member Indalecio 
Rodriguez, Nicaragua's new political leaders must seek full 
democracy for its people.  The PLI had endorsed Montealegre 
in his 1,500-member convention on September 4, 2005 and 
ratified its support last week, he said.  He explained that 
PLI's support for Montealegre is based on common principles: 
anti-autocracy, anti-FSLN (who he termed false Robin Hoods), 
and anti-corruption.  Roberto Urroz (MDN) recounted his 
party's long struggle for democracy, first against Somoza, 
then the FSLN, and now against the FSLN-PLC Pact.  He 
justified MDN's support for Montealegre because he is the 
candidate best suited to lead Nicaragua forward by breaking 
the pact and reducing poverty and corruption. 
 
10.  (C)  PLI colleague Comandante Ruben asserted that the 
Resistance still has a role to play, noting that many 
Resistance members who have supported the PLC at the 
municipal level in the past are disillusioned and willing to 
support Montealegre.  For the Resistance, it is especially 
hard to accept that after 16 years of democracy and so much 
sacrifice, the Liberals have surrendered space to the FSLN to 
protect Aleman.  Now more than ever, U.S. support will be 
determinate in the November election. 
 
UNIONS SUPPORT EDUARDO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (C) According to PSC leader Jose Esteban Gonzalez, 
Montealegre is attracting considerable support from 
Nicaragua's non-Sandinista unions.  He shared that a number 
of these unions will soon publicly endorse Montealegre. 
(Comment:  In a recent poll, Montealegre attracted 
considerable support from working class respondents.  End 
Comment.) 
 
MSL LENDS ITS CASILLA, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES WITH PLC 
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12.  (C)  MSL leader Carlos Garcia, a former president of the 
PLC, explained his party's support for Montealegre and its 
decision to lend Montealegre its spot (casilla) on the 
ballot.  According to Garcia, the MSL broke ranks with the 
PLC in 1998 in opposition to PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman's 
corruption and his decision to forge a pact with Daniel 
Ortega.  He announced that the MSL will formally select 
Eduardo Montealegre as its presidential candidate in its 
convention on April 23. 
 
MONTEALEGRE: MY CANDIDACY IS MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN RIZO'S 
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13.  (C) Replying to Ambassador's comment that the PLC cites 
its presidential convention as evidence that Rizo is a 
democratically elected candidate while Montealegre is not, 
Montealegre noted that three of the four official parties in 
his alliance have already held conventions to select him as 
their candidate.  The fourth party, the PC, will hold a 
convention on April 30.  Further, all of the 148,000 or so 
members of his movement Vamos con Eduardo have endorsed him 
in writing.  While some 400 or so PLC conventioneers voted 
for Rizo, he enjoys the official support of over 150,000, 
argued Montealegre.  Further, on May 14, Vamos con Eduardo 
affiliates will hold primaries to vote for National Assembly 
departmental deputies and the ALN-PC will also do a poll to 
verify the popularity of the candidates. 
 
DISPELLING THE PARTY MACHINERY MYTH 
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14.  (C) To Ambassador's query regarding the strength of 
Montealegre's political machinery, Montealegre replied that 
PLC claims that Montealegre lacks the machinery to defend his 
votes and win the election are bogus.  Montealegre said he 
has worked hard over the months to build his alliance and its 
large membership attests to his success.  In the Atlantic 
Coast election, for example, the ALN-PC had party monitors 
(fiscals) positioned in 95% of the polling stations. 
"Moreover, organizations don't win elections, rather 
candidates with the right messages do," argued Montealegre. 
 
A VOTE FOR RIZO IS A VOTE FOR ALEMAN 
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15.  (C) Her usual direct, succinct self, ALN-PC Assembly 
lawmaker Maria Eugenia Sequeira summed up the difference 
between Montealegre and Rizo: "A vote for Rizo is a vote for 
Aleman."  She asserted that Montealegre offers a new option 
not only for Nicaragua, but also for the region, as he 
represents an alternative to stem Latin America's rise in 
leftist leaders.  Colleague Yamileth Bonilla opined that the 
real challenge for Montealegre is to promote the vote, defend 
it, and monitor the CSE and its local offices to make sure 
the electoral process is fair and transparent.  She added 
that marketing the ALN-PC casilla will also be prove critical 
to Montealegre's success, noting that in the Atlantic Coast 
elections, many voters who supported Montealegre were 
confused whether they should mark casilla 1 (PLC) or casilla 
9 (ALN-PC) because the still associate him with the PLC. 
Marketing Montealegre and his casilla 9 as a new political 
product requires substantial resources, said Bonilla. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
16.  (C) In the latest CID-Gallup countrywide poll, taken 
after the PLC announced the selection of Jose Rizo as its 
presidential candidate, Eduardo Montealegre still leads the 
pack with 22 percent, followed by Herty Lewites (18%), Daniel 
Ortega (16%) and Rizo (13%).  Among those most likely to 
vote, Montealegre's percentage stands at 26%, followed by 
Ortega (20%), Lewites (18%), and Rizo (17%).  Montealegre 
offers voters the best option to move Nicaragua along a 
democratic, just, and prosperous future.  While he has 
developed political machinery and performs well in the polls, 
Montealegre will need a concerted, generously financed 
campaign to effectively convey his message to Nicaraguans and 
turn his popular support into votes on Election Day.  To this 
end, he requires the support of local, regional, and U.S. 
capital. 
TRIVELLI